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A country’s welfare system can have a profound impact on the housing security of its citizens. 
Welfare systems which include adequate provision of housing allowances can act as a ‘buffer’ 
that prevents an automatic association between persistent low-income, or a sudden loss of 
income, and loss of housing. In the UK, Universal Credit (UC) has been rolling out gradually 
since 2013 to replace six working-age means-tested benefits with a single payment. This 
represents a major change to the welfare system, and its design of long wait periods, 
increased conditionality and direct payments has led to concerns over housing security 
impacts.  
Using quantitative research methods, this thesis exploits cross-area variation in the timing 
of UC rollout (arising from the fact that it was introduced in different areas at different times 
– a form of natural experiment) in order to measure its impacts on housing insecurity. This 
is carried out by linking data on the timing of UC rollout (at the local authority level) with 
panel data from administrative/survey datasets on housing insecurity indicators over time. 
Housing insecurity for financial reasons can occur in four, increasingly severe, stages: (1) 
difficulties meeting rent payments, (2) build up of rent arrears, (3) legal repossession actions 
by landlord, and (4) threatened or actual homelessness. This thesis involves four separate 
empirical studies, with each making use of different data sources to examine UC’s impact 
on different indicators and stages of insecurity. Empirical studies 1 and 2 are fixed effects 
panel designs examining the impact of UC rollout, respectively, on rates of landlord 
repossession actions, and advice sought from Citizens Advice on rent arrears/homelessness 
issues, within English local authorities. Empirical study 3, which is also a fixed effects panel 
design, examines the impact of UC rollout on rates of ‘Housing Options’ approaches and 
official homelessness claims within Scottish local authorities. Finally, empirical study 4 is a 
difference-in-differences analysis of data from the ‘Understanding Society’ survey, 
examining the impact of UC rollout on household financial problems.     
Overall, the results suggest that, up to 2019, UC rollout was associated with increases in 
rates of household problems paying for housing/bills/council tax payments, rent arrears 
advice issues, landlord repossession actions and ‘Housing Options’ approaches. Taken 
together, these results provide a robust indication that UC rollout has weakened the UK 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Welfare Reform, Universal Credit and Housing Insecurity 
 
The type of welfare system or welfare regime in place in a country plays an important role 
in the provision of housing security to its citizens. If a welfare system provides housing 
allowances that adequately reduce/cover housing costs – or alternatively, provides below-
cost rents through social housing – then this will limit the extent to which sudden income 
shocks (e.g. job loss) or longer-term labour market precarity (e.g. low-paid, low hours or 
insecure employment) automatically result in loss of housing (Stephens and Fitzpatrick, 
2007; Stephens, Fitzpatrick, Elsinga et al., 2010).  
In the UK specifically, both social housing and housing allowances via the welfare system 
are targeted at low-income households to help with the management of housing costs. This 
system is said to play a significant role in protecting households against eviction for financial 
reasons, and to provide a safety net for those whose housing security might otherwise be 
threatened because of their economic status (Pleace and Hunter, 2018, p. 336). However, 
since the 1980s access to social housing has become more restricted, with a marked shift 
away from ‘producer subsidies’ for “bricks and mortar” (i.e. central housing subsidies to 
local government) towards ‘consumer subsidies’ (i.e. rent allowances via Housing Benefit 
and Local Housing Allowance) (Lund, 2017). At the same time, welfare reforms in the UK 
in recent decades (for unemployment benefits in particular but also more broadly) have 
sought to reduce the value of social security benefits and make them more conditional on 
claimants meeting certain behavioural requirements, with a particular emphasis on ‘active 
labour market policies’ (ALMPs) (Kenway, 2009; Hamilton, 2014; Millar, 2018; Watts and 
Fitzpatrick, 2018).  
The latest key development in UK welfare reform is the introduction of Universal Credit 
(UC). UC has been gradually rolling out to overhaul the UK’s working-age means-tested 
benefit system by replacing six previous benefits (income-based Jobseekers Allowance, 
income-related Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, Working Tax Credit, 
Child Tax Credit and Housing Benefit - now referred to as ‘legacy’ benefits) with a single 
UC payment. The key principles that motivated the UC reform were: (a) to simplify the 
welfare system, (b) to improve financial work incentives, (c) to increase conditionality, (d) 
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to make claiming welfare as ‘like work’ as possible (via a contract-like ‘Claimant 
Commitment’ and salary-like payment system), and (e) to better match up with the UK’s 
flexible labour market (see Department for Work and Pensions [DWP] 2010a; Millar and 
Bennett, 2017). Through implementing these principles, UC sought to improve employment 
outcomes by tackling what was perceived to be a ‘culture of worklessness’ and ‘welfare 
dependency’, with the legacy benefits system said to ‘trap’ people in poverty and 
dependency by failing to incentivise work (see Brewer, Browne and Jin, 2011, pp. 49-50; 
Patrick, 2017, p. 36). 
The rollout of UC to date has generated a great deal of controversy. In particular, the 
government have been criticised for having a single-minded focus on improving 
employment outcomes at all costs, for dismissing any evidence of claimant hardship, and for 
failing to work with others to establish an evidence base on UC’s impacts (Alston, 2018; 
National Audit Office, 2018). Empirical literature on the impacts of UC has provided mixed 
evidence on UC’s labour market impacts (Department for Work and Pensions, 2017a; 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2018b), but has tended to consistently suggest it has had 
negative wider impacts on claimant hardship. For example, quantitative research examining 
the impacts of UC so far have suggested that its rollout has been associated with increased 
debt (Drake, 2017), food bank usage (Reeves and Loopstra, 2020), psychological distress 
(Wickham, Bentley, Rose et al., 2020), and crime linked to worsening financial conditions 
amongst claimants (d'Este and Harvey, 2020).  
With regards to UC’s impacts on housing insecurity, which is the focus of this thesis, the 
government initially set out how UC aimed to “simplify provision for rent support […] as 
much as possible, while protecting potentially vulnerable people from unintended 
consequences, such as getting into arrears or being made homeless” (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2010a). However, in stark contrast to this, housing and homelessness charities 
have raised concerns throughout UC’s rollout so far that it in fact puts claimants at greater 
risk of rent arrears, eviction and homelessness (e.g. see Crisis, 2017; Shelter, 2017). Such 
concerns have tended to be particularly linked to three of UC’s key design features. Firstly, 
unlike the legacy system where benefits tended to be paid fortnightly, UC is paid monthly 
in arrears in an attempt to mirror a salary in work. This means that it entails a long wait 
period – typically around five weeks – between initially making a claim and receiving the 
first payment, and as a result claimants with limited savings to fall back on will have no 
income to meet housing costs during this period (Shelter, 2017). Secondly, UC significantly 
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extends and intensifies the use of benefit sanctions to reduce or stop benefit payments for 
those deemed to have failed to comply with their Claimant Commitment. This establishes a 
new “ubiquitous conditionality” (Dwyer and Wright, 2014), and there is concern that 
claimants struggle to meet housing costs when their benefit payments are reduced by 
sanctions (Beatty, Foden, McCarthy et al., 2015, p. 35). Thirdly, UC involves direct 
payments, i.e. UC payments are paid directly into a claimant’s own bank account. This can 
lead to difficulties meeting housing costs amongst those who prioritise other essential or 
unexpected costs over rent, or amongst those who have limited budgeting skills e.g. young 
people without prior experience of managing a household budget (Britain Thinks, 2018; 
Homeless Link, 2018).  
To date, several empirical studies (e.g. Smith Institute, 2017; Batty, 2018; Cheetham, 
Moffatt and Addison, 2018; Wright, Dwyer, Jones et al., 2018) have been conducted that 
can provide insight into UC’s housing insecurity impacts, with evidence of some claimants 
struggling to meet rent payments, falling into arrears and facing repossession actions. 
However, these pieces of research have either been qualitative studies or small-scale 
quantitative studies limited to specific localities. As noted by National Audit Office (2018, 
p. 44), throughout the rollout of UC there has been a lack of robust, national-level 
quantitative analysis into its impacts on the ability of claimants to meet rent payments. This 
thesis seeks to address this, and contribute to existing literature, by providing a quantitative 
analysis into the impacts of UC rollout on housing insecurity.  
Universal Credit has been introduced gradually, and its rollout has varied across time and 
space. Both UC ‘Live Service’ (the early version of UC only available to the simplest types 
of claim – mostly for single unemployed people) and UC ‘Full Service’ (full version of UC 
available to all claimant types) were introduced in different local authority areas of the UK 
at different times. This cross-area variation in the timing of UC rollout can be exploited in 
order to measure its impacts, as it means UC can be treated as a form of ‘natural experiment’ 
i.e. a policy intervention that is not under the control of the researcher but that is amenable 
to research which exploits variation in exposure to the policy to analyse its impact (Craig, 
Cooper, Gunnell et al., 2010, p. 4). Consequently, the empirical analysis of this thesis, using 
quantitative research methods, exploits this cross-area variation in the timing of UC rollout 
in order to measure its impacts on housing insecurity. This is done by linking data on the 
timing of UC rollout (at the local authority level) with data on various indicators of housing 
insecurity over time.  
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Housing insecurity (at least, housing insecurity for financial reasons) tends to occur in four 
stages, with increasing severity of insecurity at each stage. First, if a household is 
experiencing financial hardship, they may struggle to afford their housing costs. Second, if 
this problem persists, this may lead to rent arrears building up. Next, if rent arrears cannot 
be paid off, the landlord will likely proceed with legal repossession actions to evict the tenant. 
Finally, if the landlord is successful in their attempts to repossess the property, then threat 
of or actual homelessness occurs. 
  
1.2 Thesis Aims and Objectives 
 
This thesis aims to provide insight into the impacts of Universal Credit rollout on each of 
the four stages of housing insecurity outlined in the above discussion. Specifically, the thesis 
aims to make use of panel data from administrative/survey datasets on various housing 
insecurity indicators (at various stages of insecurity) in order to examine whether there is 
evidence that UC rollout has led to an increase in household financial problems, rent arrears, 
repossession actions and threatened/actual homelessness in the UK. Based on this, the 
overarching objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
 
1. To apply causal modelling to provide robust empirical analysis into the impacts of 
Universal Credit rollout on the different stages of housing insecurity in the UK. 
 
2. To draw upon this empirical analysis in order to contribute to policy debates in the 
UK over the ongoing rollout of Universal Credit. 
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
  
This rest of this thesis is structured as follows. First, in the following chapter (Chapter 2), a 
review of Universal Credit as a policy is provided. In order to understand UC’s impacts, it 
is first important to understand the context in which UC arrived. Consequently, Chapter 2 
begins by setting out social security policy pre-Universal Credit, beginning with how the 
modern UK social security system was formed after the ‘Beveridge Report’ (1942) and then 
discussing how the system has changed subsequently, with particular emphasis on the pattern 
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of welfare reforms since the 1980s. Chapter 2 then provides an overview of Universal Credit, 
in terms of its structure, the motivating principles that led to the reform and shaped its design, 
and how the policy has rolled out since 2013.  
Next, Chapter 3 provides a detailed review of existing literature on the impacts of Universal 
Credit rollout so far. It begins by discussing the DWP’s focus on improving employment 
outcomes through the UC reform, and considers existing empirical evidence on this, which 
comes from the DWP’s own research as well as research by others. The chapter then goes 
on to review literature on UC’s wider impacts on forms of hardship that have not been 
considered by the DWP’s own research but have been by qualitative and quantitative studies 
by others. This includes outcomes such as mental health and wellbeing, incomes and debt, 
and food bank usage. Chapter 3 ends by introducing, in detail, the concept of housing 
insecurity, providing theory on how UC is likely to effect insecurity and reviewing existing 
empirical evidence on its impacts. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the data and methodological approach of the thesis’s 
empirical analysis. This begins by justifying the use of quantitative over qualitative research 
methods, whilst also describing how the research questions addressed are informed by (and 
interpreted in the context of) existing qualitative studies on UC’s housing insecurity impacts. 
The chapter then goes on to justify the use of secondary data for the analysis by making use 
of existing administrative/survey datasets. Next, it sets out how natural experimental studies 
can be a useful means of strengthening the causal inference of quantitative studies, and how 
this can be applied in the context of UC rollout. Chapter 4 ends by providing a summary of 
the thesis’s four empirical chapters in terms of the stages of housing insecurity examined, 
data sources used, and methods used to reduce any sources of bias.  
The empirical analysis chapters themselves are Chapters 5-8. Chapters 5 and 6 are both fixed 
effects panel designs using administrative data on housing insecurity indicators at the 
English local authority level. Specifically, Chapter 5 makes use of data from the Ministry of 
Justice on repossession actions to examine UC’s impacts on rates of landlord repossession 
claims, orders, warrants and bailiff repossessions (i.e. actual eviction). Meanwhile, Chapter 
6 makes use of advice trends data from Citizens Advice to examine UC’s impacts on rates 
of advice sought on rent arrears and homelessness related issues. It also disaggregates the 
rent arrears advice data into the social versus private sector, in order to examine whether 
UC’s impact varies by sector. Next, Chapter 7, also a fixed effects panel design but this time 
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at the Scottish local authority level, uses official homelessness data obtained from the 
Scottish Government to investigate UC’s impact on rates of homelessness claims and 
‘Housing Options’ approaches (i.e. approaches for the information and advice service used 
by local authorities in Scotland in attempt to prevent homelessness when a household 
approaches them with a housing problem). Finally, Chapter 8 is a difference-in-differences 
analysis of longitudinal data from the ‘Understanding Society’ survey, and examines UC’s 
impact on household financial problems (i.e. subjective financial problems and household 
level self-reported difficulties paying for housing/bills/council tax).  
The thesis ends with Chapter 9, which is the conclusion. It provides a concluding synthesis 
of the results of the empirical chapters, sets out how they contribute to ongoing debates over 
UC’s housing security impacts, and discusses their implications for UC claimants, for 








This chapter is a review of Universal Credit (UC) as a policy, in terms of the context of its 
arrival, its structure, the motivating principles behind it and the way in which it has rolled 
out. The chapter begins by providing an overview of social security policy in the UK pre-
UC (from the ‘Beveridge Report’ in the 1940s up to the policies of the Labour governments 
in the 2000s), as in order to understand the impacts of UC it is first important to understand 
the context in which it arrived. The chapter will then go on to provide a detailed account of 
the original motivating principles of the reform, and how the policy is designed to match 
these principles. Next, it will provide an overview of the structure of UC and how its 
payments are calculated.  Finally, the chapter will conclude by setting out how UC has been 
rolled out, with specific reference to the different phases of rollout and the pace at which 
claimants have moved onto UC in each phase. 
     
2.2 UK Social Security Policy Pre-Universal Credit 
 
2.2.1 The Beveridge Report and the “Classic Welfare State” (1940s-
1970s) 
 
In the UK, the modern social security system and welfare state more broadly were founded 
following the work of William Beveridge in the 1940s, whose ‘Beveridge Report’ (1942) 
set out his plans for social security. This included three key strands: (a) ‘national insurance 
benefits’, i.e. an insurance system in which contributions from workers, their employers and 
the government were used to replace any income lost through unemployment, ill-health, 
spousal bereavement or retirement; (b) ‘national assistance benefits’ i.e. means-tested 
government support for non-working people; and (c) ‘family allowances’ i.e. universal 
benefit for all families (Beveridge, 1942; Millar, 2018, pp. 39-40). This three-stranded 
system ran, with few significant changes, from 1945 to 1975. This is often viewed as the 
“classic welfare state” years (Macionis and Plummer, 2012, p. 339), which was based on the 
notion of community and collective caring, and embraced a Marshallian philosophy of 
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universal social rights, with social security being available for all citizens in times of need 
(Marshall, 1950; Daguerre and Etherington, 2014, pp. 10-11). Importantly, during this 
period there was a commitment to a mixed economy, and (outside of recessions and cyclical 
unemployment) ‘full employment’ was a key assumption. Unemployment was viewed as a 
short-term problem, with resultant income losses usually being replaced through the national 
insurance benefit system, although means-tested benefits were available for longer-term 
unemployed people and those without the required national insurance contributions 
(Macionis and Plummer, 2012, p. 339; Millar, 2018, p. 40). However, during this period the 
notion of ‘full employment’ had different implications than it does today. Whilst today’s 
welfare system assumes employment for almost everyone (notably women, including those 
with major care obligations, and many disabled people), Beveridge’s notion of ‘full 
employment’ has been criticised for its able-bodied male breadwinner model. It was based 
on the assumption that men would earn enough via employment to support families, with 
women being dependent on men (Maltby, Kennett and Rummery, 2008).     
 
2.2.2 Three Decades of Welfare Reform: Retrenchment, Conditionality 
and Active Labour Market Policy (1980s-2000s) 
 
Whilst the social security system outlined above had worked well in the 1950s and 1960s 
when there was near ‘full employment’ (at least based on the notion of ‘full employment’ at 
the time), it began to falter in the 1970s as the unemployment rate rose, increasing the role 
of the social security system in replacing lost income. In particular, the insurance-based 
system was not well-suited to rising unemployment as it excluded young people (who had 
not made national insurance contributions) and long-term unemployed people (who had used 
up all their contributions) (Millar, 2018, p. 40). Subsequently, the past 40 years have seen 
substantial changes to the UK’s social security system, shifting away from the character of 
the post second world war ‘social democratic’ system of universal social rights and shared 
responsibility for managing risk towards a more individualised, ‘liberal’ system whereby 
individual responsibility for managing risk is emphasised (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Macionis and Plummer, 2012, p. 339; Hamilton, 2014, p. 453). This shift began in the late 
1970s and 1980s, when rising unemployment became an important political issue. 
Politicians on the right began to increasingly use terms such as ‘welfare dependency’ and 
‘dependency culture’ in order to frame social security as problematic, based on the notion 
that benefits ‘trap’ people into dependency by encouraging laziness and discouraging 
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employment (Patrick, 2017, pp. 35-39; Millar, 2018, p. 41). Subsequently, the welfare 
reforms that have followed in the decades since have attempted to tackle this perceived 
‘welfare dependency’ through benefit retrenchment, conditionality and punitive ‘active 
labour market policies’ (ALMPs). Key reforms over time with regards to benefit 
retrenchment, conditionality and ALMPS are discussed in turn below.  
Firstly, with regards to benefit retrenchment, successive UK governments have attempted to 
‘make work pay’ by a combination of reducing the returns from social security benefits for 
unemployment and increasing the returns from work. According to Kenway (2009), relative 
to the average level of consumption, unemployment benefits steadily declined in the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s and in 2009 were worth only half of what they were worth in 1979, whereas 
in the previous 30 years before that (1948-1978) they maintained their value relative to 
average consumption. This decline began under the retrenchment initiatives of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative governments, whose strong anti-welfare narrative was backed up 
by significant reforms to unemployment benefits. In total, Atkinson and Mickelwright (1990, 
as cited in Pierson, 1994) identify at least seventeen reforms to unemployment benefits 
between 1979 and 1988, which in isolation were fairly modest changes but taken together 
had substantially unfavourable impacts on unemployment benefit claimants. Amongst these 
reforms, key changes included the taxation of unemployment benefits (enacted 1980), the 
end of the earnings-related component of unemployment benefit (enacted 1981), the 
abolition of child additions to unemployment benefit (enacted 1984) and the abolition of 
lower-rate benefits (enacted 1986) (see Pierson, 1994, p. 107; Bonoli, 2013, p. 106). 
However, perhaps the most important reason for the value of unemployment benefits 
declining, as noted by Kenway (2009, pp. 12-13) has been the switch in 1980 to uprating 
benefits in line with prices rather than earnings, as the decades that followed saw earnings 
grow faster than prices. This uprating policy was retained by the Conservative and New 
Labour governments of the 1990s and 2000s, effectively reducing the returns from social 
security benefits for unemployment, although, in terms of attempts to ‘make work pay’, New 
Labour did also enact some key policies to increase the returns from work and reduce barriers 
to employment, notably by introducing the National Minimum Wage, extending tax credits 
to increase the returns from low-paid employment, enhancing anti-discrimination legislation 
and extending childcare provision (Patrick, 2017, p. 44).  
With regards to conditionality, welfare conditionality is defined as policy which “links 
eligibility for collectively provided welfare benefits and services to recipients’ specified 
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compulsory responsibilities or particular patterns of behaviour […] with various sanctions 
for non-compliance” (Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018, p. 8). Conditionality is not a 
new feature of the UK welfare system, as benefits for unemployment have always been 
conditional on recipients looking for work and being available for work (Ibid, p. 9). However, 
as noted by Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018, p. 1), recent decades have seen a radical shift in the 
UK and other western welfare systems towards increasingly conditional forms of welfare. 
They characterise this as a shift away from a system that protects individuals from risk 
associated with market forces, and towards a system that uses the welfare system as a lever 
for changing behaviour. This shift arguably began under the successive Conservative 
governments of 1979-1997, whose social security reforms led to a “stricter benefit regime” 
from the late 1980s and ultimately to the introduction of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) in 
1996 (Watts, Fitzpatrick, Bramley et al., 2014, p. 3). Importantly, JSA introduced a 
‘Jobseekers Agreement’ setting out requirements for claimants and giving new powers to 
advisers, who could – under threat of benefit withdrawal for non-compliance – compel  
claimants to alter their behaviour if they felt it was damaging their chances of gaining 
employment (Dwyer, 2016). The Labour Governments that followed from 1997-2010 
largely embraced the monitoring of claimants job search behaviour and use of sanctions, and 
expanded them further via mandatory ‘Work-Focused Interviews’ for JSA claimants, and by 
extending conditionality to previously exempt groups e.g. lone parents and some sick and 
disabled people (Watts, Fitzpatrick, Bramley et al., 2014; Dwyer, 2016).  
Finally, with regards to ALMPs, this label is used to describe a wide range of social policies, 
which can make discussions of ALMPs ambiguous and confusing. In order to address this, 
Bonoli (2010) provides a typology of four different types of ALMPs. These are set out in 
Table 2.1. Under this typology, many of the welfare reforms in the UK since the 1980s that 
have already been discussed – benefit retrenchment, conditionality, sanctions and tax credits 
– are considered as incentive reinforcement forms of ALMP. However, employment 
assistance has also been an important part of active labour market policy in the UK, 
especially since the 1990s. In particular, ALMP in the form of incentive reinforcement policy 
combined with employment assistance policy became a “high profile and highly publicised 
area of government policy” under the Labour governments of 1997-2010 via their New Deal 
programmes for young and long-term unemployed people (Bonoli, 2013). With a strong 
emphasis on both the right to real training/employment opportunities and the responsibility 
to take up these opportunities, the New Deal programmes involved a combination of work 
incentives, compulsory training, and compulsory work-related programmes, with 
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punishment through sanctions for non-compliance (Daguerre and Etherington, 2014, p. 20). 
For example, the New Deal for Young People entailed intensive work search assistance for 
those in the first four months of unemployment, followed by compulsory entering of either: 
(a) subsidised employment (in public or private sector), (b) education or training, or (c) self-
employment (Ibid). This punitive approach, which combines intensive job searches and 
work placements with sanctions is considered an extreme form of ALMP, and is often 
referred to as the “workfare approach” (Bonoli, 2010, p. 439).        
Table 2.1. Four Different Types of ALMPs. 
ALMP Type Objective Examples 
Incentive reinforcement To strengthen work incentives 
for benefit claimants 
• Benefit retrenchment 
• Conditionality 
• Sanctions 
• Tax Credits  
• Other in-work benefits 
Employment Assistance To encourage re-entry to the 
labour market by removing 
barriers to employment 
• Placement services 
• Job subsidies 
• Job search programmes 
• Counselling 
• Childcare funding  
Occupation To prevent human capital from 
depleting by keeping 
jobseekers occupied 




Upskilling To provide opportunities for 
training to boost skills for 
employment 
• Vocational training  
Source: adapted from Bonoli (2010). 
 
This type of ALMP and workfare approach was continued under the Coalition Government 
after they came into power in 2010, primarily through its flagship welfare to work 
programme ‘The Work Programme’ (WP). The WP was in place from 2011-2017 to replace 
the previous New Labour’s New Deal, Flexible New Deal and Employment Zones. It aimed 
to get long-term unemployed people into work by matching benefit claimants with ‘provider’ 
employers, who were given financial incentives for achieving long-term job outcomes for 
claimants. Importantly, participation in the WP was mandatory for long-term Jobseekers 
Allowance claimants, meaning that it had an impact on sanctions as people were sanctioned 
for non-compliance. The WP, alongside other programmes include ‘Mandatory Work 
Activity’, ‘Work Trials’ and ‘Sector Based Academies’ expanded the proportion of 
claimants who were subject to welfare-to-work activation measures, and meant that for the 
first time, many lone parents and disabled people were mandated to participate if they had 
been (re)categorised as capable of waged work or preparation for waged work (Wiggan, 
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2015, p. 370). However, the WP was replaced by ‘The Work and Health Programme’ in 
2017, which was a smaller programme and was available on a voluntary basis.  
 
2.2.3 Housing Subsidies Within the Social Security System Pre-
Universal Credit 
 
Whilst sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. primarily focussed on social security benefits related to the 
labour market (unemployment benefits and in-work tax credits etc.), it is also important to 
outline UK social security policy pre-UC relating to housing subsidies, given that housing 
security is the outcome of interest in this thesis.  
In the UK, under the initial years of the post-war welfare state – between 1945 and 1972 – 
rented housing was made more affordable via a combination of rent controls in the private 
rented sector and ‘producer subsidies’ (i.e. central subsidies to local government) for the 
social rented sector  (Lund, 2017, pp. 136-137). During this period, where UK governments 
were committed to the welfare state, there was mass construction of social housing – it grew 
to represent nearly a third of the overall housing stock and was largely seen as providing for 
working families and ex-servicemen (Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 2014; Stephens, 2019).  
However, into the 1970s social housing became more targeted at disadvantaged households 
(Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 2014), and following the 1972 Housing Finance Act there was a 
shift away from rent controls and ‘producer subsidies’ towards a ‘consumer subsidies’ 
system, whereby housing was subsidised through national rent rebates for tenants in the 
social rented sector and rent allowances for tenants in the private rented sector (Lund, 2011 
pp. 131-132). Subsequently, these have been replaced by Housing Benefit (HB) from 1983 
and then, for those in the private rented sector, Local Housing Allowance (LHA) from 2008. 
Importantly, in the late 1980s, the UK housing market was effectively deregulated via the 
Housing Act in 1988 and Local Government and Housing Act 1989, which allowed all rents 
to increase to market levels (by decontrolling private landlord lettings and reducing central 
government grants to housing associations), leaving HB to support low-income households 
and protect against eviction (see Lund, 2017, p. 137; Pleace and Hunter, 2018, pp. 334-336). 
The basic principle of both HB and LHA is that paying for housing costs should not reduce 
a household’s income below set ‘Income Support levels’ (Lund, 2017, p. 137). Consequently, 
so called ‘requirements’ are set based on these levels, and HB/LHA pays all of the rent if 
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‘requirements’ match income, tapering off (e.g. at 63p since 2016) for each additional £1 
increase in income (Ibid, p. 138). 
 
2.2.4 Benefits Limits/Freeze (2013-2020) 
 
A final important part of the social security context before and during UC rollout is policy 
to limit/freeze working-age benefit payments. Most working-age benefits in the UK had their 
annual increases limited to 1% for three years from 2013-14 to 2015-16, before then 
undergoing a four-year freeze from 2016/17 to 2019-20 (after which the usual system of 
uprating in line with inflation resumed) (McInnes, 2020, p. 6). The rationale for this was to 
“ensure that is always pays to work” (HM Treasury, 2015, p. 37), and it represented a major 
erosion to the social security safety net (Resolution Foundation, 2019). It has had 
implications for poverty and housing insecurity (Barnard, 2019), and as such is an important 
part of the context of housing insecurity during the period of UC rollout that is the focus of 
this thesis.   
 
2.3 Motivating Principles of Universal Credit Reform 
 
Universal Credit has been gradually rolling out since 2013 to overhaul the previous legacy 
welfare system, and whilst section 2.2 set out the general direction of welfare reform prior 
to UC rollout, this section discusses the specific origins of UC.  
The motivation for, and roots of, the UC reform can be traced back to the work of the Centre 
for Social Justice (CSJ), a think tank set up in 2004 by Iain Duncan Smith who would later 
become the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. Through their ‘Breakthrough Britain’ 
report (see Centre for Social Justice, 2007), CSJ claimed to have identified the five primary 
“pathways to poverty” as: (1) economic dependency and worklessness, (2) family 
breakdown, (3) educational failure, (4) drug and alcohol addiction, and (5) serious personal 
debt. According to the CSJ, the UK’s legacy benefit system played a key role in facilitating 
these pathways to poverty. They viewed welfare spending under the legacy system as 
excessive, poorly monitored and as facilitating poverty and intergenerational unemployment, 
setting out how “our benefit system is broken. Although it alleviates financial hardship, it 
[…] traps millions in worklessness and dependency, often over several generations” (Centre 
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for Social Justice, 2009, p. 14). However, as noted by Gordon (2018) there was no evidence 
of any analytical methodology in CSJ’s identification of poverty pathways, and there is a 
lack of scientific basis for their claims, with no other researchers having ever identified these 
same five factors as key to poverty causation. Moreover, subsequent research by Shildrick, 
MacDonald, Furlong et al. (2012) found little evidence of the existence of intergenerational 
cultures of worklessness in the UK. Despite this, the CSJ’s work became highly influential 
to the social policy agenda of the Coalition Government (2010-2015). In particular, the 
notions of welfare dependency and intergenerational cultures of worklessness were key to 
the rationale for the UC reform. The 2010 white paper making the case for UC – entitled 
‘Universal Credit: Welfare that Works’ – sets out how:  
 
Successive governments have ignored the need for fundamental welfare reform, not 
because they didn’t think that reform was needed but because they thought it too 
difficult to achieve. Instead of grasping the nettle, they watched as economic growth 
bypassed the worst off and welfare dependency took root in communities up and 
down the country, breeding hopelessness and intergenerational poverty. (Department 
for Work and Pensions, 2010a, p. 1).  
 
Going on, it asserts: 
 
A life on benefits is a poor substitute for a working life but too much of our current 
system is geared towards maintaining people on benefits rather than helping them to 
flourish in work; we need reform that tackles the underlying problem of welfare 
dependency. That is why we are embarking on the most far-reaching programme of 
change that the welfare system has witnessed in generations. (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2010a, p. 1).  
  
This notion of the need to tackle welfare dependency, and a sharp emphasis on the distinction 
between those in work (seen as ‘deserving’) and those on benefits (seen as ‘undeserving’) is 
not new, but in many ways is an extension and intensification of the narratives of the 
Conservative and Labour Governments of the past three decades (as discussed in section 2.2) 
(see Patrick, 2012; Wiggan, 2012). In terms of the actual aims and principles of the UC 
reform, some of these (e.g. conditionality and ‘making work pay’) are similar to those of 
previous government welfare policies, whilst others (e.g. making the welfare system more 
simple and flexible) are more novel. A list of the five key aims/principles of the UC reform 
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(herein referred to as UC’s ‘motivating principles’), which all aim to promote transition off 
benefits and into work, is provided below: 
 
1. Simplifying the Welfare System 
 
2. Improving Financial Work Incentives (i.e. ‘making work pay’) 
 
3. Extending and Intensifying Conditionality 
 
4. Making Welfare as ‘Like Work’ as Possible 
 
5. Modernising the Welfare System to match the UK’s Flexible Labour Market 
 
Sections 2.3.1-2.3.5 which follow discuss each of these five motivating principles in turn, in 
terms of why each has been important in the motivation for the reform, how the policy is 
designed to match the principle and any issues/problems that have arisen in reality to 
undermine them.  
 
2.3.1 Simplifying the Welfare System 
 
[Universal Credit] will cut through the complexity of the existing benefit system to 
make it easier for people to get the help they need, when they need it. (Department 
for Work and Pensions, 2010a, p. 1).  
    
The first UC motivating principle was to simplify the welfare system. Under the legacy 
system there were six different working-age means-tested benefits. These were paid in 
different intervals and withdrawn at different rates as earnings from work increased. They 
were also administered by three different government departments (out-of-work benefits by 
the DWP, in-work benefits by HMRC and Housing Benefit by local authorities), with many 
claimants being on different combinations of benefits at different times (Bennett, 2012).  
The Coalition Government argued that this complexity in the system they inherited led to: 
(a) higher administrative costs, (b) confusion over how to navigate the system, and (c) the 
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onerous task of submitting the same details multiple times to different administrative bodies 
if claiming multiple benefits. This was said to reduce trust in the system, make it harder for 
claimants to see if they will be better off in work, and to stop people from focussing on 
getting back to work (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a, p. 9).  
Universal Credit attempts to overcome these problems by creating a simpler welfare system. 
As noted by Bennett (2012), there are two key simplifying elements to UC. Firstly, replacing 
six working-age means-tested benefits with a single UC payment means that claimants only 
make one benefit claim to a single department (the DWP) rather than multiple claims to 
multiple departments. Secondly, UC’s single taper rate (as opposed to different benefits 
being withdrawn at different rates) as earnings rise was initially designed to make it easier 
for claimants to see how much financially better off they will be from taking on work. The 
combination of these two simplifying elements was projected by the government to reduce 
poverty by increasing benefit take up and allowing for a “smoother and simpler transition 
into work” (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a; Department for Work and Pensions, 
2017b). However, evidence to date suggests that UC has not reduced poverty, and evidence 
regarding its impact on improving transition into employment is mixed (Chapter 3 will 
provide a review of literature on the impacts of UC on various outcomes). However, as noted 
by Millar and Bennett (2017, pp. 169-170), the principle of simplifying the welfare system 
has been almost universally welcomed amongst service users and stakeholder organisations. 
 
2.3.2 Improving Financial Work Incentives (i.e. ‘making work pay’) 
 
Today’s Welfare Reform Bill will mean we move to just one core income-related 
benefit - a universal credit and one message - that it will always pay to work. Even 
if you just work a few hours at first, you’ll see the benefits in the money you keep. 
Say for example you’re on Jobseeker’s allowance and you have the chance to do a 
few hours work. Today after the first £5 you earn, you lose a pound of benefits for 
every extra pound you take home. But with the universal credit, you would keep 35p 
of benefit for every extra pound you take home. And because this rate of benefit 
withdrawal is the same whatever you earn - it’s easy to calculate just how much better 
off you will be. […] It’s simple. You don’t need a computer model to work it out any 
more. The more you work, the better off you will be. (Cameron, 2011). 
 
The above quote comes from (Prime Minister at the time) David Cameron’s speech to 
introduce UC via the Coalition Government’s Welfare Reform Bill in 2011. It conveys – 
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albeit in a simplified way (the process of calculating UC payments is still fairly complicated, 
involving a three-stage calculation process which will be set out in Section 2.4) – the second 
motivating principle behind UC, ‘making work pay’. As Cameron touches on, under the 
legacy system there was no incentive to take on ‘mini-jobs’ of just a few hours a week. This 
is because Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants could lose a pound of benefits for every extra 
pound earned from work up to the 16 hours per week Working Tax Credit entitlement 
threshold (Bennett, 2012, p. 3; Royston, 2017, pp. 165-166). Moreover, there was little 
incentive to work more hours than this 16 hours per week threshold as, though qualifying 
for Working Tax Credit provided a big income boost, taking on extra hours beyond the 16 
hours threshold did not provide much of a further income boost (Bennett, 2012, p. 3; Royston, 
2017, pp. 165-166).  
UC initially sought to overcome these problems through a combination of a single taper rate 
and the use of work allowances. The UC taper rate was initially 65% (hence Cameron’s 
reference to keeping 35p of benefit), and is currently 63%, meaning that UC payments are 
reduced by 63p for every extra pound earned from work above work allowances. However, 
UC’s work allowances allow claimants to earn up to a certain threshold before the taper rate 
kicks in. This means that 100% of UC payments are kept on top of extra earnings from work 
below the work allowance threshold.  
The extent to which UC does improve work incentives compared to the legacy system 
depends on the claimant’s number of hours worked and their household circumstances, with 
some groups gaining from the switch to UC and others losing out. UC has been effective in 
improving work incentives for ‘mini-jobs’ of less than 16 hours per week due to more 
generous withdrawal rates (Brewer, Finch and Tomlinson, 2017). However, UC continues 
to incentivise single parents to reduce working hours below 16 hours per week, and work 
allowances are only applied once per household, meaning that ‘second earners’ in a 
household have reduced work incentives (Finch and Gardiner, 2018). Given that both of 
these groups are more likely to be women, this has important gendered implications, and 
results in lower work incentives for women than men overall (see Bennett, 2012; MacDonald, 
2018). This undermines the ‘making work pay’ principle of UC as, whilst work incentives 
are improved for some groups under UC they are weakened for others (for a detailed 




2.3.3 Extending and Intensifying Conditionality 
 
Mutual responsibility is the vital ingredient of a strong, successful, compassionate 
welfare system. We need responsibility on the part of those who contribute to the 
system - government and taxpayers. And responsibility on the part of those who 
receive from the system. (Cameron, 2011). 
 
Universal Credit will make sure that work pays for benefit recipients. […] In return, 
we expect recipients to do everything that can reasonably be expected of them to find 
work or prepare for work in the future as a condition of receiving support. 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a, p. 25). 
 
We will introduce a ‘claimant commitment’ to clearly set out what is expected of 
each recipient. We will raise the requirements placed on some individuals and will 
introduce tougher sanctions to ensure recipients meet their responsibilities. 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a, p. 24).  
 
As set out in section 2.2., recent decades have seen a radical shift in the UK (and other 
western countries) towards more conditional forms of welfare. As indicated by the above 
quotes from the early years of Coalition Government, welfare conditionality has been 
extended and intensified further under UC, with a key motivating principle of UC being 
increasing the number of requirements placed on claimants and introducing harsher 
sanctions for non-compliance.  
Specifically, UC extends conditionality (for the first time) to those who are in work via 
mandatory job search conditions for low-paid workers to promote ‘progression’ (which can 
include taking on extra hours/multiple jobs) (Wright and Dwyer, 2020). This blurs the binary 
distinction between ‘deserving’ workers (‘hard working families’) and ‘undeserving’ benefit 
claimants (‘welfare dependents’), which has been used to frame many post 2010 welfare 
reforms, thus extending the stigmatising rhetoric of ‘welfare dependency’ to up to 1.2million 
workers (Bennett, 2012; Dwyer and Wright, 2014, p. 31; Patrick, 2017, p. 47).  
In addition, conditionality is also extended to more lone parents under UC, increasing the 
number of requirements they face through ‘Lone Parent Obligations’ (LPOs). Reforms to 
increase LPOs have been ongoing since 2008, but UC takes this further by compelling lone 
parents with children over one year old to attend work-focussed interviews and by abolishing 
some of the legacy system’s ‘lone parent flexibilities’ (Cain, 2015; Rafferty and Wiggan, 
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2017). Specifically, this includes: (a) no longer allowing lone parents to leave/refuse a job 
due to lack of affordable childcare, and (b) no longer allowing lone parents with children 
over 13 to restrict their work availability to school hours (Gingerbread, 2014 as cited in 
Rafferty and Wiggan, 2017, p. 516). As such, Rafferty and Wiggan (2017, p. 533) note that 
UC thoroughly incorporates lone parents into the supply of poor workers, removing the de-
commodifying protections that previously existed via the Income Support system.   
As well as extending conditionality to new groups, UC also intensifies its use in practice 
amongst groups for whom benefits were already conditional, through a greater number of 
work-related requirements and harsher sanctions for non-compliance. The specific rules 
regarding UC’s system of conditionality and sanctions for different groups of claimants is 
provided in Table 2.2. Compared to the legacy benefits system, this new system is said to 
represent a major intensification of conditionality and sanctions, establishing a new 
“ubiquitous conditionality” within the UK welfare system (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). This 
has been reflected in the rates of sanctioning under UC in its rollout so far, with analysis of 
sanction statistics suggesting that UC has much higher sanction rates than legacy benefits 
(Webster, 2019), although it can be difficult to make accurate comparisons (see Keen, 2018). 
Table 2.2 Conditionality and Sanctions Under Universal Credit. 




1) “Full Conditionality” Group: 
This is the default group for 
claimants, including lone parents 
and couples with older children 
Those in this group are required 
to do all they can to find a job or 
a higher paid job. This includes 
being available for work straight 
away, actively looking for work, 
applying for jobs, and attending 
interviews. There may also be a 
requirement to participate in 
mandatory work related activity 
and in welfare-to-work 
programmes.  
High Level Sanctions:  Applied to 
claimants in this group who fail to 
participate in mandatory work 
activity, fail to apply for/accept paid 
work, leave work voluntarily, lose a 
job via misconduct, or lose pay 
without good reason. They consist 
of sanctions of: (a) 13 weeks for first 
failure to comply, or (b) 26 weeks if 
have already had a high level 
sanction in past year. 
 
Medium Level Sanctions: Applied 
to claimants in this group who fail to 
be available for work or take all 
actions expected to get work. They 
consist of a 4 week sanction for first 
failure to comply and a 13 week 
sanction for any further failures. 
 
Low Level Sanctions: Applied to 
those in this group who fail to attend 
a meeting or meet a work-search 
requirement. They are fixed 
escalating sanctions, with benefit 
payments withheld until behaviour 
is corrected. Penalty periods last 7 
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Notes: high level sanctions could previously last up to three years, but this was phased out in 2019. Work 
searches and sanctions were temporarily suspended in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Sources: 
Department for Work and Pensions (2010a); Citizens Advice (2018). 
 
2.3.4 Making Welfare as ‘Like Work’ as Possible 
 
Another motivating principle behind the UC reform was to make claiming welfare benefits 
as ‘like work’ as possible, with UC said to “mirror the world of work” (Department for Work 
days for first sanction, 14 days for 
the second and 28 days for the third.    
2) “Work Preparation” Group: 
Claimants will be in this group if 
they are disabled or have a health 
condition which means they have 
limited capability to work at the 
current time. 
Those in this group are required 
to ‘take reasonable steps to 
prepare for work’. This includes 
CV writing, attendance of work 
experience or training, and 
attendance at work coach 
meetings. There is no 
requirement to actually search 
for or be available for work.  
Low Level Sanctions:  Outlined 
above – they can be applied to those 
in this group who fail to attend a 
meeting or comply with a work 
related requirement (e.g. failure to 
write a CV or attend CV writing 
workshop).   
3) “Keeping in Touch with the 
Labour Market” Group: 
Claimants will be in this group if 
they are a lone parent or lead carer 
in a couple with a child aged 1-5.  
Those in this group are required 
to attend regular interviews with 
their work coach to discuss 
preparations for future work. 
There is no requirement to look 
for or be available for work. 
Lowest Level Sanctions:  Applied 
to those who fail to attend jobcentre 
meetings without good cause. 
Consists of UC payments being 
reduced to a 40% rate until you 
attend an interview.  
4) “No Conditionality” Group: 
Claimants will be in this group if 
they are in one of the following 
categories: (a) have a 
disability/condition that prevents 
them from working or preparing 
for work; (b) are a lone parent/lead 
carer of a child under one; (c) have 
intensive and regular caring 
responsibilities; or (d) earn above 
the conditionality threshold. 
UC payments are unconditional 
(i.e. no work related 




and Pensions and Gauke, 2017). As set out by Millar and Bennett (2017, pp. 171-172), UC 
being ‘like work’ means two things: (a) in the same way that those in work must sign and 
adhere to their employment contract, UC claimants must sign and adhere to their ‘claimant 
commitment’, and (b) to reflect how wages are paid, UC payments are paid monthly in 
arrears and directly into the claimants own bank account. 
With regards to UC claimants signing a ‘claimant commitment’, this is nothing new as the 
contractualism of the ‘claimant commitment’ is markedly similar to that of the ‘Jobseekers 
Agreement’ under JSA. The only difference is that UC extends this contractualism to a 
greater number of groups (namely those in work, lone parents and disabled people), and 
compared to the legacy system has harsher sanctions for non-compliance (as discussed in 
section 2.3.3). In fact, benefit sanctions are harsher than any penalty you’d expect to receive 
for failing to meet requirements in an actual employment contract (Millar and Bennett, 2017, 
p. 171; Patrick, 2017, pp. 24-25). 
Whilst UC’s contractualism is similar to the JSA system, its reform to the benefit payment 
structure – i.e. the monthly direct payment in arrears system – does take the ‘like work’ 
principle further than before. Under the legacy system, benefits tended to be paid fortnightly, 
with Housing Benefit being paid to a claimant’s landlord rather than directly to the claimant 
(UK Government, 2018).The rationale for this new monthly direct payment in arrears design 
is that it will “help low-income households develop a greater responsibility for managing 
their household budget” and “ensure that they will be better prepared and more in control of 
their money when they […] move into work” (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012, p. 
38). Yet, it has been criticised for failing to fit with the pattern of how many low-income 
households manage their money (Bennett, 2012), and the assumption that monthly payments 
match pay from work is not true in reality given that only around half of people earning 
under £10,000 per year are paid monthly (Millar and Bennett, 2017). In addition, the switch 
to monthly arrears payments has created a long wait period (previously six weeks, now five) 
between households making a UC claim and receiving the first payment, whilst direct 
payments meant that help towards housing costs were no longer automatically paid to 
landlords. This has had considerable negative impacts, which are discussed in the review of 




2.3.5 Modernising the Welfare System to match the UK’s Flexible Labour 
Market 
 
The final motivating principle for the UC reform is to modernise the welfare system to match 
the UK’s flexible labour market. The UK labour market for much of the 20th century had 
seen firms (i.e. employers) seeking to attract and retain a high-quality loyal workforce whose 
skills improved over time – this maximised their productivity, but importantly also provided 
secure “jobs for life” for employees (Bender and Theodossiou, 2017, p. 2). However, 
flexibilization has occurred in recent decades, with technological advancements and 
globalisation resulting in what Bender and Theodossiou (2017, p. 1) describe as “a 
perception of a need for labour market flexibility enabling employers to respond to market 
pressures in order to respond to changing circumstances and to retain a competitive 
advantage in the face of global market pressures”. The policy response to this has been to 
deregulate labour markets in order to provide increased flexibility to employers to adjust 
their staff levels in response to fluctuations in demand (see Deakin and Reed, 2000; Bailey, 
2016, pp. 3-4). Consequently, the 21st century has seen a notable rise in the use of ‘flexible’ 
or ‘atypical’ forms of employment (see Taylor, 2017). This includes temporary work, zero-
hour contracts and low-paid self-employment, which often involve more variable and/or 
anti-social hours and lower levels of employment security, rights and protections (Trade 
Union Congress, 2016; Bailey, 2018, p. 159).  
On one hand, the UK’s flexible labour market, and increasing usage of flexible forms of 
employment, is said to boost business efficiency, and in 2015 was hailed by then Prime 
Minister David Cameron as key to the UK’s “jobs miracle”, whereby (despite being in 
recovery from the 2008 financial crisis) unemployment rates were kept at record low levels 
in the 2010s (as cited in Rubery, Keizer and Grimshaw, 2016, p. 235). On the other hand, 
there are concerns that the insecure forms of work promoted by the flexible labour market, 
which pass financial risks from firms onto workers and their families (see Standing, 2011; 
Rubery, Keizer and Grimshaw, 2016), are associated with adverse mental health outcomes 
(Bender and Theodossiou, 2017) as well as persistent levels of underemployment (see 
Rafferty and Wiggan, 2017; Taylor, 2017, p. 20) and in-work poverty (see Hick and Lanau, 
2017). 
When introducing UC, the Coalition government set out how they wanted to “create a 
welfare system that provides people with the confidence and security to play a full part in 
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society through a flexible labour market within a modern competitive economy” 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a, p. 12). In practice, as well as promoting the 
flexible labour market via conditionality – which supports flexibilisation by compelling UC 
claimants to actively search for and accept atypical and insecure forms of employment, thus 
increasing labour supply (Rafferty and Wiggan, 2017) – UC also promotes flexibilisation by 
implementing a new Real Time Information (RTI) system. RTI is designed to improve 
efficiency for those in atypical forms of employment by being more responsive to 
fluctuations in earnings. As such, payments are based on income in a specific monthly 
assessment period, with UC payments being automatically recalculated if earnings drop 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2016). This overcomes issues within the legacy system 
whereby workers whose hours fluctuated above and below the 16 hours per week threshold 
struggled to access benefits. However, it has led to new problems, with evidence of some 
claimants losing out on payments if their work payment date varies from month to month or 
if their employer inaccurately record their information in the RTI system (Citizens Advice 
Scotland, 2016).   
 
2.4 An Overview of Universal Credit’s Structure and How 
Payments are Calculated 
 
As previously intimated in section 2.3.1, unlike the legacy system it replaces, UC involves 
a single payment and is fully administered by the DWP. However, it is still made up of 
various different elements, with the UC child element, housing element and other additions 
potentially being added to the standard allowance depending on the claimant’s circumstances. 
Based on this, Table 2.3 provides an overview of the structure of UC, and how this compares 
to the structure of the six different benefits of the legacy system that it replaces.   
 
Table 2.3 An Overview of the Structure of Universal Credit and the Legacy System. 
Legacy System Universal Credit System 
 
Six legacy benefits: 
 
• Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance: 
for unemployed people 
 
• Income-related Employment and 
Support Allowance: for out-of-work 
disabled people   
 
 
One single benefit made up of the following 
elements: 
 
• Standard Allowances: standard amount 
for all UC recipients (amount varies 
depending on circumstances) 
 
• Child Element: additional amount for 




• Income Support: for out-of-work 
parents  
 
• Working Tax Credit: for topping up 
the incomes of those in low income 
employment (eligibility depends on 
number of hours worked, income and 
circumstances) 
 
• Child Tax Credit: for in-work and out-
of-work families with children 
 
• Housing Benefit: to providing support 
towards housing costs for tenants who 
are out-of-work or in work on a low 
income 
 
• Housing Element: additional amount to 
provide support towards housing costs 
(eligibility depends on age and 
circumstances)  
 
• Other Additions: other additional 
amounts are added for people with a 
disability/health condition or caring 
responsibilities 
 
Entitlement as income from employment rises: 
 
• Different legacy benefits withdrawn at 
different rates as claimants increase 
their earnings from employment 
 
 
Entitlement as income from employment rises: 
 
• UC withdrawn at taper rate of 63p for 
every £1 increase in earnings from 
employment. Taper rate only kicks in 
once claimants are earnings above a 
certain threshold (called their ‘work 
allowance’) 
 
Source: adapted from Finch (2015, p. 26) and Brewer, Joyce, Waters et al. (2019). 
 
As a result of having various different elements, the way in which a household’s UC payment 
is calculated involves a three stage-process. Firstly, claimants are given a standard monthly 
amount that varies based on their age and whether they are in a couple, with single people 
and those aged under 25 receiving lower amounts. Secondly, additional monthly amounts 
are added on if claimants have a disability/health condition, caring responsibilities and for 
additional support towards housing costs, children (limited to two children) and childcare. 
Third and finally, monthly adjustments are made based on the claimant’s income, earnings, 
capital, or if deductions or the benefit cap are applied. A detailed overview of this calculation 
process, and how much households will receive, is provided in Table 2.4.  
Importantly, the housing costs amount under Universal Credit is broadly the same as those 
under the legacy system. This is because in the short and medium term it is still calculated 
based on the existing LHA and HB systems (Webb, 2012, p. 9). This means that cuts to HB 
and LHA since 2011 – such as reducing the level of LHA from 50th to 30th percentile of 
market rents, the national cap on LHA/HB, and size criteria in social rented housing (see 





Table 2.4 How a Household’s Universal Credit Payment is Calculated, and How Much They 
Will Currently Receive. 
1) Standard Monthly 
Amount 
2) Additional Monthly 
Amounts 
 
3) Monthly Adjustments 
 
Single (aged under 25) 
 
• £256.05 (uplifted 





Single (aged 25+) 
 
• £323.22 (uplifted 





Couple (both under 25) 
 
• £401.92 (uplifted 





Couple (either or both aged 
25+) 
 
• £507.37 (uplifted 








• £281.25 (born before 6 
April 2017) or £235.83 
(born on/after 6 April 
2017) for first child 
 
• £235.83 for second child 
 
• £128.25 or £400.29 for 





• Up to £646.35 for one 
child 
 
• Up to £1,108.04 for 2 or 
more children 
 
Housing Costs Amount 
 
• Calculated broadly in 






• £128.25 if ‘limited 
capability for work’ 
(only applies if receiving 
benefit for the condition 
before 3 April 2017) 
 
• £341.92 if ‘limited 
capability for work and 




• £162.92 for providing 
full-time care for a 





• As set out in Table 2.3, 






• UC payments are 
adjusted based on capital 
(e.g. savings, investments 
or property) 
 
• Capital of <£6,000 
ignored 
 
• Capital of £6,000-
£16,000 reduces UC 
payments 
 
• Capital of >£16,000 




• UC is also withdrawn for 
other income sources e.g. 
pension, student income 




• Further deductions can be 
made for sanctions, 
repayments (for advances 
or overpayments) 
• The benefit cap caps the 
overall amount that a 
household can receive to 
£20,000 per year for 
couples/single parents (or 
£23,000 in Greater 
London), and £13,400 for 
single adults (or £15,410 
in Greater London)   
 
Notes: amounts are for 2020-2021. Standard monthly amounts were uplifted in March 2020 in response 
to the COVID pandemic – the amounts including the uplift are shown in brackets. At the time of writing, 
this uplift is due to end in September 2021. Sources: McInnes (2020); Department for Work and Pensions 





2.5 How Universal Credit Has Been Rolled Out 
 
UC has been rolling out gradually since 2013, in a staggered way (being introduced in 
different areas at different times) and using a “twin track” approach (Kennedy and Keen, 
2018, p. 8). This has been made up of the twin rollout of: (a) UC ‘Live Service’, which rolled 
out gradually between 2013 and 2016, becoming available to new benefit claims that were 
most simple to manage (typically claims from single, childless unemployed people), and (b) 
UC ‘Full Service’, which used an updated IT system and rolled out gradually between 2015 
and 2018, becoming available to all new claimants (National Audit Office, 2018, pp. 14-15).  
By the end of 2018, UC ‘Full Service’ had reached all Jobcentres in all UK local authorities, 
meaning that all new claims (and those on the legacy system with a change of circumstances) 
move onto UC. This process is known as “natural migration” (Kennedy and Keen, 2018, p. 
15). The process of transferring those still on legacy benefits who have not had a change of 
circumstances onto UC (known as the “managed migration” process) had been due to take 
place between 2019 and 2023, but the COVID-19 pandemic led to this being paused in March 
2020 whilst it was still being piloted (Work and Pension Committee, 2020, p. 20). 
Figure 2.1. Quarterly Number of People on UC, New Starts to UC and Households on UC 
with Housing Costs Support (2013-2018). 
 
Notes: the number of households on UC with housing costs support is measured on the second Thursday 
of the quarter’s middle month. People on UC is a cumulative measure of the total number of people 
currently on UC in the given quarter who have accepted their claimant commitment.  
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Figure 2.1 outlines, for England only, the quarterly pace of UC rollout (in terms of number 
of people on UC, new starts per quarter and households on UC with housing costs support) 
and key dates in the rollout schedule over time. It highlights how initially the number of 
people on UC increased slowly during ‘Live Service’ rollout as this was targeted at the 
simplest claims to manage. However, claimants began to move onto UC more rapidly during 
‘Full Service’ rollout, with over 1.2 million people in England being on UC by 2018 Q4.      
 
2.6 Concluding Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a review of Universal Credit as a policy, in terms of the context 
in which it arrived, its structure, its motivating principles, its design and its rollout. UC 
represents a major change to the welfare system. Whilst some of the key features of UC, 
such as increased conditionality, being ‘like work’ and ‘making work pay’ are not new and 
have been aims of previous welfare reforms, UC takes these further than before, and other 
features of UC like simplifying the welfare system and introducing the RTI system to 
promote the flexible labour market are novel.  
As this chapter has set out, UC has been rolled out slowly since 2013. During this time, there 
has been much research and debate into the impacts that UC has had and is likely to have in 
the future. The following chapter (Chapter 3) focuses on this, providing a review of literature 
on the impacts on UC on various outcomes.               
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This chapter provides a review of literature examining the impact of Universal Credit on a 
variety of outcomes. As set out in Chapter 2, the notions of ‘welfare dependency’ and 
intergenerational ‘cultures of worklessness’ were key to the rationale for the UC reform, 
with all of UC’s motivating principles being based on the aim of promoting transitions off 
benefits and into work. Given the strong emphasis placed on UC and employment outcomes 
by the government, this chapter will begin by reviewing literature on the impact of UC 
rollout on employment. However whilst the government has had a single-minded focus on 
employment outcomes when it comes to UC (see Alston, 2018), this has often come at the 
cost of evidence on UC’s wider impacts being overlooked, and the DWP have been criticised 
for failing to work with others to establish an evidence base on hardship caused by UC on 
claimants (National Audit Office, 2018). In response to this, this chapter will also provide a 
review of evidence on these wider impacts of UC, with specific reference to existing research 
on claimant’s mental health and wellbeing, incomes and debt, and food bank usage. The 
chapter will then end by introducing the concept of housing insecurity, and providing a 
detailed account of current evidence on the impact of UC on various indicators of housing 
insecurity. 
 
3.2 Universal Credit’s Impacts on Employment Outcomes 
 
With regards to employment outcomes, the intention of UC is to increase both: (a) the 
number of people entering work, i.e., “work participation”, and (b) the number of hours 
worked by those already in work, i.e., “work intensity” (Millar, 2018, p. 51). Increasing work 
intensity is often framed as promoting in-work “progression”, e.g., by applying large scale 
job search requirements to low-paid workers in order to compel them to take on more hours 
or multiple jobs (Wright and Dwyer, 2020).   
Throughout the rollout of UC, the government have repeatedly claimed that UC will get an 
additional 200,000 people into work through its increased financial incentives, additional 
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conditionality and its simpler/smoother system (e.g. see Department for Work and Pensions, 
2018a). This has been key to the government’s economic case for the UC reform, with 
improved employment outcomes being an important part of justifying the large upfront 
expenditure on the new system (Ibid). However, in reality UC’s employment impact has 
been described as “highly uncertain” (Johnson, 2018), as there is a lack of precedents 
regarding some of UC’s key features, particularly its integration of different benefits and its 
use of work allowances to attempt to incentivise work. Whilst there is some empirical 
evidence specifically on the labour market impacts of increased use of conditionality and 
sanctions, these have produced mixed results. For example, research by National Audit 
Office (2016), using an instrumental variables approach, suggests that under Jobseekers 
Allowance sanctions were associated with increased probability of claimants being in 
employment in later months, but had no impact on earnings. However, a fixed effects panel 
analysis of local authority level data by Loopstra, Reeves, Mckee et al. (2015) suggests that 
although Jobseekers Allowance sanctions were associated with claimants exiting benefits, 
this was more likely to be into non-work destinations (i.e. remaining out-of-work but not 
claiming benefits) than into employment. Similarly, a time-series analysis by Taulbut, 
Mackay and McCartney (2018) suggests that “intensifying the use of sanctions and 
introducing harsher penalties associated with being sanctioned has been largely ineffective 
at increasing flows from JSA into sustainable employment” (p. 1417).     
Throughout the rollout of UC to date, the DWP have been conducting their own research 
into its labour market impacts, in terms of employment entry and progression, with mixed 
results. Their research into the early, short-term impacts on employment entry suggest a 
small positive increase under UC, with UC claimants (63%) being four percentage points 
more likely to have been in work at any point within six months of their claim than those in 
a matched group of JSA claimants (59%) (Department for Work and Pensions, 2017a). 
However, this analysis was limited to single unemployed claimants without children. To 
examine the ability of UC (via sanctions and support) to promote in-work progression, 
measured via increased earnings, the DWP conducted an in-work progression randomised 
control trial between 2015 and 2018. The trial had three treatment groups: “frequent support 
participants” (who had Jobcentre work search meetings every fortnight, with mandatory 
actions), “moderate support participants” (who had Jobcentre work search meetings every 
eight weeks, with mandatory actions), and “minimal support participants” (who had 
telephone calls with a work coach every eight weeks, with voluntary actions) (Department 
for Work and Pensions, 2018b, p. 13). The trial found no evidence that those in the more 
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intensive treatment group experienced “higher or more sustainable earnings growth” than 
those in the more light touch groups, and no evidence that sanctions helped motivate UC 
claimants to progress in work (Ibid, pp. 104-106).  
Outside of the DWP’s own research, results from research into UC’s employment impacts 
are also mixed. Analysis by Vilanova and Ghelani (2018) investigates employment effects 
of UC using three alternative methodologies, with data from a small sample of three local 
authorities. Their findings suggest that UC had a “positive, albeit small” impact on 
employment outcomes (p. 12). Conversely, the results of a quasi-experimental study by 
Wickham, Bentley, Rose et al. (2020), “found no evidence that Universal Credit exposure 
was associated with moving into employment” (p. e158). Similarly, qualitative studies with 
UC claimants have suggested that employment outcomes under UC were relatively neutral 
(Wright, Dwyer, Jones et al., 2018), that financial and housing insecurity under UC push 
claimants further away from the labour market (Cheetham M, Moffatt S, Addison M et al., 
2019), and that conditionality for in-work UC claimants has been largely counter-productive 
(Wright and Dwyer, 2020). 
 
3.3 Universal Credit’s Wider Impacts 
 
Whilst the DWP have conducted some analysis into UC’s employment impacts (as outlined 
in section 3.2), they have failed to work on establishing an evidence base on UC’s other 
impacts, and there has been a tendency to dismiss any evidence provided by others on 
claimant hardship across a range of outcomes (see National Audit Office, 2018). Sections 
3.1.-3.3. which follow provide a review of literature on UC’s impacts on such outcomes, 
namely mental health and wellbeing, incomes and debt, and food bank usage. Section 3.4 
will then provide a review of literature on housing security impacts, which are the focus of 
the empirical analysis of this thesis.   
 
3.3.1 Impacts on Mental Health and Wellbeing 
 
One area where the DWP have been criticised for failing to consider UC’s impacts is mental 
health and wellbeing. As UC has been rolling out, concerns have been raised by mental 
health charities over its potentially detrimental impact on the mental health of claimants. In 
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particular, there have been concerns that financial problems associated with UC’s long wait 
for the first payment cause worsening mental health, that UC’s increased threat of sanctions 
cause emotional distress, and that some people with existing mental health problems will 
have difficulties coping with UC’s ‘digital by default’ system and the increased budgeting 
responsibility of monthly direct payments (Mind, 2018; SAMH, 2019). 
To date, empirical evidence on UC’s mental health and wellbeing impacts has largely come 
from qualitative research studies. One such study, by Cheetham M, Moffatt S, Addison M 
et al. (2019), examined the health and social effects of UC rollout in North East England 
through semi-structured interviews with UC claimants with complex needs. Their results 
suggest that UC negatively impacts on mental health and wellbeing, due to: (a) the claims 
process, with the digital claims system being “complicated, disorientating, impersonal, 
hostile and demeaning” (p. 1), and (b) the consequences of managing on UC, with long wait 
periods and sanction threats leading to distress and deterioration of emotional wellbeing. 
This is backed up by further qualitative research by Britain Thinks (2018), whose findings 
suggest UC’s long wait periods can push claimants into a spiral of depression/anxiety, and 
Wright, Dwyer, Jones et al. (2018), whose findings suggest that the constant threat of 
sanctions under UC leads to a great deal of stress and anxiety amongst claimants. 
In terms of quantitative analysis into UC’s mental health impacts, the only known study is 
Wickham, Bentley, Rose et al. (2020)’s quasi-experimental research, which uses 
longitudinal survey data to examine the effect of UC on psychological distress. Their 
findings are in line with the qualitative research – they suggest that UC’s introduction 
increased the prevalence of distress by 6.57 percentage points amongst unemployed 
individuals. Whilst this is the only study on UC specifically, its findings are consistent with 
previous studies in highlighting the detrimental impact of increased sanctions and 
conditionality under Jobseekers Allowance on mental health (Williams, 2021a; Williams, 
2021b), given that increased conditionality is a key feature of UC.      
  
3.3.2 Impacts on Incomes and Debt 
 
Given that Universal Credit radically reforms the structure of working-age means tested 
benefits (and how payments are calculated), it has a significant impact on the incomes of 
claimants. This is because, by combining six different legacy benefits together into a single 
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payment, UC, both naturally and as a results of policy choices, leads to changes in how much 
claimants are entitled to. 76% of those entitled to means-tested benefits will have their 
entitlements changed by (gains or losses of) at least £100 per annum  as a result of the switch 
to UC (Brewer, Joyce, Waters et al., 2019). Whether claimants income increase or decrease 
under UC depends on their circumstances. Brewer, Joyce, Waters et al. (2019)’s analysis, 
which modelled the impact of UC on claimant incomes over eight years, suggests that overall 
UC will likely result in income gains for around 4.2 million people and income losses for 
around 4.6 million people, and, importantly, the poorest 10% of adults lose the most. 
Similarly, a separate analysis by Finch and Gardiner (2018) suggests that 2.4 million families 
are likely to see income gains from the transition to UC and 3 million likely to see income 
losses, although more families could gain if UC manages to increase benefit take up. 
Outside of the fact UC creates income gains/losses for different families, some of its key 
design features have been identified as problematic in potentially causing or exacerbating 
debt problems. In particular, UC’s long wait period can leave claimants without income for 
rent and bills whilst waiting for the first payment, and thus push them towards borrowing 
money to get by, either from lenders or through UC advance payments (essentially an interest 
free loan from the DWP). This, combined with budgeting difficulties associated with UC’s 
monthly direct payment system, can lead to personal debt.  
Consequently, research by Drake (2017), which involved quantitative analysis of Citizens 
Advice’s service data and qualitative interviews with their clients, suggests that those on UC 
are more likely to be struggling with debt problems than those on legacy benefits. The 
research found that UC claimants were particularly struggling with priority debts (i.e. debts 
which can lead to loss of home, essential goods/services or imprisonment) like council tax 
arrears, magistrates court fines, and rent arrears (UC’s impacts on rent arrears are discussed 
in detail later in this chapter in section 3.4) (Ibid, pp. 8-9). The author notes that these could 
lead to further borrowing from high-cost lenders, making it more difficult to pay off debts 
in the long term (Ibid, p. 34). With regards to UC’s detrimental impact on council tax arrears 
specifically, this is an important finding given that UC is not directly responsible for 
providing council tax support (following the abolishment of Council Tax Benefit in 2013, 
local authorities have been responsible for running their own council tax reduction 
schemes, which has increased the amount of council tax paid by low-income families in 
England (see Bushe, Kenway and Aldridge, 2013)). This implies that although UC does 
not directly affect council tax support, it is having an indirect impact in that financial 
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problems arising from UC are having a knock on impact on the ability of households to 
meet council tax payments.    
In addition to Drake (2017)’s research, the negative impact of Universal Credit rollout on 
personal debt problems is also highlighted by research from the debt charity StepChange 
(2020). Their client survey suggests that inadequate support, long wait periods and 
unpredictable monthly payments meant that UC exacerbated debt problems amongst those 
with low-incomes by leading to increased borrowing from friends, family, lenders or illegal 
loan sharks. Other qualitative research by Robertson, Wright and Stewart (2020) and Britain 
Thinks (2018) have also had similar findings, highlighting several examples of UC claimants 
who have been forced to borrow money from friends and family to get by during UC’s long 
wait for the first payment. Finally, quantitative research by d'Este and Harvey (2020), 
involving causal modelling strategies (including difference-in-differences and instrumental 
variables analysis), suggests that UC rollout has also had criminological effects via increased 
burglaries, which the authors link to benefit claimants worsening financial conditions under 
UC. 
     
3.3.3 Impacts on Food Bank Usage 
 
Another wider impact of UC rollout that has been identified in literature so far relates to food 
bank usage. In the UK, the past decade has seen rising demand for food parcels from 
foodbanks, and this has been linked to post 2010 austerity policies aimed at reducing central 
and local government spending on welfare (see Loopstra, Reeves, Taylor-Robinson et al., 
2015; Trussell Trust, 2020). This is because, in general, policies to reduce the financial 
returns from, and universality of, a country’s welfare system also reduces their ability to 
provide food security (Loopstra, Reeves, McKee et al., 2016), and in particular, the use of 
sanctions under the old Jobseekers Allowance system has been linked to rising food bank 
usage in the UK (Loopstra, Fledderjohann, Reeves et al., 2018). 
With regards to UC specifically, Trussell Trust (2019) have raised concerns that UC 
increases food bank use not only through its increased conditionality and sanctions, but also 
due to its long wait periods as a lack of income whilst waiting for the first payment means 
that people are forced to use food banks to feed their families. Their own research, which 
provides an analysis of their food bank parcel data covering 414 of their food bank centres, 
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suggests that usage had risen by 30% 12 months after UC rollout locally, rising to 40% after 
18 months and 48% after 24 months (Thompson, Jitendra and Rabindrakumar, 2019). 
Qualitative case studies, conducted as part of the same research, identified the long wait 
period for the first UC payment as the key contributing factor to this (Ibid). This finding is 
complemented and backed up by analysis from Reeves and Loopstra (2020), who link data 
on food bank usage to data on the introduction of UC and, using a range of causal 
identification strategies (i.e. fixed-effects, granger causality tests and matching designs) 
consistently find that food parcel distribution has increased as UC has rolled out.          
 
3.4 Universal Credit and Housing Insecurity 
 
As set out in Chapter 1, and as will be discussed in more detailed in terms of the data and 
methodological approach in Chapter 5, the overarching aim of this thesis is to examine the 
impact of Universal Credit rollout on housing security. Consequently, it is important, here, 
to introduce the concept of housing insecurity, to set out how UC rollout may potentially 
lead to various stages of housing insecurity, and to provide a review of literature on existing 
evidence around UC’s housing security impacts. This is done in sections 3.4.1-3.4.3, which 
follow.   
 
3.4.1 Housing Insecurity as a Concept 
 
Housing is one of the major social, economic and environment conditions that influences the 
health and wellbeing of people and populations (Braubach, 2011). It has traditionally been 
conceptualised in terms of its physical dimensions, with reference to the role it plays in 
providing a physical place to dwell and prevent exposure to cold/damp conditions or 
dangerous toxins (Bentley, Pevalin, Baker et al., 2016, p. 209). However, it also contributes 
to social wellbeing by providing a sense of identity, worth, security and constancy (Preece 
and Bimpson, 2019, p. 16). 
Housing insecurity (sometimes instead referred to as housing instability, and part of the 
wider concept of housing need) is when personal or economic difficulties in a household 
threaten the sustainment of their housing. The most extreme form of housing insecurity, with 
the most obvious harms on population health (see Leng, 2017; Waugh, Knowles and Rowley, 
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2018), is homelessness. However, housing security does not always equate to homelessness 
as those facing housing insecurity may still have a place to live, but they are facing 
difficulties maintaining their residence (Rollins, Glass, Perrin et al., 2012). As briefly 
introduced in Chapter 1, housing insecurity in the current context of the UC welfare reform 
can broadly be summarised as occurring in four, increasingly severe, stages – these are 
summarised in Figure 3.1. and are discussed in this context in more detail in section 3.4.2. 
Harms to health and wellbeing can arise not only from homelessness but also from the earlier 
stages of insecurity. Stress and anxiety can arise from fear of losing your home amongst 
those facing rent arrears and/or repossession actions (Bond, Evans and Holkar, 2018). More 
broadly, having a secure home provides a long-term base from which to engage in 
society through holding down work and building social networks/connections (Bailey, 
Besemer, Bramley et al., 2015). This is threatened when housing becomes insecure, 
whether that is through rent arrears, repossession actions or actual eviction.   
 





Housing insecurity can arise for a variety of reasons, such as financial difficulties, 
relationship breakdown, domestic violence, harassment, or discharge from prison/care. One 
helpful way of conceptualising this comes from Preece and Bimpson (2019), who consider 
housing insecurity as being made up of three interacting dimensions: (a) financial insecurity, 
(b) spatial insecurity, and (c) relational insecurity. These are described in box 3.1.  
 
Box 3.1. The Three Dimensions of Housing Insecurity. 
 
1. Financial Insecurity: This relates to the affordability of housing and is typically 
measured by the relationship between income and housing costs, but, importantly, 
is also determined by other fixed costs and security of employment. Financial 
insecurity is indicated by housing-related debts and other financial stressors, which 
in the UK have been impacted by austerity and welfare reform in recent years. 
 
2. Spatial Insecurity: This relates to the ability of a household to remain in their 
dwelling or neighbourhood. This can be determined by the security of their 
tenancy. In the UK’s expanding private rented sector, tenancies have become less 
secure in recent years through short tenancy agreements and section 21 or ‘no 
fault’ evictions, which allow landlords to evict tenants without a reason, giving 
rise to ‘revenge evictions’. Spatial insecurity is also caused by ‘un-elective fixity’, 
whereby individuals housing choices are limited, e.g.by refusal of some landlords 
to let to benefit recipients or people with mental health problems. 
 
3. Relational Insecurity: This relates to how an individual’s housing and their sense 
of home is bound to their relationship with other household members. This can 
include family members living together but also, as is increasingly the case 
amongst young people, strangers who live together. Insecurity can arise if these 
relationships break down or if other home sharers are unable to meet rent 
payments. 
 
Source: adapted from Preece and Bimpson (2019). 
    
3.4.2 Universal Credit and Housing Insecurity: Potential Causal Pathway 
to Insecurity 
 
Using Preece and Bimpson (2019)’s conceptualisation of housing insecurity set out in Box 
3.1, the rollout of UC directly impacts on financial insecurity (but also potentially indirectly 
on spatial and relational insecurity) as the UK’s welfare system plays a key role in providing 
housing security to low-income households via provision of support towards housing costs. 
When UC was first announced, the DWP (2010a, p. 19) set out how their aim was “to 
simplify provision for rent support […] while protecting potentially vulnerable people from 
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unintended consequences, such as getting into arrears or being made homeless”. However, 
instead UC has threatened housing security as not only is UC less generous than the legacy 
system for some poorer households (Brewer, Joyce, Waters et al., 2019), but several of its 
design features are problematic when it comes to helping claimants meet housing costs. 
Firstly, UC’s long wait period can leave claimants with little or no income to meet housing 
costs whilst waiting for the first payment. Shelter (2017) have noted that many of their clients 
have few savings to fall back on during the wait period, and that this results in financial 
hardship and rent arrears. Whilst the DWP do offer advance payments to those in need of 
immediate financial support, these then have to be paid back through deductions on future 
UC payments. Therefore, advances are not a long-term solution because, as noted by 
Thompson, Jitendra and Rabindrakumar (2019), they effectively leave claimants with the 
choice of hardship now or hardship later.  
Secondly, UC’s extension and intensification of the use of conditionality and sanctions has 
implications for housing security as claimants may struggle to meet housing costs if their 
UC payments are reduced via sanctions (Beatty, Foden, McCarthy et al., 2015, pp. 35-38). 
This is because, although UC sanctions do not directly reduce the amount claimants receive 
towards housing costs, by reducing the standard allowance they make it more likely that 
claimants will ‘borrow’ money from their housing costs amount to pay for other essential 
costs (e.g. food, bills etc.). 
Thirdly, UC’s novel use of a monthly direct payment system (i.e., monthly in arrears 
payments, all directly into claimants own bank account rather than paying housing costs to 
landlord’s bank account) also has housing insecurity implications. This is because some UC 
claimants, particularly young people (see Homeless Link, 2018), may have limited 
budgeting skills and experience of managing a tenancy. In addition, UC claimants with less 
disposable income may be forced to ‘borrow’ money from their housing costs in order to 
pay for other essential or unexpected costs, which leads to rent arrears. In response to these 
concerns, ‘Alternative Payment Arrangements’ (APAs) and ‘Scottish Choices’ (in Scotland 
only) have now been put in place to provide the option of more frequent payments and 
managed payment of housing costs to landlords. However, it has been argued that there 
remains a lack of awareness of APAs (Hobson, Spoor and Kearton, 2019), and this is backed 
up by official statistics, which suggest that they are not widely taken up (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2018c, p. 8). 
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The combination of long wait periods, increased conditionality and monthly direct payments 
under UC have led to widespread concerns amongst housing charities and homelessness 
charities over UC’s housing security impacts (e.g. see Crisis, 2017). The four stages of 
housing insecurity previously set out in Figure 3.1 are the different stages that are likely to 
occur on the potential causal pathway from UC to housing insecurity. First, claimants may 
get into financial problems that lead to difficulties meeting rent payments. For example, it 
may be that the long wait period leads to a missed payment amongst a UC claimant without 
savings. Second, if the financial problems persist then more rent payments may be missed, 
leading to a build up of rent arrears. This can be exacerbated further by UC payments being 
reduced by sanctions, by claimants having limited budgeting skills to ensure rent payments 
are met, or if other essential or unexpected costs are prioritised over rent, which is permitted 
by UC’s monthly direct payment system. Next, if claimants – who by this point are likely to 
also be in other forms of debt – still have no means to pay off arrears, and landlords have 
exhausted all other options of rent recovery, then formal repossession actions will be made. 
Finally, if other protective ‘buffers’ are not in play, e.g. social support networks (see 
Bramley and Fitzpatrick, 2018), this could result in threat of, or actual, homelessness.      
 
3.4.3 Empirical Evidence on UC’s Housing Insecurity Impacts 
 
Literature examining the impacts of UC to date is made up of a mixture of: (a) qualitative 
studies with UC claimants, and (b) some quantitative studies that have tended to be small-
scale and limited to specific localities. Overall, these have tended to consistently highlight 
the detrimental impact of UC’s long wait periods, conditionality and monthly direct 
payments on housing security, particularly the early stages of insecurity set out in Figure 3.1. 
In terms of qualitative evidence, one study by Robertson, Wright and Stewart (2020), which 
involved interviews, focus groups and ‘deliberative’ workshops with UC ‘Full Service’ 
claimants, found most of their participants to be struggling financially and finding it hard to 
stay afloat during the five-week wait for the first payment. They also found that many 
claimants were anxious about losing their home due to rent arrears, and some had already 
missed rent payments whilst waiting for the first payment, which had triggered “longer-term 
arrears and worsening debt” (p. 14). Further qualitative research in North East England by 
Cheetham M, Moffatt S, Addison M et al. (2019), involving interviews/focus groups with 
UC claimants with complex needs, and Britain Thinks (2018), involving 
39 
 
workshops/interviews with UC ‘Full Service’ claimants, have also highlighted the negative 
impact of UC’s long wait period on housing security. In both studies, participants who did 
not have savings or the means to receive financial support from friends/family reported 
experiencing debt and unpaid bills/council tax/rent, with some experiencing threat of or 
actual eviction as a result. In another study by Bush, Templer, Allen et al. (2019), their 
focus groups with UC claimants in Rochdale and North Tyneside suggest that the 
combined costs of housing, bills, food, clothing and (where applicable) childcare often 
pushed claimants to the limit of their incomes, and this was exacerbated by the long 
wait period between UC payments and often led to debt and ‘rotating’ which household 
bills were paid each month.  Other qualitative studies have highlighted the impact of UC 
sanctions on housing insecurity – interviews conducted by Batty (2018) and Wright, Dwyer, 
Jones et al. (2018) have suggested that UC’s conditionality regime has led to rent arrears 
and repossession actions amongst some claimants. 
The limited number of quantitative studies examining UC’s housing insecurity impacts have 
tended to be small-scale localised studies focussing on rent arrears. The DWP have been 
criticised by the National Audit Office (2018, p. 44) for failing to conduct any national, 
representative analysis of whether UC is leading to increased rent arrears. The only piece of 
research the DWP have conducted on this has been an analysis limited to one single housing 
association, which found that, as tenants moved onto UC there was a stark rise in average 
rent arrears during the initial wait for the first payment, which then plateaued 10-12 weeks 
after the claim as they began to repay the arrears (see National Audit Office, 2018, pp. 44-
45). Similarly, the Smith Institute (2017)’s rent account analysis of social housing tenants in 
two London Boroughs, using data from 2016, also found increased rent arrears for UC 
claimants compared to legacy benefit claimants. In a follow up study using data from 2018 
(see Smith Institute, 2019), they also note that rent arrears have reduced over time between 
2016 and 2018, due to better access to Alternative Payment Arrangements, but that levels of 
rent arrears still remained higher than under the legacy Housing Benefit system. In terms of 
quantitative analysis examining the specific impact of UC’s monthly direct payment system, 
there is one study by Hickman, Kemp, Reeve et al. (2017) which examines a pilot 
programme of the direct payment system amongst social housing tenants. Their analysis 
suggests that the introduction of direct payments acted as a trigger that pushed tenants into 
debt, and the authors conclude that “although some tenants felt that direct payments enabled 
them to be better money managers [..] the harsh reality is that only a small minority managed 
to pay all their rent” (p. 19).    
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3.5 Concluding Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a review of literature examining the impacts of Universal Credit. 
Throughout the rollout of UC the DWP have maintained a single-minded focus on improving 
employment outcomes, with an emphasis on the need to tackle ‘welfare dependency’ and a 
perceived ‘culture of worklessness’. As set out throughout this chapter, evidence on the 
impact on UC on employment outcomes to date has been mixed, but research on its impacts 
on wider outcomes – namely mental health, debt and food bank usage – have consistently 
suggested that UC has had a detrimental impact. This chapter has also introduced the concept 
of housing insecurity, how UC’s long wait periods, increased conditionality and monthly 
direct payments can threaten housing security, and existing evidence on this. Whilst existing 
research on UC’s housing insecurity impacts have tended to be qualitative studies, or small-
scale quantitative studies limited to specific localities, this thesis seeks to provide a more 
robust and nationwide analysis by making use of local authority and household level 
administrative/survey data. The specific data and methodology used in the empirical analysis 
of this thesis is set out in Chapter 4, which follows. 
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This chapter sets out the research methods that the empirical chapters of this thesis employ 
to gain insight into the impact of Universal Credit rollout on housing security in the UK. The 
thesis includes four empirical chapters in total, using a range of quantitative research 
methods/designs in order to examine UC rollout’s impact on the various stages of housing 
insecurity. This chapter begins by justifying the selection of quantitative over qualitative 
methods, whilst also acknowledging that the research questions addressed are informed by, 
and results interpreted in reference to, existing qualitative literature on UC’s impacts. It then 
justifies the use of existing sources of data and secondary data analysis. Next, the chapter 
provides a broad overview of the use of natural experimental study designs and methods to 
improve causal inference within the social sciences, and sets out how these can be applied 
in the context of measuring the impact of UC rollout. Finally, the chapter ends by providing 
a summary of the four empirical chapters of the thesis, in terms of the stages of housing 
insecurity they examine and an overview of the data sources, level of analysis and methods 
they use. Some more specific details of the data, variables and modelling used in the 
empirical analysis are not included in this chapter, but instead are contained within the 
empirical chapters themselves.       
 
4.2 Using Quantitative Research Methods 
 
The analysis outlined in the empirical chapters of this thesis rely upon quantitative research 
methods to examine the impact of UC rollout on housing security, although the rationale for 
the research and interpretation of many its findings are partially informed by existing 
literature on UC from both qualitative and quantitative studies. 
Traditionally, literature on social research methods has tended to make this distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative research because, as set out by Bryman (2015, pp. 31-
32), it provides “a useful means of classifying different methods of social research” and “a 
helpful umbrella for a range of issues concerned with the practice of social research”. In the 
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view of King, Keohane and Verba (1994), the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research is not in the logic of inference that underlies the research, but rather is 
in the style of the research carried out. Quantitative research relies on numbers and statistical 
models, using numerical measurements to test causal hypotheses in relation to specific 
aspects of social phenomena (Ibid, p. 3). On the other hand, qualitative research does not 
rely on numerical measurements, instead tending to focus on a smaller number of cases and 
unearthing a larger amount of information from research participants e.g. via intensive 
interviews (Ibid, p. 4). This can be summarised as the difference between: (a) the 
‘reductionist’ approach of quantitative research, whereby there is a narrow but sharp focus 
on breaking down theories or ideas to test a small discrete set of hypotheses/research 
questions, and (b) the ‘holistic’ approach of qualitative research, which aims to develop a 
more complex picture of the issue/problem of interest and identifying a broader range of 
factors involved in the situation to provide a more rounded understanding (Creswell and 
Creswell, 2018). With regards to sampling, quantitative research is often carried out by 
analysing data from a representative sample of a wider population so that research findings 
are generalisable (see Bryman, 2015, pp. 170-180), whereas in qualitative research sampling 
is often chosen based on the methodology and topic rather than by the need for 
generalisability, and usually is based on who has the best knowledge of the research topic 
e.g. via a purposive sampling (Elo, Kääriäinen, Kanste et al., 2014; Smith, 2018).  
In terms of research methods specifically for generating evidence on the impact of social 
policies (e.g. welfare reforms), there can be a variety of strengths and weaknesses to both 
qualitative studies and quantitative studies. These can also vary depending on which specific 
policy is being examined and what outcomes the research is interested in. For example, 
whilst medical research has traditionally favoured randomised control trials (RCTs) for 
generating evidence, this kind of approach can be difficult to undertake when researching 
the impact of social policies (Barr, Bambra and Smith, 2015) (this will be discussed in detail 
in section 4.4 of this chapter). Therefore, it has been argued that econometric techniques to 
examine ‘natural experiments’, whereby variation in the population’s exposure to social 
policies can be exploited to measure their impacts, can often be the best way of addressing 
gaps in the evidence base, particularly when considered in combination with qualitative 
studies (Ibid). Considering the results of quantitative studies alongside the findings of 
qualitative studies can be particularly important when researching the impact of welfare 
reforms because, as noted by Patrick (2017, p. 2), the experiences of those directly impacted 
by welfare reforms are often neglected during political discussions regarding changes to the 
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benefits system. Importantly, qualitative research provides an opportunity to hear 
perspectives from those with a direct personal insight into the impacts of welfare reform, 
who are ‘experts by experience’ (Ibid). Therefore, quantitative research providing 
generalisable findings on the impact of welfare reform, considered alongside the findings of 
existing qualitative studies involving those with direct experience of reforms, can provide 
the most complete and robust evidence base. 
Consequently, as set out in the remainder of this chapter, the empirical chapters of this thesis, 
whilst informed by existing qualitative studies, employ quantitative research methods to 
examine the impact of UC rollout on various indicators of housing insecurity. There are 
several reasons why this approach is particularly well suited here. Firstly, there are already 
multiple existing qualitative studies which provide some insight into the impact of UC on 
housing security. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Secondly, the staggered nature 
of UC rollout means it can be treated as a form of natural experiment – this will be set out 
in detail in section 4.5 of this chapter. Despite this, there still remains a lack of robust 
quantitative research into UC’s housing security impacts.  
Overall, using quantitative research methods, whilst also being informed by existing 
qualitative studies, can provide a strong balance in terms of filling this gap in knowledge 
and providing insight into UC’s impacts on various indicators of housing security. This is 
because: (a) indicators of housing insecurity can be tracked over time, before and after UC 
rollout, exploiting cross-area variation in the timing of rollout in order to measure its impact, 
and (b) existing qualitative studies can be drawn upon in order to shed light upon some of 
the key design features of UC (e.g. long wait periods, conditionality and monthly direct 
payments) that are likely to be contributing to this impact (if any impact is found). 
 
4.3 Conducting Secondary Analysis of Existing Data Sources 
 
In addition to solely employing quantitative research methods, the analysis in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis also solely employs secondary analysis of existing data sources. The 
majority of the existing data used in the analysis is local authority-level administrative data. 
That is, data derived from the operation of administrative systems in government and other 
organisations, which is usually collected for purposes such as operational monitoring and 
analysis rather than specifically for research purposes (see Office for National Statistics, 
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2015; Connelly, Playford, Gayle et al., 2016). Specific local authority-level administrative 
data sources used include county courts repossessions data collected by the Ministry of 
Justice, ‘advice trends’ data on rent arrears/homelessness advice issues collected by Citizens 
Advice and homelessness data collected by the Scottish Government (this is outlined in 
section 4.6 of this chapter). In addition, one empirical study (Chapter 8) uses statistical 
survey data from a large longitudinal study, namely ‘Understanding Society’.  
In general, there are two approaches when it comes to secondary analysis of existing data 
sources. First, there is the ‘research question-driven’ approach, whereby the researcher 
identifies a hypothesis or research question and then searches for suitable datasets to address 
them afterwards (Cheng and Phillips, 2014, p. 373). Second, there is the ‘data first’ approach, 
whereby the researcher searches through the variables within datasets and only then decides 
what kind of hypothesis or research question can be addressed (Ibid). The empirical analysis 
of this thesis used a combination of these two approaches. Initially, a ‘research question-
driven’ approach was used in that evaluating the impact of Universal Credit rollout on 
housing insecurity was broadly identified as the aim of the research – due to concerns raised 
by housing charities and early evidence from qualitative studies – before any data sources 
were identified. Subsequently, a more ‘data-first’ approach was used in order to identify 
longitudinal data on housing insecurity indicators and determine which specific research 
questions could be addressed. This involved using tools such as the UK Data Service and 
Shelter’s housing databank (available from: Shelter, 2019) to search for data sources and 
identify suitable ones that capture different aspects of housing insecurity.  
The key drawback of using existing data sources for analysis is the absence of control over 
how the data used is collected and what it measures, including how a survey question is 
worded or who/what is included in admin data (e.g. relating to demographic characteristics 
of who is included or geographical/temporal coverage of data) (Bryman, 2004). This means 
that many of the outcome variables used in the analysis, whilst useful indicators of various 
aspects of housing insecurity, by no means capture the outcomes of interest perfectly. Yet, 
this limitation is outweighed by the fact that secondary analysis of existing data provided 
routinely and regularly collected longitudinal data on various outcomes, in some cases 
covering the time period before UC rollout and throughout the different stages of its rollout. 
This created the potential for examining the rollout of UC as a form of natural experiment. 




4.4. Causal Inference and the Use of Natural Experiments    
  
In social sciences, research is commonly concerned with examining questions of cause and 
effect. If causal relationships between variables are known then this tells us what would 
happen in alternative or “counterfactual” worlds (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 3). 
Importantly, if research can identify causal relationships, this can be used in order to gain 
insight into the impact of changing circumstances or of a policy intervention (Ibid). 
Traditionally, when it comes to research interested in causal relationships, ‘evidence-ranking 
schemes’ or ‘hierarchies of evidence’ – which rank different research designs based on their 
perceived ability to infer causality, often in a medical context – have tended to place RCTs 
(or systematic reviews of RCTs) at the top and viewing them as gold standard evidence (for 
more in depth discussion on this see Cartwright and Hardie, 2012a; Barr, Bambra and Smith, 
2015). In order to be considered as a ‘true’ experiment, RCTs aiming to establish the cause 
and effect of an intervention must meet three key principles. These are set out in Box 4.1. 
 
Box 4.1. The Three Key Principles of Randomised Control Trials. 
1. Individuals being researched are assigned into either (a) the ‘treatment’ group, 
who are exposed to the intervention, or (b) the ‘control’ group, who resemble 
the ‘treatment’ group but who are not exposed to the intervention and thus can 
be used to measure the counterfactual.  
 
2. The assignment into the ‘treatment’ or ‘control’ group is done at random, with 
participants having an equal chance of being in either group.  
 
3. The manipulation of the intervention is done under the control of an 
experimental researcher. 
 
Sources:  Dunning (2008, p282); Murnane and Willett (2011, p46) 
   
By following these principles, RCTs can, in theory, measure the causal impact of the 
intervention being examined by comparing the outcomes of the ‘treatment group’ to the 
outcomes of the ‘control group’ to ascertain the “average treatment effect” (Murnane and 
Willett, 2011, p. 46). This is because when assignment to the treatment or control group is 
entirely random it is guaranteed to be exogenous to (i.e. independent of) all other 
characteristics of the recipients. This means that variation in outcomes must be due to the 
intervention rather than due to these confounding characteristics.  
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However, despite their high ranking in many ‘evidence-ranking schemes’ or ‘hierarchies of 
evidence’, the use of RCTs in the social policy context is more contentious than in a medical 
context where such rankings often originate (see Roberts, Petticrew , Macintyre  et al., 2008). 
There are a variety of reasons for this. First, RCTs may be viewed as too expensive or 
impractical to undertake (Roberts, Petticrew , Macintyre  et al., 2008, p. 1; Dunning, 2012, 
p. 7). Second, randomisation of policies may be politically and ethically difficult – for 
example, if theory suggests a given intervention is likely to have a positive impact it may 
not be considered ethical to provide it to some people but withhold it from others (Roberts, 
Petticrew , Macintyre  et al., 2008; Barr, Bambra and Smith, 2015). Third, RCTs may not be 
generalisable due to geographical heterogeneity. In other words, just because an RCT infers 
the causal impact of a policy in one population (e.g. an area, a city, or a school etc.) this does 
not necessarily mean it will also work for a different population, particularly if the second 
population has different characteristics to the first (see Cartwright and Hardie, 2012b). This 
is known as the ‘transportation problem’ (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). Finally, many 
social policies of interest to researchers are implemented by policymakers and are therefore 
outwith the control of most researchers, and policymakers rarely allocate scarce resources in 
a way that involves true randomisation (Dunning, 2012, p. 7).    
These limitations mean that there is a lack of RCTs in the social policy context, and in recent 
decades researchers have increasingly addressed this gap in the evidence base by examining 
‘natural experiments’. When it comes to defining the term ‘natural experiment’, there is no 
universal definition. Some authors (e.g. Dunning, 2012, pp. 15-16), define it narrowly as 
studies in which exposure to the given intervention is not manipulated by the researcher, but 
where exposure (or lack of exposure) to the intervention is still random, or ‘as if’ random 
(i.e. not truly random but still independent to any potential confounding variables). Under 
this definition, a natural experiment is close to a RCT in the sense that principles 1 and 2 of 
RCTs described in Box 4.1 are essentially met, with the only difference being that the 
intervention is not manipulated by the researcher. However, this can be rare in reality, and 
most definitions of ‘natural experiment’ are more broad than this. For example, one 
particularly clear definition comes from Craig, Cooper, Gunnell et al. (2010): 
 
By natural experiments, we mean events, interventions or policies which are not 
under the control of researchers, but which are amenable to research which uses the 
variation in exposure that they generate to analyse their impact. By natural 
experimental studies, we mean the methodological approaches to evaluating the 
impact on health or other outcomes of such events. The key features of these 
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definitions are that (1) the intervention is not undertaken for the purposes of research, 
and (2) the variation in exposure and outcomes is analysed using methods that 
attempt to make causal inferences. (p. 4) 
 
Under this broader definition, there are various scenarios in which researchers can exploit 
variation in exposure to policies in order to analyse their impact, provided that accurate data 
on outcomes of interest is available. For example, Barr, Bambra and Smith (2015), identify 
three  common scenarios. These are: (a) exposure to a policy varies between groups and over 
time, e.g. a policy is introduced in one area (could be a state, local authority, pilot site etc.) 
but not a neighbouring area, and data on outcomes is available over time in both areas, (b) a 
policy is introduced in some areas but not others, and only cross-sectional data is available 
after the intervention, and (c) data on exposure to a policy and outcomes is available before 
and after the intervention, but there is no suitable unexposed comparison group, so the 
analysis examines change in outcomes only in those exposed (i.e. an interrupted time series).  
Importantly, the major limitation of these kind of natural experimental studies is that, in the 
absence of randomisation (or at least ‘as if’ randomisation), outcomes in unexposed groups 
may not be a suitable means of judging the counterfactual in exposed groups. This is because 
differing outcomes may arise from underlying differences between groups as opposed to the 
policy intervention (Barr, Bambra and Smith, 2015). However, as will be discussed in 
regards to examining Universal Credit rollout later in the chapter, there are a range of 
analytical techniques that can be used in attempt to reduce this kind of bias, such as 
regression techniques to control for observed differences between groups, use of fixed-
effects to account for unobserved differences between groups, robustness checks, 
falsification tests and/or sensitivity analysis to strengthen the researcher’s confidence that 
observed relationships are causal (Barr, Bambra and Smith, 2015; Stock and Watson, 2015; 
Craig, Gibson, Campbell et al., 2018).        
 
4.5. Universal Credit Rollout as a Natural Experiment  
 
Despite being hailed by UK policymakers as “the most radical overhaul of our welfare 
system since its inception” (see Department for Work and Pensions, 2010b), Universal 
Credit was introduced with little evaluation by the government into its impacts on certain 
outcomes. The UK Government have conducted research into the impact of UC on 
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employment outcomes (Department for Work and Pensions, 2017a) and the impact of 
different levels of work coach support on in-work progression under UC (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2018b). However, there has been a lack of analysis by the government 
into UC’s impacts on other outcomes. As already discussed, the DWP have been criticised 
in particular for a failure to consider UC’s impacts on health and wellbeing (Wickham, 
Bentley, Rose et al., 2020, p. e158), for only undertaking very limited analysis of UC’s 
impact on rent arrears (National Audit Office, 2018, p. 44), and for a general tendency to 
dismiss any evidence of claimant hardship rather than working with others to establish an 
evidence base (National Audit Office, 2018, p. 10).   
Although the government have not carried out their own national, representative analysis 
into UC’s housing security impacts, the staggered nature of the UC rollout schedule – i.e. 
the fact that it rolled out in different areas at different times between 2013 and 2018 – means 
that exposure to the policy varied across time and space. As such, it can be treated as a form 
of natural experiment in that variation in exposure to the policy over time makes UC 
amenable to research analysing its impact (Craig and Katikireddi, 2020). As set out in section 
4.4, the ideal scenario in terms of confidently making causal claims in natural experimental 
studies is where variation in exposure to the intervention of interest is truly random (or at 
least ‘as if’ random whereby exposure is not truly random but is still independent to any 
potential confounding variables). Therefore, the ideal scenario to make causal claims on 
UC’s impact would be if the variation in its rollout across time and space was truly random. 
This was not the case. The DWP have not formally stated the basis for which the order of 
rollout was determined, but their research has noted that rollout was not random, but rather 
was “designed, in part, to be deliverable” (Department for Work and Pensions, 2014). This 
can threaten the validity of making causal claims on UC’s impact if there are confounding 
variables linked to both the timing of UC rollout and outcomes of interest relating to housing 
insecurity. This phenomenon is also known as ‘omitted variable bias’ (see Stock and Watson, 
2020, p. 213). One way to examine potential cause for concern in this regard is to look at 
differences in labour and housing market characteristics between areas that became UC ‘Full 
Service’ areas earlier in the rollout schedule, and areas that became UC ‘Full Service’ areas 
later in the rollout schedule.  
This is done using data for England in Figure 4.1, and the results suggest that there are minor 
differences. Areas where ‘Full Service’ rolled out earlier tended, on average, to have slightly 
higher unemployment rates, slightly lower wages and slightly less affordable housing than 
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areas where it rolled out later. However, whilst this may introduce some bias, methods such 
as a fixed-effects design, inclusion of control variables and falsification tests can be used to 
attempt to reduce the influence of any bias arising from non-randomness in the UC rollout 
schedule. In addition, analysis by Reeves and Loopstra (2020) in their paper examining UC’s 
impact on food bank usage suggests that although UC was initially introduced in areas with 
slightly higher than average levels of deprivation, when they considered the speed at which 
new claimants enter UC by the period in which UC was implemented, they found similar 
trends in pace of rollout for areas with different levels of deprivation. Based on this, they 
conclude that bias arising from the timing of UC rollout was unlikely to influence the results 
of their analysis (Ibid, p. 6).  
 
Figure 4.1. Non-Randomness in UC rollout in England: Quarterly Trends in Mean Housing 
and Labour Market Characteristics in UC ‘Full Service’ versus non UC ‘Full Service’ Local 
Authorities, 2017-2018. 
 
Notes: The number of local authorities that were UCFS areas gradually increased over time as rollout 
progressed – 10% of local authorities were UCFS areas by 2017 Q1, increasing to 17% by 2017 Q3, 
37% by 2018 Q1, 65% by 2018 Q3 and 85% by 2018 Q4. Data Sources: NOMIS official labour market 
statistics, Office for National Statistics ‘Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings’ and Ministry of 




4.6. Summary of Empirical Chapters 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of UC rollout on housing security, 
and this is done via four empirical studies (Chapters 5-8). Each empirical study exploits 
cross-area variation in the rollout schedule – as outlined in section 4.5 – in order to examine 
its impact on the different indicators of housing insecurity arising for financial reasons in 
UK (i.e. the four stages of housing insecurity set out in Chapter 3). Box 4.2 provides details 
of various potential data sources indicating insecurity at each stage. A summary of the 
specific stages of housing insecurity examined in each empirical study, along with the data 
sources actually used to measure that insecurity, is provided in Table 4.1. These data sources 
were used over the other sources listed in Box 4.2 because: (a) these data sources were 
consistently available throughout the rollout of UC, (b) they were available at the local 
authority level so could be linked to data on the timing of UC rollout, and (c) with the 
exception of Understanding Society data, they were collected quarterly or monthly meaning 
they could be more accurately linked to data on the exact timing of UC rollout within local 
authorities.    
The analysis in each of the empirical chapters employ a range of methods in attempt to 
reduce potential sources of bias, e.g. bias potentially arising from any non-randomness in 
UC’s rollout schedule. Details of the methods used in each chapter are also summarised in 
Table 4.1.  
 





Table 4.1. Summary of the Four Empirical Chapters of this Thesis 






Level of Analysis Methods to 
Reduce 
Potential 
Sources of Bias 
 Chapter 5 Repossession 
Actions 
Quarterly Ministry of 
Justice Data on 




Panel Design & 
Falsification Test 
 











Panel Design & 
Falsification Test 
 















UK Individual & 
Household Level 





Firstly, Chapter 5 examines the impact of UC rollout on landlord repossessions rates within 
English local authorities. This was done using a fixed effects panel design, linking data on 
the timing of UC rollout in each local authority from its official rollout schedule (available 
from: UK Government, 2015a; UK Government, 2015b; UK Government, 2018 and listed 
in full in Appendix 1) with quarterly data on the rates of landlord repossession actions 
(including repossession claims, orders, warrants and actual bailiff repossessions) between 
2012 Q1 and 2019 Q1. To improve casual inference, a falsification test (i.e. a test to assess 
the plausibility that the effect of the explanatory variable on the outcome variable is causal 
by checking the specificity of the effect (see Craig, Katikireddi, Leyland et al., 2017, p. 51)) 
was also carried out by repeating the analysis using mortgage repossession rates as a non-
equivalent outcome variable. A non-equivalent outcome variable is a new outcome variable 
that is “predicted not to change because of the treatment but […] expected to respond to 
some or all of the contextually important internal validity threats in the same way as the 
target outcome” (Shadish, Cook et al., (2002, p509). The falsification test is set out in full in 
Chapter 5 itself. 
Secondly, Chapter 6 examines the impact of UC rollout on rates of advice given by Citizens 
Advice on issues relating to rent arrears and homelessness within English local authorities. 
In a similar research design to Chapter 5, a fixed effects panel design is used, linking data 
on the timing of UC rollout with quarterly data on rates of advice given on rent 
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arrears/homelessness issues between 2014 Q1 and 2019 Q1. As in Chapter 5, a falsification 
test was carried out to improve causal inference, using data on rates of advice given on 
mortgage and secured loan arrears as a non-equivalent outcome variable. In addition, data 
from DWP StatXplore on the pace of UC rollout in the social versus private rented sectors 
was used to examine whether there was any variation in the impact of UC rollout between 
the different sectors.  
Thirdly, Chapter 7 examines the impact of UC rollout on rates of homelessness applications 
and 'Housing Options’ approaches (i.e. approaches for the information and advice service 
used by local authorities in Scotland in attempt to prevent homelessness when a household 
approaches them with a housing problem) within Scottish local authorities. As in Chapter 5 
and 6, a fixed effects panel design was used linking the claims/approaches data to data on 
the timing of UC rollout to create a monthly local authority level dataset covering the period 
April 2014 – March 2019. In addition, the homelessness claims data was disaggregated in 
order to assess whether there was any variation in the impact of UC rollout depending on 
what the reason for the claim was (e.g. asked to leave home, violent/non-violent household 
dispute, terminated tenancy) and what their prior circumstances were (e.g. staying in family 
home, with friends/partner, private rented sector, social rented sector or owner occupying). 
It was not possible to conduct a falsification test for this chapter’s analysis due to lack of 
data on a suitable non-equivalent outcome variable.  
Finally, Chapter 8 examines the impact of UC rollout on household financial problems such 
as subjective difficulties managing financially and self-reported difficulties meeting 
payments for housing, bills or council tax. Unlike in the other empirical chapters, the 
outcome variables here are individual level data, obtained from the ‘Understanding Society’ 
longitudinal survey, also known as the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). This 
was linked to local authority level data on timing of UC rollout to enable difference-in-
difference analysis to measure UC’s impact. This analysis is split into two parts, with part 1 
examining the initial impact of UC in the first 12 months of the ‘Live Service’ phase of 
rollout, and part 2 taking a more longitudinal approach using data from waves 1-9 of the 
survey. A more detailed description and explanation of all of the data, variables, methods 





4.7. Concluding Summary 
 
This chapter has outlined the broad methodological approach employed in this thesis, 
setting out how the empirical analysis uses quantitative research methods on existing 
data sources, and how cross-area variation in the UC rollout schedule is exploited in 
order to measure its impact. In addition, this chapter has provided a summary of the four 
empirical chapters of this thesis, in terms of the stages of housing insecurity they examine 
and an overview of the data sources, level of analysis and methods they use to reduce the 
potential influence of bias. The empirical chapters themselves – which follow this chapter – 
provide a more detailed account of the data, variables and methods used in each piece of 
analysis, as well as setting out the results and their policy implications.     
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Chapter 5. Empirical Study 1: Impact of Universal 




This chapter examines the impact of Universal Credit rollout on landlord repossession 
rates within 323 English local authorities. As set out in Chapter 4, this is done by 
employing a fixed effects panel design, linking data on the timing of UC rollout (from 
its official rollout schedule – see Appendix 1) with aggregate Ministry of Justice data 
on legal repossession actions made by landlords (across both social and private rented 
sectors in England) between 2012 Q1 and 2019 Q1. The specific research questions 
addressed in this chapter are as follows: 
 
1. Has UC rollout led to an increase in rates of landlord repossession actions (i.e. 
rates of legal actions by landlords to evict tenants) within 323 English local 
authorities up to 2019 Q1? 
 
2. Does the impact of UC rollout on rates of landlord repossession actions (if any 
found) increase when it has been rolled out for longer and thus reached more 
claimants?  
 
This chapter begins by providing an overview of the determinants of eviction. Whilst 
Chapter 3 has already introduced the concept of housing insecurity, the determinants of 
eviction are useful to set out here to provide some additional context on factors likely 
to shape the likelihood of households facing repossession actions, which is of specific 
relevance to this chapter. Following on from this, this chapter provides a detailed 
account of the data, variables, methods, and modelling used in the chapter’s empirical 
analysis. The Chapter will then present the results of the empirical analysis, before ending 
with a conclusion which summarises the research findings, discusses the limitations of the 
analysis and considers what inferences can be drawn.  
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It is important to note that this chapter’s analysis has been published in the following journal 
article in the Journal of Social Policy: 
 
Hardie, I. (2021). The Impact of Universal Credit Rollout on Housing Security: An 
Analysis of Landlord Repossession Rates in English Local Authorities. Journal of 
Social Policy, 50(2), 225-246. doi:10.1017/S0047279420000021. 
   
5.2 Background: Determinants of Eviction 
 
Where repossession of a property through eviction takes place, it often arises due to the 
same “trigger factors”, which typically centre on income reduction due to 
unemployment, relationship breakdown or a combination of other factors (Pleace and 
Hunter, 2018). As set out by Chamberlain and Johnson (2013), experience of a 
“financial crisis” is a key pathway to eviction  and homelessness, and this can occur for 
a variety of reasons. For example, financial crises may arise from: (a) persistent low-
income, which can lead to hardship and an inability to afford housing and other essential 
costs (e.g. food, heating and bills), or (b) a sudden income loss, which may arise from 
a job loss or the collapse of a small business, resulting in the household no longer being 
able to meet housing costs (Ibid, p. 64). Qualitative research conducted with tenants in 
serious rent arrears (and thus at risk of eviction) suggests that, in the UK specifically, 
benefit complications/suspensions and insecure employment (e.g. temporary or zero-
hour contracts) are also key triggers (Ambrose, Eadson, Hickman et al., 2015).  
Whilst eviction is often triggered by experiencing a financial crisis, it is also caused by 
a range of individual and structural factors which are key to determining the prevalence 
of eviction. With regards to individual factors, there are certain groups who face greater 
risk of eviction or tenancy breakdown than others. For example, analysis of tenancy 
sustainment amongst those aged under 35 by Ambrose, Eadson, Hickman et al. (2015) 
suggests that single adults, men and 21-25 year olds were the groups at most risk of 
eviction. The authors note that greater eviction risk amongst young people is partially 
related to the fact that they are more likely to be unemployed or on very low incomes 
during their tenancy, but that being aged 21-25 carries a risk that goes beyond any of 
these associated variables (Ibid, p. 3). Similarly, research by Pawson, Donohoe, Munro 
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et al. (2006) and Pawson and Munro (2010) also highlights the disproportionate risk for 
young people, single men, and childless couples, when it comes to tenancy breakdown. 
Finally, other research has highlighted the specific risks of eviction faced by former 
homeless people (Randall and Brown, 2002) and those who have previously served in 
the armed forces (Johnsen, Jones and Rugg, 2008).   
With regards to structural determinants of eviction, these are linked to housing policy, 
the housing market (particularly housing affordability), poverty and landlord practices. 
The UK’s private rented sector (PRS) has grown markedly over the past two decades, 
with people increasingly remaining in the sector into their 30s, and the sector 
increasingly housing young adults who are in low-income poverty (Bailey, 2020). This 
rise of the PRS has a significant impact on housing affordability, as 70% of the poorest 
fifth of households who live in the PRS face housing costs that account for over a third 
of their total income (Tinson, Ayrton, Barker et al., 2016, p. 10). This unaffordability 
of housing is said to be one of the key drivers of forced moves and eviction in the UK 
(Clarke, Hamilton, Jones et al., 2017, p. 17), with Pleace and Hunter (2018, pp. 334-
335) noting that there is now a chronic shortage of affordable housing in the UK and a 
growing gap between income and housing costs in many areas. Another key structural 
determinant of eviction in recent years has been the use of section 21 or “no fault” 
evictions, whereby landlords can repossess a property without having to establish fault 
on the part of the tenant. The increasing use of section 21 drove a significant rise in 
overall evictions between 2000 and 2014, and was particularly prominent in London, 
where market rents were rising rapidly and landlords commonly evicted tenants in order 
to re-let the property at higher rates or as short-term lets (e.g. via Airbnb) (Clarke, 
Hamilton, Jones et al., 2017). However, the use of section 21 has declined since 2014, 
and the government have now vowed to ban them (UK Government, 2019). 
 




As previously intimated in Chapter 4, the empirical analysis in this chapter involved the 
compiling of a quarterly local authority level dataset, which links data on the timing of 
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UC rollout with Ministry of Justice data on landlord repossessions. This dataset covers 
the period of 2012 Q1 – 2019 Q1, and the final analytical sample included 323 of the 
326 lower tier local authorities in England. Isles of Scilly, West Somerset and City of 
London were the three local authorities that were excluded, and this was due to their 
small population sizes. 
 
5.3.2 Repossessions Data (Outcome Variables) 
 
The process for landlords (or mortgage lenders) repossessing a property in England is 
carried out via the county courts, and occurs in four stages (Ministry of Justice, 2019a). 
Firstly, the landlord must make a ‘repossession claim’ to the court in order to establish 
whether they have the right to repossess the property. Secondly, if the court agrees that 
the landlord has the right, a ‘repossession order’ will be granted. Next,  in the third stage, 
the landlord can apply for a repossession warrant. If a warrant is issued this leads to the 
fourth and final stage of the process, which is a formal bailiff repossession (i.e. actual 
eviction carried out by a bailiff). The most common reason for repossession actions to 
occur is rent arrears (Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 3). The Ministry of Justice publish 
data on each stage of this process, i.e. the quarterly number of landlord repossession 
claims, orders, warrants, and actual repossessions within each local authority . It is 
important to note that the latter stages are often not reached because tenants may pay 
off their arrears/leave the property voluntarily before latter stages are required, or a 
judge may decide not to make a repossession order. It has been estimated that 
approximately 72% of landlord repossession claims lead to repossession orders, 40% to 
repossession warrants and only 21% to actual bailiff repossessions (Clarke, Hamilton, 
Jones et al., 2017).   
For the purposes of analysis, this data on the number of landlord repossession claims, 
orders, warrants and bailiff repossessions was converted into rates per 10,000 rented 
dwellings in the given local authority (using Office for National Statistics ‘Subnational 
Dwelling Stock by Tenure Estimates’ and Ministry of Housing, Communities  and Local 
Government (MHCLG) ‘live tables on dwelling stock’). This led to the creation of four 
outcome variables for the analysis, with one variable for each of the four stages of the 
legal repossessions process. These are: (1) ‘landlord repossession claim rate’, (2) 
‘landlord repossession order rate’, (3) ‘landlord repossession warrant rate’, and (4) 
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‘landlord bailiff repossession rate’. It was not possible to disaggregate this data by 
tenure, so these variables indicate rates of actions carried out by both social landlords 
and private landlords. However, it should be stressed that the behaviour and motivations 
for social landlords cannot be viewed in the same way as private landlords, especially  
where the social landlord is a council who also have statutory duties around 
homelessness.     
 
5.3.3 Universal Credit Data (Explanatory Variables) 
 
Modelling within this chapter focusses on the timing of UC rollout within English local 
authorities. As noted in Chapter 4, data on the timing of UC rollout comes from the 
official UC rollout schedule, which is available from UK Government (2015a; 2015b; 
2018) and is also listed in a single table in Appendix 1. This data was used to track each 
of the 323 English local authorities over time and create three explanatory variables for 
the analysis. These specify which stage of rollout they were at during each quarter 
between 2012 Q1 and 2019 Q1. The first explanatory variable is ‘UC Live Service’, 
which is a binary variable indicating whether UC ‘Live Service’ had rolled out yet in 
each local authority in each quarter of the analysis period. Second, ‘UC Full Service’, 
also a binary variable, indicates whether UC ‘Full Service’ had rolled out yet in each 
quarter of the analysis period. Third, ‘UC Full Service (by length of rollout)’ is a 
categorical variable indicating whether ‘Full Service’ had rolled out yet and if so for 
how long – this entail five categories: (1) ‘pre rollout’, (2) ‘first quarter post rollout’, 
(3) ‘second quarter post rollout’, (4) ‘third quarter post rollout’, and (5) ‘fourth + (i.e. 
fourth or more) quarters post rollout’. 
For the purposes of these variables, for the quarter in which local authorities transitioned 
into ‘Live’ or ‘Full’ Service UC they were classed as a ‘Live’ or ‘Full’ Service area if 
the corresponding rollout date occurred in the quarter’s first half but not if it was in the 
quarter’s second half. In a minority of local authorities (29 out of the 323 included in 
the analysis), UC ‘Full Service’ rolled out in different Jobcentres in the area in different 
quarters. When this occurred, local authorities were classed as ‘Full Service’ areas from 
the first quarter in which ‘Full Service’ had rolled out in most Jobcentres for most of 




5.3.4 Control Variables 
 
As set out in section 5.2, there are a range of individual and structural determinants of 
eviction, with labour market factors (e.g. unemployment and low-pay) and housing 
market factors (e.g. housing affordability) being particularly important. In attempt to 
account for this, three control variables were used in this chapter’s analysis. These make 
use of the (limited) local authority level data available on housing and labour market 
eviction determinants. These are: (1) ‘model based unemployment rate’, (2) ‘median 
weekly wages’, and (3) ‘mean weekly rents’.  
‘Model based unemployment rate’ comes from NOMIS official labour market statistics 
and is an estimate of the quarterly unemployment rate (%) in the local authority. It is 
based on the previous twelve months of data from the ‘Annual Population Survey’. 
‘Median weekly wages’ comes from the ‘Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings’ (carried 
out by the Office for National Statistics). It is a quarterly estimate of median weekly 
wages from part/full time work in the local authority and is obtained through linear 
interpolation of the annual estimate from the survey. Finally, ‘mean weekly rents’ is the 
mean weekly rents paid in the private rented sector (data from ‘Valuations Office 
Agency Private Rental Statistics’) and the social rented sector (covering tenancies 
through housing associations and, where applicable, local authorities – data from the 
MHCLG).            
 
5.3.5 Statistical Analysis 
  
Making use of the outcome variables and explanatory variables outlined above, the 
relationship between UC rollout and landlord repossession rates was formally 
investigated by using fixed effects panel models. Fixed effects modelling is a common 
approach for analysing panel data, and it measures change over time within local 
authorities. The key features of fixed effects panel modelling as a statistical technique 
are provided in Box 5.1 (adapted from Gayle and Lambert, 2018, p. 61). The key 
advantage of using fixed effects panel models here is that local authority fixed effects 
effectively control for unobserved baseline differences between local authorities. 
Meanwhile the inclusion of time fixed effects also effectively controls for unobserved 
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variables that vary over time but not between local authorities (for a full explanation of 
time fixed effects see Stock and Watson, 2015). In addition, fixed effects regression 
models can also include additional control variables, which control for potential 
confounders that are observed. This is done here through inclusion of the control 
variables set out above in section 5.3.4. 
 
Box 5.1. The Key Features of Fixed Effects Panel Models. 
The Fixed Effects Panel Model 
 
One of the two most widely used models for analysing panel data (along with the ‘random 
effects’ panel model) 
 
Measures change over time within an entity (e.g. an individual/school/local authority etc.) 
as opposed to between entities 
 
Can include explanatory variables that change over time within the entity (e.g. if the entity 
you have data on is an individual this could include, for example, age/income/body mass 
index) 
 
Cannot include variables that are time constant for the entity (e.g. if the entity you have 
data on is an individual this could be, for example, place of birth, birth weight or father’s 
occupation when aged 14) 
 
Has the attractive property of being able to control for unobserved differences between 
entities 
 
Source: adapted from Gayle and Lambert (2018, p. 61)  
 
The empirical analysis of this chapter is conducted in two parts. The first part examines 
the overall impact of UC rollout on average within local authorities, up to 2019 Q1, and 
makes use of the ‘UC Live Service’ and ‘UC Full Service’ explanatory variables. The 
specific modelling is as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑅 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡    
          
In equation 5.1, 𝑖  is the local authority and 𝑡  is the quarter. 𝐿𝑅 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒  is the landlord 
repossession rate, with a separate fixed effects regression models for each of the ‘landlord 
repossession claim rate’, ‘landlord repossession order rate’, ‘landlord repossession 




𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆  are  the ‘UC Live Service’ and ‘UC Full Service’ binary explanatory variables, whilst 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the ‘model-based unemployment rate’ variable, 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 is the ‘median 
full-time wages’ variable, and 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  is the ‘mean weekly rents’ variable. Finally, 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 denotes the time fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖 the local authority fixed effects and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 the error 
term. 
The second part of this chapter’s analysis examines whether the impact of UC rollout 
on rates of landlord repossession actions increases when it has been rolled out for longer 
and thus reached more claimants. This is done by making use of the ‘UC Full Service (by 
length of rollout)’ explanatory variable, and the specific modelling for this part is as 
follows: 
 
𝐿𝑅 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐵𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡    
 
Here, 𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐵𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ is the ‘UC Full Service (by length of rollout)’ outcome variable. 





5.4.1 Overall Trends in Landlord Repossession Rates (and their 
Relationship with UC Rollout) 
 
Figure 5.1 provides the quarterly trends in mean landlord repossession rates during the 
analysis period. It highlights that, overall, there was (on average across local authorities) 
a downward trend in rates of repossession actions between 2014 and 2019. This can be 
attributed to the declining use of section 21 evictions since 2014 (as already discussed 







Figure 5.1. Quarterly Trends in Mean Landlord Repossession Rates Across English Local 
Authorities, 2012 Q1 – 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Data includes actions by both private and social landlords. 
 
Mean rates of landlord repossession rates varied depending on whether or not a local 
authority had become a UC ‘Full Service’ (UCFS) area yet. Figure 5.2 again shows 
trends in mean landlord repossession rates, but this time disaggregates the data into 
UCFS and non-UCFS areas, i.e. local authorities where UC ‘Full Service’ had rolled out 
versus local authorities where it hadn’t yet in the given quarter. It conveys that, on 
average, UCFS areas tended to have higher repossession rates than non-UCFS areas at 
any given point in time. Figure 5.3 similarly shows that in local authorities with a higher 
rate of households on UC receiving housing costs support (another indicator of UC 
rollout using DWP Stat-Xplore data) also tend to have higher repossession rates.  
Taken together, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that areas whether UC had rolled out, and 
have a higher incidence of people claiming UC for help with housing costs, had higher 
landlord repossession rates. It is possible that some of this correlation may be due to the 
impact UC has had on housing security. However, it is also likely to be linked to the 
slight differences in the characteristics of local authorities that became UCFS areas 
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earlier compared to those that became UCFS areas later. This is because,  as already set 
out in Chapter 4, areas that became UCFS earlier tended to have slightly higher 
unemployment rates, slightly lower wages and slightly less affordable housing than areas 
where it rolled out later. It is this uncertainty (relating to differences in characteristics 
between areas that became UCFS earlier versus later) which motivates the need for using 
fixed effects regression in order to examine variation in landlord repossession rates within 
local authorities over time rather than between local authorities.    
 
Figure 5.2. Quarterly Trends in Mean Landlord Repossession Rates in UC ‘Full Service’ 
versus Non-UC ‘Full Service’ Local Authorities, 2017-2018. 
 
Notes: The number of local authorities that were UCFS areas gradually increased over time as rollout 
progressed – 10% of local authorities were UCFS by 2017 Q1, rising to 17% in 2017 Q3, 37% by 2018 Q1 
and 85% by 2018 Q4. Data includes actions by both social and private landlords. Y axes indicate mean 









Figure 5.3. 2018 Q1 Snapshot of the Relationship Between the Rate of Households on UC 
(with Support for Housing Costs), and Landlord Repossession Rates. 
 
Notes: All Rates are per 10,000 Rented Dwellings in the Local Authority. Source of UC data: DWP Stat-
Xplore. 
 
5.4.2 Overall Impact of Universal Credit Rollout  
 
Trends in mean landlord repossession rates in the quarters before and after UC ‘Full 
Service’ rollout within local authorities are shown in Figure 5.4, with time being 
adjusted to be relative to the rollout date in the given area. Rates are shown as a ratio to 
the average across local authorities for the given quarter – this removes the influence of 
the secular downward trend since 2014 (as apparent in Figure 5.1 above). Panels (a) and 
(b) of Figure 5.4 suggest a clear rise in claims and orders following UC ‘Full Service’ 
rollout, with a smaller, and much less clear rise in warrants and bailiff repossessions 
shown in panels (c) and (d).    
The relationships between UC rollout and the four separate landlord repossession 
measures are modelled formally in the fixed effects regression models in Table 5.1. This 
is the first part of the analysis set out in section 5.3.5, and it examines the overall impact 
of UC rollout, on average within local authorities, up to 2019 Q1. No significant 
relationship was found between UC ‘Live Service’ rollout and any of the four landlord 
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repossession rates. This is, most likely, because as set out in Chapter 2 ‘Live Service’ 
rollout involved a relatively small number of people as it was targeted only at those 
whose claims were most simple to manage. This, combined with the fact that ‘simple’ 
claims may have been less likely to involve housing costs, makes it unsurprising that 
‘Live Service’ would lead to a significant impact that could be picked up at the local 
authority level. However, a significant relationship was observed between UC ‘Full 
Service’ and landlord repossession rates. To be specific, after accounting for the 
unemployment rate, wages and mean rents, ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with 
an increase of 1.74 landlord repossession claims, 1.42 landlord repossession orders and 
0.70 landlord repossession warrants (all per 10,000 rented dwellings). To provide some 
context on what these figures mean in terms of the scale of the impact, the mean landlord 
repossession rates in the period immediately before ‘Full Service’ rollout within local 
authorities (i.e. 2015 Q1 – 2015 Q4) was 37.6 claims, 29.4 orders and 18.5 warrants (all 
per 10,000 rented dwellings – see Figure 5.1). Therefore, based on this, the observed 
increases associated with ‘Full Service’ rollout correspond to a 4.6% increase in claims, 
4.8% increase in orders and 3.8% increase in warrants up to 2019 Q1.    
  
Figure 5.4. Quarterly Trends in Mean Landlord Repossession Rates (Relative to the Average 
Across Local Authorities) Within English Local Authorities, Before and After UC ‘Full Service 
Rollout.    
 
Notes: only includes data on the 136 local authorities with repossessions data available to four or more 
quarters post rollout. Y axes give the mean of the ratio between landlord repossession rates and the 
average across the 136 local authorities in the given quarter. 
66 
 
Table 5.1. Relationship Between UC Rollout and Landlord Repossession Rates Within 323 
English Local Authorities, 2012 Q1 – 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kray standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. N refers to the number of local authority quarters. Landlord 
repossession rates are per 10,000 rented dwellings in the local authority. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001.  
 
5.4.3 Impact by Length of Rollout  
 
One drawback of the fixed effects regression models set out in Table 5.1 is that, because 
they use a simple binary measure of ‘Full Service’ rollout, they treat all local authority 
quarters post-rollout as being the same. This is over simplistic as in reality UC’s impact 
is likely to be greater where it has been rolled out for longer. This is because it takes 
time for new UC claims to be made after ‘Full Service’ rolls out in an area, and more 
time for its effects on housing insecurity to become apparent through repossession 
actions. Consequently, the relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and landlord 
repossession rates, by length of rollout, is formally modelled in Table 5.2. This is the 
second part of the analysis set out in section 5.3.5, and – by splitting local authority 
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quarters post ‘Full Service’ rollout based on rollout length – examines whether UC’s 
impact is greater when it has been rolled out for longer and thus reached more claimants. 
  
Table 5.2. Relationship Between UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout and Landlord Repossession Rates 
Within 323 English Local Authorities, By Length of Rollout, 2012 Q1 – 2019 Q1    
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kray standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. N refers to the number of local authority quarters. Landlord 
repossession rates are per 10,000 rented dwellings in the local authority. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001.   
 
The results of the modelling confirm that the impact does indeed tend to increase when 
UC has been rolled out for longer. There is a clear upward trend in repossession rates 
with each quarter that passes post rollout – this is strongest for claims and order but also 
evident for warrants. Whilst there is some variation in the significance/confidence 
intervals due to sample sizes (especially in the second and third quarters post rollout), 
the ordering of coefficients is largely consistent. Little impact was found on bailiff 
repossessions – this is likely to be because (as already explained in section 5.3.2) 
relatively few cases reach this stage, and those that do take longer for it to occur, so UC 
has little impact. Overall, by the fourth+ quarters (i.e. 12+ months) post rollout, UC 
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‘Full Service’ was associated with an increase of 2.60 landlord repossession claims, 
2.89 orders and 1.09 warrants (again, all per 10,000 rented dwellings). This is markedly 
higher than the estimates of UC’s overall impact in Table 5.1, and when compared to 
mean landlord repossession rates in the period immediately before ‘Full Service’ rollout, 
this corresponds to a 6.9% increase in claims, 9.8% increase in orders and 5.9% increase 
in warrants.    
 
5.4.4 Falsification Test  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the empirical analysis of this chapter involves a falsification 
test in order to improve causal inference. A falsification test is a test which assesses 
whether the relationship observed between an explanatory variable and an outcome 
variable is causal by checking the specificity of the relationship (Craig, Katikireddi, 
Leyland et al., 2017). Conducting a falsification test for the analysis here is important 
in order to assess whether the results may be spurious and somehow linked to the 
structure of UC’s rollout (i.e. related to any non-randomness in UC’s rollout schedule, 
as discussed in Chapter 4). This is done by repeating the analysis using data on mortgage 
repossession rates as ‘non-equivalent outcome variables’, i.e. new outcome variables 
which are “predicted not to change because of the treatment but […] expected to respond 
to some or all of the contextually important internal validity threats in the same way as  
the target outcome” (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002, p. 509). Mortgage 
repossession rates make suitable non-equivalent outcome variables here because their 
data is collected by the Ministry of Justice in the same way as landlord repossessions 
data, and any confounders that may potentially effect landlord repossession rates (e.g. 
housing or labour market factors) are likely to also effect mortgage repossession rates 
in a similar way. However, mortgage repossession rates should, crucially, not be 
impacted by the rollout of UC as 99% of UC claimants who receive help for  housing 
costs are in rented accommodation (Department for Work and Pensions, 2018c). 
The results of the falsification test are provided in Appendix 4. No significant 
relationship was found between UC rollout and mortgage repossession rates within the 
323 English local authorities in the dataset between 2012 Q1 and 2019 Q1, and the 
estimated direction of the effect was negative. This suggests that the results of the main 
analysis set out in this chapter are unlikely to be spurious and linked somehow to 
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confounding from any non-randomness in UC’s rollout schedule. This boosts the 




The results outlined in this chapter suggest that UC rollout has led to an increase in 
landlord repossession rates within English local authorities. The results from the first 
part of the analysis suggest that overall, UC ‘Full Service’ rollout was, on average, 
associated with an increase of 1.74 landlord repossession claims, 1.42 landlord 
repossession orders and 0.70 landlord repossession warrants within local authorities (per 
10,000 rented dwellings) by 2019 Q1. When compared to mean rates in the period 
immediately before ‘Full Service’ rolled out (i.e. 2015 Q1 – 2015 Q4), this corresponds 
to a 4.6% increase in claims, 4.8% increase in orders and 3.8% increase in warrants.  
In addition, the results from the second part of the analysis suggest that the impact of 
UC ‘Full Service’ tended to be greater when it had been rolled out for longer and thus 
reached more claimants. For example, where ‘Full Service’ had been rolled out for 12+ 
months it was associated with an increase of 2.60 claims, 2.89 orders and 1.09 warrants 
(again, per 10,000 rented dwellings). When this is, again, compared to mean rates in the 
period immediately before ‘Full Service’ rollout it corresponds to a 6.9% increase in 
claims, 9.8% increase in orders and 5.9% increase in warrants. There was no significant 
relationship between UC rollout and rates of bailiff repossessions, but this is likely to 
be because relatives few cases actually lead to this stage as cases tend to be resolved 
before the need for bailiffs.  
The strength of this analysis is that it was able to exploit cross-area variation in the 
timing of UC rollout, linking data from the official UC rollout schedule (at the local 
authority level) with administrative panel data on landlord repossession rates.  Whilst 
UC rollout was not truly random (as discussed in Chapter 4), the analysis used a fixed 
effects panel design to reduce the influence of any bias potentially arising from this 
(with local authority and time fixed effects to control for potential unobserved 
confounders as well as inclusion of additional control variables to control for observed 
potential confounders). In addition, the internal validity of the analysis was boosted by 
the fact that UC’s impact tended to increase when it had been rolled out for longer  (and 
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thus reached more claimants), and via the falsification test which suggests that it is 
unlikely the findings of the main analysis are spurious. It is therefore unlikely that the 
relationship observed between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and landlord repossession rates 
is not causal.  
However, the analysis did have some limitations, which are important to note here. 
Firstly, it was conducted at the local authority level as opposed to the individual level. 
This creates potential for ecological fallacy – there is no way of knowing whether the 
households facing repossession actions are the same households who have moved onto 
UC. Yet, it is hard to see why else there would be a rise in rates of repossession actions 
coinciding with UC rollout if it was not for those directly affected.   
Secondly, the Ministry of Justice data on repossessions do not capture the full extent of 
households at risk of evictions/tenancy non-sustainment in England. This is because 
some households may be forced out without legal proceedings taking place, e.g. if they 
leave voluntarily following informal pressure or threats of being evicted. There is also 
some evidence of landlords paying tenants who are in arrears to leave, as this is a quicker 
than going through the legal process (Rugg, 2008). However, this phenomenon will not 
bias the results of this chapter’s analysis unless its propensity to occur is somehow 
linked to the UC rollout schedule. There is no known reason why this may be the case.  
Thirdly, whilst the outcome variables and explanatory variables used in the analysis are 
quarterly estimates, the control variables are annual estimates that were converted into 
quarterly estimates via linear interpolation (in case of ‘median weekly wages’ and ‘mean 
weekly rents’) or by taking the average of previous 12 months of data (in case of ‘Model 
based unemployment rate’). This limits their ability to pick up quarter to quarter 
variation, and introduces greater noise (although not bias) to the data. 
Fourthly, as discussed in Chapter 2, alongside Universal Credit another important part 
of the social security context that has had implications for housing insecurity in recent 
years is benefits limits/freeze. These were in place between 2013-14 and 2019-20 and 
as such, at least at a national level, its timing broadly coincide with the rollout of UC. 
Therefore, a further limitation of the analysis was that, though it was able to exploit 
cross-area variation in UC rollout, it is not possible to fully disentangle the effects of 
UC with the national level effects of the benefits limits/freeze.    
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Finally, the Ministry of Justice repossessions data consists of actions by both social and 
private landlords and it was not possible to disaggregate the data into social rented sector 
versus the private rented sector. The impact of UC may vary between sectors because 
tenants in the social rented sector are likely to be more financially vulnerable than those 
in the private rented sector, whilst UC’s design of direct payments is novel for the social 
rented sector but not the private rented sector (where direct payment to claimants has 
been in place since LHA was introduced in 2008) (Hickman, Kemp, Reeve et al., 2017). 
This limitation is addressed in Chapter 6, which follows. 
Despite these limitations, the analysis in this chapter has provided evidence of a clear 
link between UC rollout and landlord repossession rates. Going forward, Chapters 6-8 
examine UC’s impact on the stages of housing insecurity that occur both before (i.e. 
household financial problems and rent arrears) and after (i.e. homelessness) 
repossession actions.  
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Chapter 6. Empirical Study 2: Impact of Universal 
Credit Rollout on Rates of Advice Sought from 




This chapter examines the impact of Universal Credit rollout on rates of advice sought 
from Citizens Advice on rent arrears and homelessness issues within 323 English local 
authorities. As set out in Chapter 4, and in a similar fixed effects panel design to that 
employed in Chapter 5, this involves linking data on the timing of UC rollout with 
‘advice trends’ data obtained from Citizens Advice on the number of households seeking 
advice on rent arrears/homelessness issues between 2014 Q1 and 2019 Q1. The specific 
research questions addressed in this chapter are as follows:  
 
1. Has UC rollout led to an increase in rates of advice sought from Citizens 
Advice on rent arrears and/or homelessness related issues within 323 English 
local authorities up to 2019 Q1? 
 
2. Does the impact of UC rollout on advice rates (if any found) increase when 
it has been rolled out for longer and thus reached more claimants? 
 
3. How does this impact vary between those in the private rented sector versus 
the social rented sector? 
 
This can build on the analysis of Chapter 5 and address critical gaps in two ways. First, 
whilst chapter 5 focussed on legal landlord repossession actions, the analysis here can 
provide insight into UC’s impacts on the stages of housing insecurity that occur both 
before (i.e., build-up of rent arrears) and after (i.e. threatened/actual homelessness)  
repossessions. Second, the Citizens Advice data on rent arrears can be disaggregated by 
tenure. This means that it is possible to examine how UC’s impact varies between the 
private rented sector (PRS) and the social rented sector (SRS). This is important given 
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one of the key limitations of Chapter 5’s analysis was that such disaggregation between 
sectors was not possible. 
This chapter begins by providing some background that is specific to this chapter’s 
empirical study. This includes background on the role of Citizens Advice and their data, 
and specific background on UC and the SRS versus PRS (which is included here as this 
is the only chapter in which data on outcomes is disaggregated by tenure) . Next, the 
chapter will set out the data, variables, methods and modelling used for its empirical 
analysis. It will then present the results (including how this links with previous analysis 





6.2.1 The Role of Citizens Advice and their Data 
 
Citizens Advice (aka Citizens Advice Bureau or CAB) are a network of independent 
charities who offer free confidential advice online, over the phone, and in person to those 
facing problems e.g. relating to benefits, debt, housing, employment, consumer issues, 
family or immigration (Citizens Advice, 2019a). The main service aims of Citizens Advice 
are: 1) to provide the advice people need for the problems they face, and 2) to improve the 
policies and practices that affect people’s lives (Citizens Advice, 2016, p. 3).  
In order to identify the structural and policy issues contributing to problems for people in 
society, Citizens Advice collect data on how many clients they see, who they are and the 
main problems they face (Watson, 2018). Citizens Advice is often the first place people will 
go when faced with a problem (Ibid). They helped 1,273,000 people face-to-face, 867,000 
people over the phone and 287,000 via e-mail or webchat in 2018/19 (Ibid). This, combined 
with their national coverage, means that their data can provide strong insight into the scale 




6.2.2 Existing Evidence on the Impact of UC Rollout on Advice Given 
by Citizens Advice 
 
There is some existing research, conducted by Citizens Advice themselves, on problems 
arising from UC rollout (some of which has already been briefly summarised in Chapter 3). 
Firstly, their report ‘Delivering on Universal Credit’ set out how they had helped 47,000 
people with UC issues by mid-2017, and how those claiming UC were more likely than those 
on ‘legacy’ benefits to need help with other issues (Foley, 2017, pp. 9-10). Secondly, their 
report ‘Universal Credit and debt’ suggests that Citizens Advice clients advised on UC were 
more likely to also need advice specifically on debt issues than clients advised on ‘legacy’ 
benefits, particularly relating to priority debts such as rent arrears, council tax arrears, and 
magistrates court fines (Drake, 2017). More recently, their ‘Managing Money on Universal 
Credit’ report suggests that around half of their clients helped with UC were in rent arrears, 
and around 60 percent were using advance payments during UC’s long paid period (Hobson, 
Spoor and Kearton, 2019). Overall, these reports convey that Citizens Advice clients on UC 
were more likely to seek advice on housing insecurity issues compared to clients on legacy 
benefits. However, these studies are based on cross-sectional data. In order to more closely 
examine the causal impact of UC rollout, the analysis in this chapter tracks English local 
authorities over time in a fixed-effects panel design, measuring the relationship between UC 
rollout and rates of advice given on housing insecurity issues.  
 
6.2.3 Universal Credit Housing Costs in the Social versus Private Rented 
Sectors, and the Broader Context of the Tenure Mix Amongst Low-
Income Households in England 
 
Historically, the SRS has played a key role in alleviating poverty in England (and the rest of 
the UK) – it is said to have provided a ‘saving grace’ that breaks the link between a low-
income and poverty/material deprivation (Bradshaw, Chzhen and Stephens, 2008; Tunstall, 
Bevan, Bradshaw et al., 2013; Clair, Fledderjohann, Lalor et al., 2020). At its peak in the 
mid-1970s, the SRS made up nearly a third of the British housing stock, and given its 
provision was largely for families with children, this included considerably more than a third 
of the overall population (Ravetz, 2001). This meant that – in the second half of the 20th 




However, in recent decades the availability of social housing has declined, and the PRS has 
grown substantially (as touched upon in Chapter 5’s section on determinants of eviction). 
This decline in social housing has largely been driven by sales through Right to Buy, reduced 
social housing grants and the implementation of building restrictions on Local Authorities 
(Clair, Fledderjohann, Lalor et al., 2020, p. 56). Meanwhile, private renting has increased 
following a political consensus over its important role in providing short-term and flexible 
housing to young, mobile professionals (Bailey, 2020). According to national statistics, the 
PRS in England has doubled in size since 2002, and now accounts for around 4.5 million (or 
19 percent) of the 23.3 million households living in England (MHCLG, 2019, p. 6). This 
makes it the second largest tenure group (behind owner occupation), having overtaken the 
SRS, which following a long downward trend has now stabilised at around 4 million 
households (17 percent) (Ibid). This rise in private renting has been particularly marked for 
poorer young adults and their children (Bailey, 2020).   
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the SRS in England continues to play a key role in 
housing low-income households, and in alleviating poverty. The selective selling off of 
social rented accommodation to relatively better off households through Right to Buy has 
arguably led to the remaining social rented dwellings being even more closely targeted at 
those with the most social need (Bailey, 2020). Consequently, the SRS now plays more of a 
‘safety net’ function rather than a ‘wider affordability’ function, and this is reinforced by the 
legal duties placed on local authorities to house unintentionally homeless households in 
priority need (Stephens and Leishman, 2017, p. 1040). In terms of the take up of Housing 
Benefit (HB) (targeted at low-income households), the majority of claimants continue to be 
housed in the SRS. In 2017/2018, around 60 percent (2.4 million households) of social 
renters received HB to help with rent payments, compared to just 20 percent (889,000 
households) of private renters (MHCLG, 2019, p. 16). 
With regard to housing costs under Universal Credit specifically, throughout its rollout so 
far there has tended to be more of an equal split between claimants in the social versus private 
rented sectors (perhaps because social tenants were more likely to already be claiming HB 
and thus do not transfer over to UC until they have a change of circumstances or in the 
‘managed migration’ phase of rollout). This is highlighted in Figure 6.1, which shows that 
there was an almost identical number of households on UC (with housing costs) in the SRS 
and PRS up to the latter stages of 2017. Subsequently, there has been a marginally greater 
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number of households in the SRS, with approximately 415,000 households on UC (with 
housing costs), compared to 380,000 in the PRS by 2019 Q1.  
 
Figure 6.1. Quarterly Trends in the Number of households on UC (with housing costs) in 
England, SRS versus PRS, 2015 Q3 - 2019 Q1. 
 
Data Source: DWP Stat Xplore. 
 
Figure 6.2. Quarterly Trends in the Mean Rate of Households on UC with Housing Costs 
(per 10,000 rented dwellings in sector) Across 323 English local authorities, SRS versus PRS, 
2015 Q3 – 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: rates for SRS are per 10,000 social rented dwellings in the local authority, whilst rates for PRS are 
per 10,000 private rented dwellings in the local authority. Data Sources: DWP Stat Xplore, ONS 
‘subnational dwelling stock by tenure estimates’ and MHCLG ‘Live Tables on Dwelling Stock Estimates’. 
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To provide insight into the proportion (rather than overall numbers) of households claiming 
UC with housing costs in the SRS/PRS, Figure 6.2 shows trends in the mean rate of 
households on UC with housing costs (per 10,000 rented dwellings in sector), across English 
local authorities. It shows a fairly similar trend to Figure 6.1, in that mean rates tend to be 
similar up to the middle of 2017, after which there has tended to be a marginally higher 
proportion of social renters on UC with housing costs than private renters. As of 2019 Q1, 
across local authorities there was a mean rate of around 1000 households on UC with housing 
costs in the SRS (per 10,000 social rented dwellings), i.e.10 percent. Meanwhile, there were 
around 844 households on UC with housing costs in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented 
dwellings), i.e. 8.4 percent. Both of these figures will rise substantially throughout the 
‘managed migration’ phase of transferring remaining HB claimants over to UC. 
 
6.2.4 Universal Credit’s Impacts on the Social versus Private Rented 
Sectors 
 
As set out above, UC housing costs are for tenants in both the social and private rented 
sectors. Importantly, this means that its rollout is likely to have wide-ranging implications, 
not just for social/private tenants claiming UC but also for landlords. The impact of UC 
rollout on the PRS specifically was debated in parliament in January 2018 following 
widespread concerns that it is exacerbating the reluctance of private landlords to let to those 
dependent on UC housing costs for rent payments (Wilson, 2018). Existing research suggests 
that this is a substantial issue. Landlord surveys suggests that the majority of private 
landlords are unwilling to let to those on UC, and that the majority of those who do have 
experienced the tenants who claim UC going into arrears (National Landlords Association, 
2017; Simcock, 2018). Whilst unwillingness to let to benefit claimants was also an issue 
under the legacy Housing Benefit system, Simcock (2018) notes that part of the problem that 
is specific to UC is its ethos of promoting financial responsibility to claimants (reflected in 
its monthly direct payment system – this was discussed in Chapter 2), which means that 
landlords do not have confidence that they will receive their rent payments.   
Regarding UC’s impact on the SRS, Hickman et al. (2018) set out the extensive potential 
adverse impacts of UC rollout on housing associations. This consisted of concerns that UC 
rollout would: (a) reduce housing association income streams due to rent arrears building up, 
(b) require additional costs on resources (e.g. staff) for rent collection practices as well as 
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provision of personalised support to UC claiming tenants, and (c) lead to cash flow problems 
arising from these issues, potentially threatening the financial viability of some housing 
associations. Importantly, in the context of UC rollout and other welfare reforms, there is 
some evidence of increased use of pre-tenancy affordability assessments for prospective 
tenants, and potentially excluding those with poor financial histories (Preece, Hickman and 
Pattison, 2019).  
Whilst UC rollout clearly impacts on both the PRS and SRS, there are two important ways 
in which the impact may differ between sectors, with social renters potentially being 
particularly vulnerable to rent arrears, evictions and homelessness. The first difference 
relates to the monthly direct payment system under UC. Unlike in the PRS – where direct 
payment to claimants have been in place since the introduction of Local Housing Allowance 
in 2008 – this is a completely novel approach within the SRS. Prior to UC, all HB claimants 
renting from local authorities and 92 percent of HB claimants renting from housing 
associations had the benefit paid to their landlord, not directly to themselves (Hickman et al., 
2017, p. 4). This means that the new monthly direct payment system is likely to have a 
greater impact on the SRS than the PRS, which is by now used to the direct payment system. 
Secondly, it has also been suggested that the impact of UC rollout on housing insecurity may 
be greater in the SRS than in the PRS because those in social housing are more likely to be 
vulnerable, and thus more likely to have difficulty paying their rent (Hickman et al., 2017). 
This is reflected in the fact that the majority of landlord repossession actions occur in the 
SRS (Ministry of Justice, 2019, p. 6), and that social renters are more likely to be in rent 
arrears than private renters despite spending a lower proportion of their income on rent 
(Ministry of Housing, 2018, p. 4). This means social renters may be particularly vulnerable 
to rent arrears during UC’s long wait periods, when faced with an income reduction via a 
sanction, or as a result of the new monthly direct payment system. 
Overall, these issues suggest that whilst UC rollout effects both the social and private rented 
sectors, its impact may be greater on the SRS. However, there is currently a lack of robust 
research into UC’s varying impact on housing security between sectors. This chapter seeks 
to address this. After first examining the overall impact of UC on rates of advice sought from 
Citizens Advice on housing insecurity issues, the data is then disaggregated to measure if 
the impact varies between social and private rented sectors. The data and methodology used 
to achieve this is set out in detail in the following section.  
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As with the analysis in Chapter 5, a quarterly local authority level dataset was compiled with 
a sample of 323 English local authorities (City of London, Isles of Scilly and West Somerset 
were again excluded due to small populations). Whilst Chapter 5’s analysis covered 2012 
Q1 – 2019 Q1, this time, given the availability of the Citizens Advice data, the dataset covers 
the period 2014 Q1 – 2019 Q1. 
 
6.3.2 Citizens Advice Rent Arrears and Homelessness Advice Issues 
Data (Outcome Variables) 
  
Data on the rates of advice given by Citizens Advice, at the local authority level, on rent 
arrears and homelessness issues were used to create three main outcome variables for this 
analysis. These are: (1) ‘rent arrears advice rate’, (2) ‘threatened homelessness advice rate’ 
and (3) ‘actual homelessness advice rate’. These indicate, for each local authority, the 
quarterly number of people advised by Citizens Advice on rent arrears issues, threatened 
homelessness issues and actual homelessness issues, as a rate per 10,000 rented dwellings 
(for rent arrears) or per 10,000 households (for threatened/actual homelessness). These 
include those who received advice face-to-face, over the phone, by e-mail or by webchat, 
with each issue being counted once for each client in each period so that those returning for 
help on the same ongoing issue are not duplicated.  
All this data is available at the local authority level as each person who approaches Citizens 
Advice with an issue has the local authority they live in recorded, although for the ‘actual 
homelessness advice rate’ this information was not always available due to some clients 
being unable to provide an address due to their homelessness. The ‘threatened’ and ‘actual’ 
homelessness advice rates were coded into rates per 10,000 households in the local authority 
using 2014-based annual household projections. The ‘rent arrears advice rate’ was initially 
coded into rates per 10,000 total rented dwellings in the local authority, using Office for 
National Statistics’ ‘Subnational Dwelling Stock by Tenure Estimates’ and MHCLG’s ‘Live 
Tables on Dwelling Stock’. It was then disaggregated by sector into: (1) ‘SRS rent arrears 
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advice rate’, i.e. the number of social tenants advised on rent arrears issues (per 10,000 social 
rented dwellings), and (2)‘PRS rent arrears advice rate’, i.e. the number of private tenants 
advised on rent arrears issues (per 10,000 private rented dwellings).    
Table 6.1. Details of subcategories making up Citizens Advice rent arrears, threatened 
homelessness and actual homelessness issues, 2018/2019. 
Citizens Advice 
Issue 







1. Liability for debt: 15.2% 
2. Creditor debt collection practices: 0.7% 
3. Impact on housing register: 0.1% 
4. Dealing with debt repayments: 48.6% 
5. Possession claim for arrears: 13.0% 
6. Eviction for arrears: 10.0% 
7. Direct deductions from benefit: 2.3% 
8. Former tenancy arrears recovery: 0.9% 








1. Relatives/friends unable/unwilling to house: 9.8% 
2. Relationship breakdown (excluding divorce): 5.8% 
3. Domestic Violence: 3.4% 
4. Harassment/illegal eviction: 1.9% 
5. Mortgage/secured loan possession: 3.0%  
6. LA possession action: 12.6% 
7. Housing association possession action: 15.4%  
8. Private landlord possession action: 21.4% 
9. Landlord’s mortgage arrears: 0.4% 
10. Delays in HB claims: 0.7% 
11. LA won’t re-house permanently: 1.7%  
12. Anti-social behaviour: 1.4% 
13. Not recorded/not applicable: 11.2% 
14. Benefit cuts (including cap): 0.8% 









1. Relatives/friends unable/unwilling to house: 21.9% 
2. Relationship breakdown (excluding divorce): 12.2% 
3. Domestic Violence: 6.3% 
4. Harassment/illegal eviction: 2.2% 
5. Mortgage/secured loan possession: 0.8% 
6. LA possession action: 2.0% 
7. Housing association possession action: 2.3% 
8. Private landlord possession action: 4.9% 
9. Landlord’s mortgage arrears: 0.1% 
10. Delays in HB claims: 0.2% 
11. LA won’t re-house permanently: 5.6% 
12. Anti-social behaviour: 2.1% 
13. Not recorded/not applicable: 16.5% 
14. Benefit cuts (including cap): 0.4% 
15. Other: 22.5% 
Notes: percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Data Source: Citizens Advice ‘Advice Trends’ 
Tableau Data.  
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Importantly, advice issues within each category are not homogenous, but rather are made up 
of various subcategories of client request reasons. When someone approaches Citizens 
Advice with a problem, this is first coded into a broad ‘issue’ category, and then 
subsequently sorted into a subcategory within that ‘issue’.  To provide more information on 
the most common reasons for Citizens Advice clients seeking advice within the rent 
arrears/homelessness advice issues, Table 6.1 details the different subcategories within 
Citizens Advice rent arrears, threatened homelessness and actual homelessness issues.     
 
6.3.3 Universal Credit Data (Explanatory Variables) 
 
Initially, the empirical analysis in this chapter uses the same three explanatory variables that 
were used in Chapter 5, namely: (1) ‘UC Live Service’, (2) ‘UC Full Service’ and (3) ‘UC 
Full Service (by length of rollout)’.  
In addition, the analysis of this chapter also uses two new explanatory variables as part of 
examining UC’s impact on the social vs. private rented sectors. Firstly, the ‘SRS Households 
on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ indicates the quarterly number of social rented households 
claiming UC with entitlement to housing costs, as a rate per 10,000 social rented dwellings 
in the local authority. Secondly, the ‘PRS Households on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ 
similarly indicates the quarterly number of privately rented households claiming UC with 
entitlement to housing costs, as a rate per 10,000 private rented dwellings. Data for both of 
these variables come from DWP Stat Xplore (Department for Work and Pensions, 2021b). 
They are not cumulative measures of the total number of households on UC with housing 
costs in the quarter, but rather provide a snapshot of the figure on the second Thursday of 
the quarter’s third month. The data excludes households whose UC is not in payment, i.e. 
those not currently receiving UC payments, for example due to their earning being 
sufficiently high to remove their entitlement.  
 
6.3.4 Control Variables 
 
The need for advice on rent arrears and homelessness issues is likely impacted by similar 
labour and housing market factors as those which affect landlord repossession actions. 
As such the same three control variables used in Chapter 5’s analysis are also used here, 
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namely: (1) ‘model based unemployment rate’, (2) ‘median weekly wages’, and (3) 
‘mean weekly rents’. The only difference in the use of control variables here comes in 
the analysis involving disaggregation of outcomes by SRS versus PRS. In this part of 
the analysis, the ‘mean weekly rents’ variable is disaggregated by sector into ‘mean weekly 
SRS rents’ and ‘mean monthly PRS rents’.  
 
6.3.5 Statistical Analysis 
 
As in Chapter 5, the statistical analysis of this chapter involves fixed effects panel 
models. These were used to formally examine the relationship between UC rollout and 
rates of advice sought from Citizens Advice on rent arrears/homelessness issues, both 
overall and in the SRS versus PRS. As in Chapter 5, the models include both local 
authority and time fixed effects, which effectively control for unobserved baseline 
differences between local authorities and unobserved variables that vary over time but 
not between local authorities. Time fixed effects were particularly important to include 
here as rates of advice given tend to be lower in the second and fourth quarters of the 
year, which can largely be explained by their lower number of working days (Citizens 
Advice are closed during Christmas and Easter holidays).  
In terms of the specific modelling used in this chapter’s analysis, this was conducted in three 
distinct parts, to reflect the three research questions set out in this chapter’s introduction. 
The first part of the analysis measures the overall impact of UC rollout on advice rates, as 
follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐵 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                      + 𝛽4𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    
 
Where 𝑖 is the local authority and 𝑡 is the quarterly time point. 𝐶𝐴𝐵 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the 
rate of advice given by Citizens Advice on rent arrears and homelessness issues, with 
separate models being run for ‘rent arrears advice rate’, ‘threatened homelessness advice 
rate’, and ‘actual homelessness advice rate’. 𝑈𝐶𝐿𝑆 is the ‘UC Live Service’ explanatory 
variable, 𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆  is the ‘UC Full Service’ explanatory variable, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  is the 




and 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 is the ‘mean weekly rents’ variable. Finally, 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 is the time fixed effects, 
𝛼𝑖 is the local authority fixed effects and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The second part of the analysis measures whether the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout on 
advice rates (if any found) increases when it has been rolled out for longer and thus reached 
more claimants, as follows:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝐵 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                      + 𝛽3𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
Where 𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ is the ‘UC Full Service (by length of rollout)’ categorical variable and 
all other variables are the same as those in Equation 6.1.  
The third and final part of the analysis disaggregates the data in order to examine how the 
impact of UC rollout on rent arrears advice rates varies between the SRS and PRS. This is 
as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑅𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝑆 𝑅𝐴 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                                      + 𝛽3𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡   
 
𝐶𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑅𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝑆 𝑅𝐴 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                                      + 𝛽3𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑅𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝑆 𝑅𝐴 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑅𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝑆 𝐻𝐻𝑈𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                              + 𝛽3𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑅𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
  
Where ‘CAB SRS/PRS RA Advice Rate’ is the rate of advice given on rent arrears, with 
separate models being run for rates in the SRS (per 10,000 social rented dwellings) and the 
PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings). ‘SRS/PRS HHUCR’ is the rate of households on 
UC with housing costs, again with separate models being run for each sector. All other 
variables are the same as those set out in Equations 6.1 and 6.2, except 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 which is 










6.4.1 Overall Trends in Advice Rates 
 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 provide an overview of trends in mean rates of advice given by Citizens 
Advice on rent arrears/homelessness issues during the analysis period. Specifically, Figure 
6.3 shows trends in mean rates of advice given on rent arrears, as well as mortgage arrears 
for comparison. It highlights seasonal fluctuations in advice rates. Rates tend to be highest 
in Q1 (perhaps due to people delaying approaching Citizens Advice until after Christmas), 
and tend to be lowest in Q2 and Q4 of each year (which can largely be explained by closures 
for Easter/Christmas holidays reducing the number of working days in Citizens Advice 
offices during these quarters). This is particularly clear for advice given on rent arrears. 
Unrelated to this, there was a slight downward trend in advice given on both rent arrears and 
mortgage arrears advice rates between 2014 Q1 and 2017 Q4, since when rates (particularly 
for rent arrears) have begun to rise slightly. In 2019 Q1, the mean rates were 30.01 rent 
arrears issues (per 10,000 rented dwellings) and 2.44 mortgage/secured loan issues (per 
10,000 owner occupied dwellings).  
  
Figure 6.3. Quarterly Trends in Mean Rates of Housing Arrears Advice Given by Citizens 




Figure 6.4. Quarterly Trends in Mean Rates of homelessness Advice Given by Citizens 
Advice Across English local authorities, Q1 2014 – Q1 2019. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 shows trends in mean rates of advice given by Citizens Advice on actual and 
threatened homelessness. It conveys that mean rates of actual homelessness advice has 
remained fairly constant, with just a slight downward trend from 1.98 in 2014 Q3 to 1.42 in 
2019 Q1 (per 10,000 households). In a similar trend to rent arrears, mean advice rates for 
threatened homelessness were falling from 6.03 in 2014 Q1 to 3.34 in 2014 Q4, before 
subsequently rising to 4.52 in 2019 Q1 (per 10,000 households).     
 
6.4.2 Overall Impact of Universal Credit Rollout  
 
To examine the relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and rates of advice given on 
rent arrears/homelessness issues, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 plot trends in the quarters before and 
after its rollout. This is done by adjusting time to be relative to ‘Full Service’ rollout. 
 Figure 6.5 conveys that following a downward trend prior to rollout, there is a clear rise in 
the mean rate of advice given on rent arrears in the quarters immediately following the 
introduction of UC ‘Full Service’. For comparison, it also shows the mean rates of advice 
given on mortgage/secured loan arrears, which are not expected to be affected by UC (as 
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discussed in Chapter 5). They follow a similar downward trend to the rent arrears advice rate, 
but importantly, this trend continues uninterrupted after ‘Full Service’ rollout.  
However, whilst there is a clear rise in rent arrears advice following ‘Full Service’ rollout, 
the same was not found for homelessness advice rates. Figure 6.6 shows that trends in mean 
rates of advice given by Citizens Advice on threatened and actual homelessness appear to 
be unaffected by ‘Full Service’ rollout and continue on the same pattern seen before rollout.  
The relationship between UC rollout and rates of advice given by Citizens Advice is formally 
modelled in Table 6.2, which measures the overall impact of UC rollout within local 
authorities, on average, up to 2019 Q1. Consistent with the previous analysis of landlord 
repossession rates (in Chapter 5), no significant relationship was found between ‘Live 
Service’ rollout and rates of advice given by Citizens Advice on rent arrears/homelessness 
issues. Again, this is most likely because ‘Live Service’ rollout involved a relatively 
small number of people as it was targeted only at the simplest claims to manage. 
 
Figure 6.5. Quarterly Trends in Mean Citizens Advice Housing Arrears advice rates in 
English Local Authorities, Before and After UC 'Full Service' rollout. 
 
Notes: Due to UC’s gradual rollout, the sample size of local authorities decreases in the quarters post 
rollout. Data was available for 323 local authorities in the first quarter post rollout, 272 in the second, 
208 in the third, 136 in the fourth, 117 in the fifth and 82 in the sixth quarter post rollout. 
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Figure 6.6. Quarterly Trends in Mean Homelessness Advice Rates in English Local Authorities, Before 
and After UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout. 
 
Notes: Due to UC’s gradual rollout, the sample size of local authorities decreases in the quarters post 
rollout. Data was available for 323 local authorities in the first quarter post rollout, 272 in the second, 
208 in the third, 136 in the fourth, 117 in the fifth and 82 in the sixth quarter post rollout.   
 
Table 6.2. Relationship Between UC Rollout and Rates of Advice Given by Citizens Advice 
on Rent Arrears/Homelessness Within 323 English Local Authorities, 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. Rent arrears advice rate is per 10,000 rented dwellings in the 
local authority, whilst both homelessness advice rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority. 
Median weekly wages includes both part-time and full-time work. Mean weekly rents include private 
rents, housing association rents and, where applicable, local authority rents. The discrepancies in the 
number of local authority quarters occurs due a small amount of missing data, particularly for actual 
homelessness advice rates. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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However, the results suggest that UC ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with an increase 
of 2.97 rent arrears advice issues within local authorities (per 10,000 rented dwellings). This 
is in line with the trend observed in Figure 6.5. To provide some context, the mean rate of 
rent arrears advice given by Citizens Advice in the period immediately prior to ‘Full Service’ 
rollout (i.e. 2015 Q3 – 2015 Q4) was 26.9 (per 10,000 rented dwellings). Therefore, the 2.97 
(per 10,000 rented dwellings) figure in Table 6.2 corresponds to around an 11% increase on 
pre rollout rates. This suggests that significantly more people are having to seek help with 
dealing with rent arrears following UC ‘Full Service’ rollout.  
Whilst ‘Full Service’ was associated with an increase in rates of rent arrears advice, there 
was no significant relationship found with rates of advice given on threatened or actual 
homelessness. This suggests that whilst an increasing number of households may be 
struggling to maintain rent payments following UC rollout, this was not in turn leading to a 
significant increase in those requiring help from Citizens Advice with homelessness issues 
up to 2019 Q1.  
It is important to note that some of the control variables in the regression models in Table 
6.2 (and those in subsequent tables) provide counterintuitive results. Firstly, the results 
suggest a negative relationship between mean levels of rent within local authorities and rates 
of advice given on all three housing insecurity issues. This is counterintuitive given that rent 
increases can be important homelessness determinants (particularly in the PRS), although 
PRS affordability has been improving in England in recent years (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, 
Bramley et al., 2019). Secondly, the results suggest a negative relationship between local 
authority unemployment rates and advice given on actual homelessness, which is 
counterintuitive given that unemployed individuals tend to be at greater risk of homelessness 
(Johnson, Scutella, Tseng et al., 2015). These results may perhaps be explained by ecological 
fallacy, whereby relationships observed at an area level do not necessarily match those at 
the individual level. Indeed, previous local authority level analysis of homelessness in the 
UK have also observed a negative relationship between unemployment rates and 
homelessness (Loopstra, Reeves, Barr et al., 2016; Bramley and Fitzpatrick, 2018).   
In order to tie in the findings outlined in Table 6.2 with the findings of the previous analysis 
of UC’s impacts on landlord repossession rates in Chapter 5, and thus provide a fuller picture 
of UC’s housing security impacts (as well as showing corroboration between two 
independent data sources), Figure 6.7 displays the estimated ‘Full Service’ coefficients for 
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the various housing insecurity outcome variables from both pieces of analysis. These are 
ordered from left-to-right based on their position in the stages of housing insecurity (as set 
out in Chapter 3). 
Figure 6.7. Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout on Housing Insecurity Indicators within 
English Local Authorities, Overall to 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Citizens Advice (CAB) data is from 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q1 whilst repossessions data is from 2012 
Q1 – 2019 Q1. Point estimates are derived from coefficients in the regression models already 
outlined. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Where UC ‘Full Service’ impact is 
statistically significant (i.e. confidence intervals do not cross zero), text boxes next to coefficients 
show the percentage increase compared to mean rates in the pre UCFS period (2015 Q1 - 2015 Q4). 
 
Figure 6.7 conveys a clear trend in that the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ does appear to be 
greater in the earlier stages of housing insecurity. Specifically, the biggest impact is found 
on Citizens Advice rent arrears advice rates, with an 11 percent increase on pre rollout rates. 
This is followed by landlord repossession claims (4.6 percent increase on pre rollout rates), 
landlord repossession orders (4.8 percent increase on pre rollout rates) and landlord 
repossession warrants (3.8 percent increase on pre rollout rates).  
Conversely, no significant impact was found on landlord bailiff repossession rates or rates 
of advice given by Citizens Advice on threatened or actual homelessness. This suggests that 
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either: (a) there are some protective factors that are preventing increased rent arrears and 
repossession actions arising from UC leading to actual eviction/homelessness, (b) as UC 
rollout was still in its relatively early stages by 2019 Q1, impacts on the latter ‘stages of 
housing insecurity’ were not yet picked up by the data, and/or (c) there is no significant 
impact because relatively few households actually reach the stage of bailiff repossession as 
cases tend to be resolved (e.g. via paying off arrears or moving out voluntarily into new 
accommodation) before this occurs, thus preventing homelessness from arising.  
   
 
6.4.3 Impact by Length of Rollout 
 
In order to examine whether UC’s impact increases over time post rollout, as more claimants 
move onto UC and its effects have more time to become apparent, Table 6.3 measures UC’s 
impact by length of rollout.  
The results suggest that, in general, the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout on rent arrears 
advice rates does indeed tend to increase when it has been rolled out for longer. Specifically, 
it is associated with an increase of 1.65 rent arrears advice issues (per 10,000 rented 
dwellings) in the first quarter post rollout, rising to 2.81 in the second quarter post and 4.77 
in the third quarter post. It then falls slightly to 4.37 in the fourth quarter post (although by 
this point data is only available for less than half of local authorities, as the majority hadn’t 
reached this stage by 2019 Q1), before again rising to 4.40 in the fifth quarter post and 4.84 
in the sixth quarter post.  
These results are in line with the trend displayed in Figure 6.5, which also conveys the 
increasing impact of UC ‘Full Service’ in the quarters post rollout. Overall, this suggests that 
‘Full Service’ rollout is associated with a significant negative impact on rent arrears, leading 
to an increasing number of households requiring help from Citizens Advice on how to deal 
with arrears. This impact appears to be almost immediate, as it is seen in the first quarter 
after rollout, and increases over time as more people move onto UC. 
However, Table 6.3 also shows that there was no clear significant relationship between UC 
rollout and rates of advice sought from Citizens Advice on threatened or actual homelessness. 
This is consistent with the results shown in Table 6.2, as well as the trends outlined in Figure 
6.6. It suggests that, up to 2019 Q1, UC rollout had not significantly impacted on the number 
of households requiring homelessness related advice from Citizens Advice.     
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Table 6.3. Relationship Between UC Rollout and Rates of Advice Given by Citizens Advice 
on Rent Arrears and Homelessness within 323 English Local Authorities, by Length of 
Rollout, 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. Rent arrears advice rate is per 10,000 rented dwellings in the 
local authority, whilst both homelessness advice rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority. 
Median weekly wages includes both part-time and full-time work. Mean weekly rents include private 
rents, housing association rents and, where applicable, local authority rents. Discrepancies in the number 
of local authority quarters occurs due a small amount of missing data, particularly for actual homelessness 
advice rates. Models only include data up to the 6th quarter post rollout as the sample size of local 
authorities became too low in the 7th+ quarters post rollout. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
6.4.4 Impact on Arrears in the Social versus Private Rented Sector 
 
In order to examine variation in the impact of UC rollout on rent arrears between the SRS 
and PRS, Figure 6.8 plots trends in rent arrears advice rates in each sector. Firstly, this shows 
that rent arrears advice rates are substantially higher in the SRS than in the PRS, i.e. those 
living in the SRS are more likely to seek advice on rent arrears from Citizens Advice than 
those living in the PRS. For example, in 2019 Q1 the mean rent arrears advice rate across 
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local authorities was 49.2 in the SRS (per 10,000 social rented dwellings) compared to 13.9 
in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings). This backs up the point made in section 
6.2.4 that those in the SRS tend to, in general, be more vulnerable to rent arrears.   
 
Figure 6.8. Quarterly Trends in Mean Rent Arrears Advice Rates in the SRS versus PRS in 
English local authorities, Before and After UC 'Full Service' rollout. 
 
Notes: Due to UC’s gradual rollout, the sample size of local authorities decreases in the quarters post 
rollout. Data was available for 323 local authorities in the first quarter post rollout, 272 in the second, 
208 in the third, 136 in the fourth, 117 in the fifth and 82 in the sixth quarter post rollout.   
 
Moreover, Figure 6.8 also shows that the rise in rent arrears advice rates following UC ‘Full 
Service’ rollout (previously shown for the SRS and PRS combined in Figure 6.5) occurred 
in both the social and private rented sectors. However, the rise is more pronounced in the 
SRS, where mean rent arrears advice rates rose from 42.6 prior to rollout to 52.1 in the 6th 
quarter post rollout (per 10,000 social rented dwellings). This is compared to a rise from 
11.9 to 14.0 in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings).  
These relationships are formally modelled in Table 6.4. The results suggest that up to 2019 
Q1, and after accounting for unemployment rates, wages and rents, UC ‘Full Service’ rollout 
was, on average, associated with an increase of 5.24 rent arrears advice issues in the SRS 
(per 10,000 social rented dwellings). Meanwhile, it was also associated with an increase of 
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0.96 issues in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings). Mean rent arrears advice rates 
in the pre UC ‘Full Service’ rollout period (2015 Q1 – 2015 Q4) were 44.05 in the SRS (per 
10,00 social rented dwellings) and 12.17 in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings). 
Therefore, these coefficients correspond to around an 11.9% increase on pre rollout rates in 
the SRS, compared to a 7.9% increase on pre rollout rates in the PRS.     
 
Table 6.4. Relationship Between UC Rollout and Rates of Advice Given by Citizens Advice 
on Rent Arrears in the Social versus Private Rented Sectors within 323 English Local 
Authorities, 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. SRS rent arrears advice rate is per 10,000 social rented 
dwellings in the local authority. PRS rent arrears advice rate is per 10,000 private rented dwellings in the 
local authority. Median weekly wages includes both part-time and full-time work. Mean weekly SRS rents 
include housing association rents and, where applicable, local authority rents. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
The impact of UC ‘Full Service’ on SRS and PRS rent arrears advice rates is further 
examined, by length of rollout, in Table 6.5. To enable visual interpretation, and comparison 
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with the results for both sectors combined (as measured in Table 6.3), the coefficients are 
also plotted in Figure 6.9.  
 
Table 6.5. Relationship Between UC Rollout and Rates of Advice Given on Rent Arrears 
in the Social versus Private Rented Sectors, by Length of Rollout, within 323 English 
local authorities, 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. Social rented sector rent arrears advice rate is per 
10,000 social rented dwellings in the local authority. Private rented sector rent arrears advice rate 
is per 10,000 private rented dwellings in the local authority. Median weekly wages includes both 
part-time and full-time work. Mean weekly SRS rents include housing association rents and, where 
applicable, local authority rents. Models only include data up to the 6 th quarter post rollout as the 





Figure 6.9. Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout on Citizens Advice SRS and PRS Rent Arrears 
Advice Rates within English Local Authorities, by Rollout Length, to 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Point estimates are derived from coefficients in regression models in Tables 6.3 and 6.5. 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Coefficients are less precise in quarters further 
post rollout (exemplified by wider confidence intervals) due to decreasing sample size of local 
authorities. 
 
The increasing impact of UC ‘Full Service’ in the quarters post rollout is most pronounced 
in the SRS. Per 10,000 social rented dwellings, the impact rises from 2.47 additional rent 
arrears issues (i.e. a 5.6% increase on pre rollout rates) in the first quarter post rollout, up to 
8.85 in the sixth quarter post rollout (i.e. a 20.1% increase on pre rollout rates).  
This increasing impact is less pronounced, albeit still apparent, in the PRS. Per 10,000 
private rented dwellings, the impact increases from 0.65 additional rent arrears issues (i.e. a 
5.3% increase on pre rollout rates) in the first quarter post rollout, up to 1.26 in the sixth 
quarter post rollout (i.e. a 10.4% increase on pre rollout rates).  
Overall, the regression models in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 (and the visualisation in Figure 6.9) 
suggest that whilst UC ‘Full Service’ rollout’s impact on demand for Citizens Advice 
rent arrears advice is consistent across both the SRS and PRS, it has been greater and 
more detrimental in the SRS. This is seen both in terms of its overall impact up to 2019 
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Q1 and in the impact becoming more pronounced over time in the quarters post rollout 
as more households move onto UC.  
However, one limitation of using the timing of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout in a local 
authority as the explanatory variable here is that this does not take into account the fact 
that the rate of households moving onto UC with housing costs is slightly higher in 
social rents than private rents (as previously set out in Figure 6.2 earlier in this chapter). 
Therefore, the greater impact observed in the SRS may be partially explained by their 
higher rate of households on UC with housing costs. In order to account for this, the 
analysis was repeated using the ‘SRS Households on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ and the 
‘PRS Households on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ as explanatory variables and comparing 
the results. The results of the modelling are shown in Table 6.6.  
Table 6.6. Relationship Between ‘Households on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ and 
Rates of Advice Given by Citizens Advice on Rent Arrears in the SRS and PRS Within 
323 English Local Authorities, 2015 Q3 – 2019 Q1. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. The ‘households on UC with housing costs rate’ is per 
10,000 SRS dwellings in model 1, and per 10,000 PRS dwellings in model 2.  SRS rent arrears advice 
rate is per 10,000 social rented dwellings in the local authority, whilst PRS rent arrears advice rate 
is per 10,000 private rented dwellings in the local authority. Median weekly wages includes both 
part-time and full-time work. Mean weekly SRS rents include housing association rents and, where 
applicable, local authority rents. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
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The results suggest that every 100 additional households (in sector) on UC with housing 
costs are associated with a 0.43 increase in rent arrears advice rate in the SRS (per 10,000 
social rented dwellings) and a 0.18 increase in rent arrears advice rate in the PRS (per 10,000 
private rented dwellings). To put these figures into context, as previously highlighted in 
Figure 6.2, the mean rates of households on UC with housing costs by 2019 Q1 were 1000.65 
in the SRS (per 10,000 social rented dwellings) and 843.68 in the PRS. Therefore, the 
coefficients in Table 6.6, in an average local authority, would correspond to an increase of 
around 4.30 rent arrears advice issues in the SRS (per 10,000 social rented dwellings) and 
1.52 in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings).  
These estimates differ slightly from the estimates of UC’s overall impact outlined in Table 
6.4. However, in general it backs them up in the sense that: (a) it again suggests that UC’s 
impact on demand for rent arrears advice has occurred in both the social and private rented 
sectors, and (b) that the impact has been greater in the SRS than in the PRS. Overall, this 
suggests that UC’s impact has been greater on the SRS than in the PRS, even after accounting 
for variation between the sectors in the rates of households moving onto UC.  
 
6.4.5 Falsification Test  
 
As in Chapter 5’s analysis, one way to test whether the results outlined in this chapter may 
be spurious, and linked somehow to the structure of UC rollout, is to conduct a falsification 
test. Similar to Chapter 5, this is done here by repeating the main analysis but using data on 
Citizens Advice mortgage arrears advice rates as a non-equivalent outcome variable. The 
results of the falsification test are provided in Appendix 5. No significant relationship was 
found between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and rates of advice given by Citizens Advice on 
mortgage arrears. This suggests that the results of the main analysis are unlikely to be due to 




This chapter has exploited data held by Citizens Advice in order to examine the impact of 
UC rollout on rates of advice they give on rent arrears/homelessness issues. This analysis 
can not only be used to confirm the results of Chapter 5’s analysis of landlord repossession 
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rates, but also adds to it in some important ways. Namely, this is by: (a) providing insight 
into UC’s impact on the stages of housing insecurity that occur before (rent arrears) and after 
(homelessness) landlord repossession actions, and (b) by examining how UC’s impact on 
housing insecurity varies between the SRS and PRS. This has provided a number of 
important findings.  
Firstly, the findings suggest that UC rollout has led to an increase in demand for advice from 
Citizens Advice on rent arrears issues. After accounting for unemployment rates, wages and 
rents, UC ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with, on average, an increase of 2.97 rent 
arrears advice issues within local authorities (per 10,000 rented dwellings), overall to 2019 
Q1. This corresponds to around an 11% increase on rates in the pre rollout period of 2015 
Q3 – 2015 Q4.  
Moreover, the findings suggest that whilst this impact on rent arrears advice rates tended to 
occur immediately in the first quarter post ‘Full Service’ rollout, it then also tended to 
increase over time when it had been rolled out for longer. Where ‘Full Service’ had been 
rolled out for longest (i.e. 6th quarter post), it was associated with an increase of 4.84 rent 
arrears advice issues (per 10,000 rented dwellings), i.e. an 18% increase on pre rollout rates. 
Therefore, a key concern is that this impact may continue to increase into the future, with 
the number of households on UC with housing costs expected to increase substantially 
during the remaining ‘managed migration’ phase of rollout. 
However, the analysis found no significant relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout 
and rates of Citizens Advice homelessness advice issues. This is in line with the finding of 
Chapter 5 that there was no impact of UC rollout on bailiff repossessions. It may be because 
it takes time for people to get to the stage of facing homelessness after rent arrears begin to 
build up – this could mean that UC’s homelessness impact will only be seen in the longer 
term so is not picked up by the data, which was limited up to Q1 2019. However, it may also 
indicate that UC is leading to financial problems and arrears, but that these cases tend not 
reach the most extreme stage of actual repossession/homelessness. Cases may be resolved 
due to those affected managing to pay off their arrears or voluntarily moving out and into 
new accommodation. Protective barriers may also be preventing those with rent arrears from 
in turn becoming homeless – e.g. those affected may have good social support networks 
(Bramley and Fitzpatrick, 2018) or they may be supported out of their rent arrears as a direct 
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result of the advice given by Citizens Advice (or via support from the DWP’s UC safeguards 
targeted at those in rent arrears, such as ‘Alternative Payment Arrangements’).   
Finally, the analysis suggests that UC rollout has had a larger and more detrimental impact 
on rates of rent arrears advice in the SRS than in the PRS. Specifically, UC ‘Full Service’ 
was associated with an increase of 5.24 rent arrears advice issues in the SRS (per 10,000 
social rented dwellings), i.e. a 11.9% increase on pre rollout rates. This is compared to an 
increase of 0.96 issues in the PRS (per 10,000 private rented dwellings), i.e. a 7.9% increase 
on pre rollout rates. Some of this divergence could be due to a higher proportion of social 
renters moving onto UC with housing costs. However, the divergence was still apparent after 
accounting for this by using the ‘SRS Households on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ and the 
‘PRS Households on UC with Housing Costs Rate’ as explanatory variables and comparing 
the results. This means that the greater impact in the SRS is likely to be due to greater 
vulnerability in the sector and the fact that UC’s direct payment system is novel in the SRS 
but not the PRS. However, one alternative explanation is that the divergence may arise due 
to differences in landlord behaviour between sectors – it may be the case that social landlords 
were more likely to signpost tenants who were facing arrears due to problems with UC 
towards advice services like Citizens Advice.  
As in Chapter 5, the key strength of the analysis here is that it was able to exploit cross-area 
variation in the timing of UC rollout in order to measure its impact, by linking data from its 
official rollout schedule with administrative panel data from Citizens Advice. In addition, 
the analysis is further strengthened through its use of local authority and time fixed effects 
to control for unobserved confounding variables, and by its falsification test which boosts 
the internal validity of the analysis. This means that it is unlikely that the relationships 
observed were not causal.  
Nonetheless, there were some limitations that should be noted. Firstly, it shares some 
limitations of Chapter 5 in that its use of local authority level data (as opposed to individual 
level data) creates the potential for ecological fallacy, and the accuracy of its control 
variables were limited by the fact that they are essentially annual estimates converted into 
quarterly estimates. One further limitation, which is specific to this chapter’s analysis, is that 
the most common way of receiving advice from Citizens Advice during the analysis period 
was face-to-face. This means that those who have better access to a Citizens Advice Bureau 
(e.g. those who live near one) may be more likely to access advice services. However, the 
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use of local authority fixed effects should be able to control for this in the analysis, and this 
phenomenon should not bias the results unless there were new Citizens Advice Bureaux 
opened up in new areas as a direct result of UC rollout.  
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Chapter 7. Empirical Study 3: Impact of Universal 
Credit Rollout on Rates of Homelessness 




This chapter investigates the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout on homelessness 
assistance need within 29 Scottish local authorities. In Scotland, households can make a 
statutory homelessness claim to their local authority, and – provided they have a connection 
to the local area and are assessed as unintentionally homeless or threatened with 
homelessness in the next 90 days – are entitled to permanent accommodation (ScotPHO, 
2019). In addition, since 2010 an approach called ‘Housing Options’ has also been adopted 
in Scotland, which is an information and advice process that attempts to prevent 
homelessness by identifying the options available to those approaching their local authority 
with a housing problem (ScotPHO, 2019; Scottish Government, 2020a). 
The analysis in this chapter makes use of data obtained from the Scottish Government on 
the monthly number of statutory homelessness claims and approaches for Housing Options. 
As set out in Chapter 4, and in a similar fixed effects panel design to that employed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, data on the timing of UC rollout in Scottish local authorities is linked with 
the Scottish Government data on homelessness assistance need. The specific research 
questions addressed are as follows: 
 
1. Has UC ‘Full Service’ rollout led to an increase in the rates of Housing Options 
approaches within Scottish local authorities up to March 2019? 
 
2.  Has UC ‘Full Service’ rollout led to an increase in the rates of statutory 
homelessness claims within Scottish local authorities up to March 2019? 
 
3. Does the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout (if any found) increase when it has been 




4. How does the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout on homelessness claim rates (if 
any found) vary based on the main reason cited for the homelessness claim and the 
prior circumstances of the applicant? 
 
This can build on Chapters 5 and 6 by providing further analysis into UC’s impact on the 
last stage of housing insecurity (i.e. threat of or actual homelessness), and providing analysis 
in a different national context, Scotland. Despite its limitations (which are discussed 
throughout the course of this chapter), Scottish homelessness and Housing Options data 
arguably provides the best available data on local authority-level homelessness rates in 
recent years in the UK. This is because the way that official homelessness data in England 
is collected was changed in 2018 (see MHCLG, 2018), meaning it is not possible to 
accurately track homelessness claim rates over time in the period of UC rollout.  
Moreover, whilst Chapters 5 and 6 only shed light on housing insecurity in terms of people 
facing rent arrears/eviction from their own property, the homelessness data also sheds light 
on those facing insecurity for other reasons and from other prior circumstances. In particular, 
relationship breakdown and family conflict forcing young people to leave their family home 
are key homelessness triggers in the UK, and these can occur (amongst other reasons) as a 
result of stresses associated with welfare reform (see Watts, Johnsen and Sosenko, 2015, p. 
65). This is a particular issue in Scotland as, in contrast to England where the past decade 
has seen large increases in statutory homelessness claims due to ending of a private rented 
sector tenancy, Scotland’s lower overall housing pressures mean this has not been the case 
(Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019; Scottish Government, 2020b). Instead, 
homelessness claims in Scotland most commonly come from: (a) those experiencing 
relationship breakdown, or (b) young people who are “asked to leave” their family home 
(Scottish Government, 2020b). This is why, in addition to examining the overall impact of 
UC rollout on homelessness claims, the homelessness data is also disaggregated by the main 
cited reason for the claim and the prior circumstances of applicant. This can provide insight 
into whether UC is linked to homelessness arising specifically from relationship breakdown, 
being “asked to leave” the family home, or from terminated tenancies.  
This chapter is structured as follows. It begins by providing some background that is specific 
to this chapter. This includes an overview of the Scottish homelessness system and how its 
homelessness data is collected, as well as an overview of the determinants of homelessness 
(both broadly and in Scotland specifically). Next, the chapter will set out the data, variables 
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and methods used in its empirical analysis. It will then present the results of the analysis, 




7.2.1 The Scottish Homelessness System: Post Devolution Policy, 
Legislation and Practice 
 
Scottish housing and homelessness policy has been largely devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament since 1999. Consequently, although the legal definition of homelessness remains 
unchanged since 1987 (see Box 7.1), Scotland has developed its own distinctive approach to 
homelessness, accentuating pre-existing differences in policy to the rest of the UK. This has 
occurred following the establishment of the Homelessness Task Force (1999-2002), which 
was commissioned by the Scottish Executive to comprehensively review legislation, policy 
and practice on homelessness in Scotland and to provide recommendations on how 
homelessness could be prevented and tackled (Homelessness Task Force, 2002).  
  
Box 7.1. Legal Definition of Homelessness in Scotland. 
1. A person is homeless if they have no accommodation in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
 
2. A person is to be treated as having no accommodation if there is no accommodation which 
they, together with any other person who normally resides with them, are legally entitled 
to occupy. A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is 
accommodation which it would be reasonable for them to continue to occupy, though 
regard may be had to the general housing circumstances prevailing in the local authority 
area.   
 
3. A person is also homeless if: 
 
A. They have accommodation but cannot secure entry to it, or it is probable that 
occupation would lead to violence or threats of violence; 
B. Or the accommodation consists of a moveable structure, vehicle or vessel for 
human habitation and there is no place where they are entitled or permitted to 
place and reside in it; 
C. Or the accommodation is legally overcrowded and may endanger the health of 
occupants; 
D. Or it is not permanent accommodation and the local authority duty arose before 
occupation of the accommodation. 
 
4. A person is threatened with homelessness if it is likely that they will become homeless 
within 2 months 
Source: Amended from Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 and cited in Anderson and Serpa (2013, p. 16) 
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The work of the Homelessness Task Force has led to a legislative shift in Scotland away 
from the previous ‘priority need’ system. The ‘priority need’ system, which gave the right 
to settled accommodation to some homeless people (e.g. households with dependent children, 
pregnant women, care leavers or vulnerable people), but not others, has long being viewed 
as unfair and had been described as a “double edged sword” for excluding many households 
from rights (Drake, 1989, p. 126). Scotland has moved away from this system initially via 
the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 and the Homelessness Etc. (Scotland) Act 2003, which 
strengthened the statutory safety net and extended councils’ duties to non-priority homeless 
households in the build up to the ambitious target of fully abolishing the ‘priority need’ test 
by 2012, thus extending the right to settled accommodation to all those assessed as homeless 
(Anderson, 2009, pp. 107-109). Subsequently, this target has been successfully achieved in 
2012 via the Homelessness (Abolition of Priority Need Test) (Scotland) Order 2012, which 
extended the right to settled accommodation (i.e. to a ‘Scottish Secure Tenancy’) to all 
unintentionally homeless households (although not those assessed as intentionally homeless). 
Scotland’s initial commitment to abolish ‘priority need’ and extend the right to housing was 
internationally lauded, with the Scottish homelessness system being interpreted as a unique 
‘rights based’ approach (Anderson, 2009, p. 107), and referred to as “some of the most 
progressive homelessness legislation in Europe” (Scottish Executive, 2005, p. 10). However, 
implementing this new system has not been problem-free. As noted in one implementation 
review, “outcomes for those facing homelessness [have] varied somewhat from the highest 
aspirations of the radical 2002 policy review” (Anderson and Serpa, 2013, p. 13). Alongside 
the implications for homelessness from austerity measures and welfare reform (see Beatty, 
Foden, McCarthy et al., 2015; Loopstra, Reeves, Barr et al., 2016; Johnsen, Watts and 
Fitzpatrick, 2018), another issue has been that the extension of the right to settled 
accommodation has increased demand, which has led to a big challenge for local authorities 
to secure enough settled accommodation for everyone (Anderson and Serpa, 2013, p. 26; 
Lund, 2017, pp. 174-175). This led to increases in the numbers in temporary accommodation 
in Scotland, and ultimately has led to the adoption of a ‘prevention’ strategy from 2009/10, 
whereby information and advice is offered via the aforementioned Housing Options 
approach system, which is designed to reduce the number of people becoming officially 
homeless (Scottish Government, 2020a). This ‘prevention’ approach and the use of Housing 
Options has been positively reviewed (Ipsos Mori and Littlewood, 2012), but there has been 
controversy throughout over potential ‘gatekeeping’, with Housing Options sitting 
uncomfortably alongside the statutory homelessness system, and being used to discourage 
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people from making official homeless applications and accessing their statutory rights 
(Pawson, 2009; Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2015). Consequently, it has been argued 
that Scotland should adopt homelessness prevention legislation similar to that in Wales and 
England, which place duties on local authorities to provide assistance to all eligible homeless 
households or households threatened with homelessness in the next 56 days (regardless of 
their ‘priority need’ status) (Fitzpatrick, Mackie and Wood, 2019).      
 
7.2.2 Scottish Homelessness Statistics: Data Collection, Key Trends 
and Challenges 
 
The Scottish Government’s National Statistics on homelessness are made up of two separate 
data collections. Firstly, homelessness data is collected from local authorities on statutory 
homelessness applications (including overall number of claims, main reasons for 
applications and characteristics/prior circumstance of applicants) and use of temporary 
accommodation, which are officially published bi-annually. Secondly, Housing Options data 
is collected from local authorities, which measures the number of Housing Options 
approaches and outcomes for those making the approach (e.g. whether they go on to make a 
homelessness claim or manage to remain in their accommodation/find alternative 
accommodation). Taken together, these statistics can provide insight into the scale of 
homelessness assistance need within local authorities over time in Scotland. However, trends 
in the data must be interpreted in the context of administrative and legislative changes 
ongoing at the time, as well as other data limitations (as discussed below). 
The Scottish Government’s own analysis of homelessness statistics suggests that following 
on from the extension of councils’ duties to non-priority households, the number of 
homelessness applications made in Scotland rose from 52,217 (and 39,712 acceptances) in 
2002/2003 to a peak of 60,542 applications (and 43,534 acceptances) in 2005/2006 (Scottish 
Government, 2018). More recent trends, covering the mean rates of both new Housing 
Options approaches and new homelessness claims across local authorities, are provided in 
Figure 7.1. There are monthly fluctuations (most notably via sharp reductions in rates in 
December each year), but the moving average highlights that, in general, there was a large 
drop in homelessness claim rates from 20.2 claims (per 10,000 households) in April 2010 
down to 10.7 (per 10,000 households) in November 2014. This drop has largely been 
attributed to Scotland adopting their ‘prevention’ strategy and Housing Options system 
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(Scottish Government, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, analysis has shown that the annual level of 
‘homelessness presentations’ – i.e. taking into account both homelessness applications and 
‘homelessness type’ Housing Options approaches from 2009/10 – have in fact remained 
relatively steady at around 54,000 (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2015). In terms of 
trends in Housing Options approaches, Figure 7.1 highlights that since data collection began 
in April 2014, there has been a steady decrease in the rate of Housing Options approaches. 
One possible explanation for this is that an increasing number of households are making 
homelessness applications directly without first making a Housing Options approach 
(Scottish Government, 2019a). 
 
Figure 7.1. Trends in the Mean Rates of Housing Options Approaches (April 2014 – March 
2019) and Homelessness Applications (January 2010 – March 2019) Across 29 Scottish 
local authorities (per 10,000 households. 
Data Source: Scottish Government Homelessness Statistics – authors analysis.    
 
In addition to the issue of homelessness statistics being influenced by legislative and 
administrative changes, another issue is that people will not apply for homelessness 
assistance from their local authority (and thus will not be recorded in the statistics) if they 
think that they will not receive help. Importantly, this can reduce the reliability of official 
homelessness data as a means of gauging the scale of homelessness over time. For example, 
despite other evidence of acute housing and homelessness pressures in Edinburgh, there has 
been a sharp fall in both homelessness applications and Housing Options approaches in 
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recent years. This has been interpreted by some as arising from potential applicants feelings 
that Edinburgh provide poor offers to applicants (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019).   
Moreover, one final (and related) challenge with regards to official statistics is that they by 
no means fully capture homelessness. In general, governments tend to use ‘minimalist’ 
definitions of homelessness in order to reduce the size of the problem they have to deal with 
(Fitzpatrick, Kemp and Klinker, 2000), and whilst the Scottish Government have been 
praised for their wide-ranging definition of homelessness (as previously set out in Box 7.1), 
there are still many who could be classed as homeless but who are not picked up by the legal 
definition or in official homelessness statistics. This includes those involuntarily living with 
other households, squatters, ‘sofa-surfers’, those living in overcrowded/substandard 
conditions and those sleeping rough in hidden locations. The scale of ‘hidden homelessness’ 
is, by nature, difficult to measure. However, Scotland’s ‘Homelessness Monitor’ in 2015 
(Fitzpatrick, Pawson et al., 2015) did attempt to measure some forms of ‘hidden 
homelessness’ using official survey and census data. Their analysis suggests the following: 
 
• About 9.3% of households in Scotland contain ‘concealed households’ (i.e. 
individuals/groups/families that are not able to form separate households so are 
obliged to live with others). This is made up of non-dependent children (6.7%), 
unrelated adults (2.3%) and concealed families (0.9%). 
 
• ‘Concealed household’ trends in Scotland tend to parallel those in England. 
 
• Scotland appears to have a higher rate of household sharing than England, which can 
be an indicator of ‘hidden homelessness’ including ‘sofa-surfing’, although this may 
partly reflect differences in housing regulation. 
 
• Until 2010 overcrowding levels tended to be higher in England than Scotland but 
have since evened out due to a rise in overcrowding in Scotland. 
 
• Overcrowding in Scotland appears to be strongly correlated with poverty, and most 
commonly occurs in Glasgow and other major cities, followed by the poorest urban 




7.2.3 A Broad Overview of the Determinants of Homelessness 
 
Traditionally, explanations of homelessness causation have tended to focus upon either 
‘individual’ or ‘structural’ factors. ‘Individual’ explanations, which were dominant in the 
1960s and 1970s, emphasise the personal vulnerabilities and behaviours of homeless people 
e.g. substance dependency, mental health problems, offending, family dysfunction and a lack 
of social support. These accounts often place an emphasis upon personal ‘agency’ and thus 
can have connotations of individual culpability and blameworthiness (Bramley and 
Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 97). Conversely, ‘structural’ accounts, which became dominant in the 
1980s, emphasise social and economic issues e.g., housing market conditions, poverty, 
unemployment and the welfare system.  However, these accounts came under pressure in 
the 1990s when the growing number of single homeless people in the UK (particularly rough 
sleepers) tended to have high social support and health needs (Watts, Johnsen and Sosenko, 
2015). 
In the 21st century, academic literature has tended to suggest that explanations of 
homelessness are more nuanced than the old ‘individual’ versus ‘structural’ dichotomy, and 
that there is in fact a lot of interaction between different causes of homelessness. For example, 
Pleace (2000 cited in Fitzpatrick, Pleace, Stephens et al., 2009, p. 4) described and critiqued 
the following ‘new orthodoxy’ of assertions on homelessness causes: (a) ‘Structural’ factors 
like housing shortages, poverty, and unemployment create the conditions for homelessness 
and impact upon its prevalence, (b) people with ‘individual’ personal problems are more 
vulnerable to homelessness under these conditions, and (c) high support needs among 
homeless people are explained by their susceptibility to structural forces rather than being 
the cause of their homelessness. However, ‘hybrid’ explanations such as this which 
incorporate both individual and structural factors, but emphasise the importance of structural 
factors, have been critiqued as “unsatisfying” for being too ‘simplistic’ and ‘positivist’ 
(Fitzpatrick, Pleace, Stephens et al., 2009). It has instead been argued from a ‘critical realist’ 
perspective that, in reality, causation of homelessness is more complex than this and operates 
on four levels – economic, housing, interpersonal and individual – that interact in 
complicated and unpredictable ways, with economic and housing factors being most 




Importantly, international comparative research also suggests that the relative importance of 
individual and structural factors in homelessness causation varies between countries. E.g. it 
has been posited that countries whose generous social democratic welfare regimes produce 
low levels of poverty and inequality (e.g. Sweden and Denmark) tend to have a lower 
prevalence of homelessness, and that those who are homeless are likely to be so due to 
complex personal problems like mental illness and/or addiction rather than structural factors 
(Stephens and Fitzpatrick, 2007). Conversely, countries with liberal welfare regimes that 
produce higher poverty and inequality (e.g. the US and the UK) tend to have greater 
homelessness prevalence which is more likely to occur structurally rather than through 
personal problems (Stephens and Fitzpatrick, 2007). 
Much of the literature involving empirical modelling of homelessness determinants comes 
from the US. One such study used 1990 census data to assess variation in homelessness rates 
across 335 US metropolitan areas, and found housing affordability and demographic 
composition to be the key determinants of homelessness, with higher median rents and 
higher representation of single-person households being significantly associated with higher 
homelessness rates (Lee, Price-Spratlen and Kanan, 2003). It also found economic 
conditions, welfare safety net and climate to be further homelessness determinants (ibid). 
More recently, a study by Fargo, Munley et al. (2013) modelled homelessness determinants 
for four US subpopulations: families and single adults in metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas. It found economic factors like housing costs, unemployment and income to be the 
most important determinants of homelessness for all groups, whilst demographic and safety 
net factors were also important for all single-adults, and drug use was a uniquely important 
determinant for single adults in metropolitan areas (ibid). Gould and Williams (2010)’s study 
of the number of people in family units in emergency homelessness shelters further 
highlights unemployment as a key homelessness determinant, as well as a lack of social 
welfare support. 
In terms of modelling in the UK, Loopstra, Reeves et al. (2016)’s cross-area analysis of 
English local authority data found that increasing rates of homelessness were “strongly 
linked” with budget cuts and reductions in welfare spending (particularly on housing 
services, discretionary housing payments and social care). Another important study found 
that structural factors such as higher house prices, fewer homelessness prevention 
programmes and lower household incomes are all significantly associated with increased 
statutory homelessness rates in England (Bramley, Pawson, White et al., 2010). A more 
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recent study by Bramley and Fitzpatrick (2017) suggests that the odds of experiencing 
homelessness in the UK are “systematically structured” around a set of structural, social and 
individual factors outwith the control of those affected. It specifically highlighted the 
centrality of poverty (especially childhood poverty) to homelessness, as well as other 
structural factors like labour market and housing market contexts, and clearly discredits the 
myth that homelessness ‘can happen to anyone’.  
 
7.2.4 The Scottish Context: Reasons for Homelessness and Prior 
Circumstances of Homelessness Applicants 
 
The main reasons for homelessness, and the prior circumstances of those making 
homelessness applications may differ somewhat in Scotland compared to other countries e.g. 
England or the US where much of the homelessness literature (discussed above) comes from.  
As previously discussed, Scotland’s official statistics on homelessness claims record the 
main reason why those submitting applications have become homeless, and (closely related) 
their prior circumstances. The main reasons cited have remained relatively unchanged over 
the past decade, with being “asked to leave” their prior accommodation – i.e. by the host, 
likely to be a parent (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019, p. 72) – being the top one 
(25% of applicants in 2017/18) (Scottish Government, 2018, p. 13). Household 
disputes/relationship breakdown tends to be another key driver recorded – in 2017/18 13% 
and 18% of applicants became homeless following a violent or non-violent domestic 
household dispute respectively (Scottish Government, 2018, p. 13).  
This prevalence of homelessness due to leaving a family home or shared home with a partner 
is also reflected in statistics on the prior circumstances of homelessness applicants in 
Scotland. Specifically, in 2018/19, homelessness applicants were more likely to have been 
living with friends, family or partners (42% of applicants) than to have been living in their 
own owned or rented accommodation (38% of applicants). This is in contrast with England, 
where fewer people tend to live with family/friends, and the main reason cited for 
homelessness is the ending of a private rented tenancy, followed by rent arrears – it has been 
noted that this is less of a problem in Scotland due to its “less challenging private rented 
sector, although unaffordability is a growing issue” (Shelter, 2016, p. 8).  
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Whilst the previous two empirical chapters suggest that UC rollout has increased demand 
for advice from Citizens Advice on rent arrears and on repossession actions made by 
landlords within English local authorities, the distinct reasons for homelessness in Scotland 
discussed above motivate the need for research on the impact of UC rollout on homelessness 
in Scotland, by reason and prior circumstances. However, it is important to note that data on 
the main cited reason for homelessness is unlikely to capture the full picture of why 
households become homeless.  This is because, as set out in the previous section, becoming 
homeless is usually a complex process involving interaction between a number of variables, 
including ‘structural’ determinants and ‘individual’ triggers, rather than being down to one 
singular reason (Lund, 2017, pp. 157-159). For example, whilst being “asked to leave” and 
relationship breakdown/disputes are the main cited reasons for homelessness in Scotland, it 
is unlikely that this tells the full story, as it has been noted that: 
  
Family conflict can be the result of individual problems and support needs (e.g. 
substance misuse), interpersonal difficulties (e.g. in ‘blended families’, abusive 
relationships) or manifestations of childhood trauma. Further to this, stress within 
families may also be caused by ‘structural’ factors, for instance housing/labour 
market and welfare changes. (Watts, Johnsen and Sosenko, 2015). 
 
This suggests that family conflict and relationship breakdown can be linked to economic 
factors, including welfare reform, with financial pressures putting a strain on relationships 
with family members and partners. Similarly, it has also been noted in Scotland’s latest 
‘Homelessness Monitor’ in 2019 (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019, p. 3) that 
‘anchor’ social relationships, which usually provide a homelessness ‘buffer’, can be strained 
by financial pressures, meaning that worsening economic conditions may increase 
‘interpersonal’ vulnerability to homelessness over time in Scotland.  Therefore, the negative 
financial impact of UC’s long wait periods, increased conditionality and monthly direct 
payments may result in family conflict, and this may be a particular issue in Scotland due to 
its prevalence of homelessness arising from being “asked to leave” or relationship 
breakdown. Moreover, the impact of UC rollout on relationships may be exacerbated further 
by its default system of making payments into a single bank account (i.e. one partner of a 
couple), which has been criticised for reinforcing a ‘male breadwinner’ model and 








For the purposes of this chapter’s empirical analysis, a monthly Scottish local authority level 
dataset was compiled, with a final sample of 29 of Scotland’s 32 local authorities. Na h-
Eileanan Siar, Orkney Islands and Shetland Islands were excluded from the analysis due to 
their small population sizes.  
Ideally, the final analytic sample would cover the entire UC rollout period. However, this 
was not possible here due to the need to minimise omitted variable bias, as well as data 
availability issues. The Scottish Government began to collect data on Housing Options 
approaches from April 2014, and thus the analytic sample for the analysis on Housing 
Options covered the period of April 2014 – March 2019. However, the analysis of 
homelessness claims data used a different timeframe of January 2015 – March 2019.  
Importantly – as discussed/shown in Figure 7.1 – data on homelessness claims was affected 
by the introduction of Housing Options approaches in 2010, which meant that there was a 
large drop in claims. The inclusion of local authority and time fixed effects can control for 
baseline differences between local authorities and unobserved variables that vary over time 
but not between local authorities (Stock and Watson, 2015). However, their inclusion does 
not control for unobserved variables that vary both over time and between local authorities. 
Changes in homelessness claim rates due to introduction of Housing Options falls into this 
category as it is up to local authorities themselves to decide what constitutes an approach, 
which leads to large variation in rates of Housing Options approaches between them 
(Scottish Government, 2019a). Therefore, in order to reduce omitted variable bias, the 
analytic sample used to examine homelessness claims is restricted to the period of January 
2015 – March 2019. Omitted variable bias should not be an issue from 2015 onwards as the 
effect of Housing Options on decreasing homelessness had reached a plateau and was said 
to be unlikely to be still having an impact on claim rates (Scottish Government, 2019b; 




7.3.2 Homelessness and Housing Options Data (Outcome Variables)  
 
The Scottish Government data on the number of Housing Options Approaches (April 2014 
– March 2019) was used to create the first outcome variable: ‘total Housing Options 
approach rate’. This indicates, for each local authority, the total monthly number of Housing 
Options approaches, coded as a rate per 10,000 households in the local authority using 
National Records for Scotland (NRS) data on household estimates.  
The data on the number of homelessness claims (January 2015 – March 2019) was then used 
to create a further ten outcome variables. Firstly, there is the ‘working age homelessness 
claim rate’, which indicates the total number of homelessness claims made by households 
with a working age (16-64 year olds) main applicant. The variable is coded into a rate per 
10,000 working age households (i.e. where head of household is aged 16-64 years) using 
NRS data on household projections.  
Next, there are four outcome variables indicating the rate of homelessness claims by the 
main cited reason for the application. These are: (1) ‘asked to leave rate’, (2) ‘non-violent 
dispute rate’, (3) ‘violent dispute rate’, which are all per 10,000 households in the local 
authority using NRS household estimates data, and (4) ‘terminated tenancy rate’, which is 
coded into a rate 10,000 rented dwellings in the local authority using data obtained from the 
Scottish Government on dwelling stocks by tenure.  
Finally, there are five outcome variables indicating the rate of homelessness claims by the 
prior circumstances of the applicant. These are: (1) ‘staying in family home or with relatives 
rate’, (2) ‘staying with friends/partners rate’, which are also coded as rates per 10,000 
households in the local authority using NRS household estimates data, and (3) ‘SRS property 
rate’, (4) ‘PRS property rate’,  and (5) ‘owner occupied property rate’, which are all coded 
per 10,000 dwellings in the given housing tenure using the aforementioned data obtained 
from the Scottish Government on dwelling stocks by tenure.    
 
7.3.3 Universal Credit Data (Explanatory Variables)  
 
The analysis uses two explanatory variables, which are similar to the main explanatory 
variables used in Chapters 5 and 6, but are applied to the monthly Scottish local authority 
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data as opposed to English quarterly data. These are: (1) ‘UC Full Service’, and (2) ‘UC Full 
Service (by rollout length)’. ‘UC Full Service’ is created using data from the official UC 
rollout schedule on the timing of ‘Full Service’ rollout, i.e. it exploits variation in the timing 
of UC rollout across Scottish local authorities – this variation is summarised in Figure 7.2, 
and is also available in table form in Appendix 2. This is a binary variable and indicates 
whether ‘Full Service’ had rolled out yet in each month of the analysis period (coded 0 = 
‘No’ and 1 = ’Yes’). Where rollout occurred in different Jobcentres within a local authority 
in different months it was coded as ‘Yes’ only once rollout had reached the majority of 
Jobcentres. ‘UC Full Service (by rollout length)’ is a categorical variable indicating if ‘Full 
Service’ had rolled out yet in each month of the analysis period, and if so for how long. It is 
coded as follows: 0 = ‘No (pre rollout)’ 1 = ‘Yes (1-3 months post)’, 2 = ‘Yes (4-6 months 
post)’, 3 = ‘Yes (7-9 months post)’, 4 = ‘Yes 10-12 months post’, and 5 = ‘Yes (13+ months 
post)’.  
 
Figure 7.2. Variation in Universal Credit ‘Full Service’ Rollout Across Scottish local 
authorities. 
Notes: start point of bars represent month in which UC ‘Full Service’ rolled out within the local authority. 
Maroon bars represent the local authorities that were excluded from the analysis due to low population 




Unlike in the analysis in previous chapters, the analysis here does not control for ‘Live 
Service’ rollout as the analysis period starts too late to accurately do so. However, this should 
not bias the results, as ‘Live Service’ involved relatively few cases and the analysis outlined 
in previous chapters have found no significant relationship between ‘Live Service’ rollout 
and housing insecurity indicators within English local authorities. 
 
7.3.4 Control Variables  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter (in sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4), homelessness causation is 
complex and is determined by various individual and structural factors. Without individual 
level data on those making Housing Options approaches or homelessness applications, it is 
not possible to control for all homelessness determinants in this analysis. However, the 
analysis does include four control variables in order to control for some key determinants.  
As local labour market conditions are important homelessness determinants (Rossi and 
Wright, 1987; Lee, Price-Spratlen and Kanan, 2003) the first two control variables are: (1) 
‘model based unemployment rate’, which comes from NOMIS and provides a monthly 
estimate of local authority unemployment rates, based on the previous twelve months of 
‘Annual Population Survey’ data, and (2) ‘10th percentile weekly wages’, which also comes 
from NOMIS and provides a monthly estimate of the lower ten percentile of (full-time and 
part-time) weekly wages in the local authority based on linear interpolated annual data. As 
recent research (Bramley and Fitzpatrick, 2017) has highlighted the particular vulnerability 
of single adult and single parent households to homelessness, the third/fourth control 
variables are: (3) ‘rate of single adult households’ and (4) ‘rate of single parent households’, 
which come from annual data from the Scottish Household Survey on the proportion of each 
household type, and is converted into rates per 10,000 households using NRS data on 
household estimates.  
 
7.3.5 Statistical Analysis  
 
As in Chapters 5 and 6, the empirical analysis here involves fixed effects panel models. 
These were used to formally examine the relationship between UC rollout and rates of 
Housing Options approaches and homelessness claims (with separate models for total 
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working age claims, claims by main cited reason, and claims by prior circumstances of 
applicant) within local authorities. As in Chapters 5 and 6, this exploits variation in the 
timing of UC rollout across local authorities to measure its impact. This is as follows:  
 
𝐻𝑂𝐴/𝐻𝐶 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                      + 𝛽3𝑆𝐴𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡    
 
Here, 𝑖 is the local authority and 𝑡 is the monthly time point. 𝐻𝑂𝐴/𝐻𝐶 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the rate of 
Housing Options approaches/homelessness claims. Models in the first part of the analysis 
focus on the relationship between ‘Full Service’ rollout and the ‘total Housing Options 
approach rate’ and ‘working age homelessness claim rate’. In subsequent models, 
homelessness claim rates are disaggregated by the main cited reason for the claim and the 
prior circumstances of the applicant. This is to examine whether UC rollout is straining 
relationships and thus increasing homelessness arising from leaving partners/friends/family 
home due to being “asked to leave”/relationship breakdown, and/or whether it is increasing 
homelessness arising from termination of tenancies in rented accommodation. 
The final part of the analysis measures whether the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout on 
Housing Options approach rates and homelessness claim rates (if any found) increases when 
it has been rolled out for longer and thus reached more claimants. This is as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑂𝐴/𝐻𝐶 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                                      + 𝛽3𝑆𝐴𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
Here, 𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ is the ‘UC Full Service (by length of rollout)’ categorical variable and 




7.4.1 Overall Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout  
 
The relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ and the total Housing Options approach rate and 





The results suggest that, on average, UC ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with an 
increase of 1.32 Housing Options approaches (per 10,000 households) within local 
authorities up to March 2019. To put this figure into context, the mean Housing Options 
approach rate in the 6-month period prior to ‘Full Service’ rollout beginning (i.e. September 
2015 – February 2016) was 16.2 approaches (per 10,000 households) – therefore this 
coefficient corresponds to approximately an 8.1% increase on the pre rollout period. 
In addition, the results outlined in Table 7.1 also suggest that, on average, UC ‘Full Service’ 
was associated with an increase of 0.45 working age homelessness claims (per 10,000 
working age households) within local authorities up to March 2019. This is a relatively small, 
albeit statistically significant, increase given that the mean homelessness claim rate in the 6 
months prior to rollout was 15.2 claims (per 10,000 working age households) – this means 
that the coefficient corresponds approximately to a 3.0% increase on the pre rollout period.  
 
Table 7.1. Relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and the Total Housing Options 
Approach Rate (April 2014 – March 2019) and Working Age Homelessness Claim Rate 
(January 2015 – March 2019) Across 29 Scottish Local Authorities. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (monthly) time fixed effects. All rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority, 
except ‘Working Age Homelessness Claim Rate’, which is per 10,000 working age households in the local 
authority. 10th percentile weekly wages includes both part-time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
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The fact that a larger impact was observed upon Housing Options approaches than on 
homelessness claims is logical given that a Housing Options approach is likely to occur 
earlier than a homelessness claim as it is in itself designed to prevent actual homelessness. 
This is reflected in the fact that around 50% of Homelessness claims come after a Housing 
Options approach has already been made (Scottish Government, 2019a).  
In terms of the control variables modelled in Table 7.1, the outcome variables tended to have 
positive associations with the rate of single adult and single parent households as expected 
(see section 7.3.4). However, there was no significant association with wages or 
unemployment rates – this may reflect the limitations of using linear interpolated annual data 
in the models, although the result is in line with previous local authority level analysis in 
England that also found no significant association between unemployment rates and 
homelessness claim rates (Loopstra, Reeves, Barr et al., 2016).     
 
7.4.2 Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout on Homelessness Claims by 
Main Reason for Claim and Prior Circumstances of Applicant   
 
Given that homelessness can arise for a variety of – often interlinked – reasons and from a 
variety of prior circumstances, the regression models in this section disaggregate the data on 
homelessness claim rates by: (a) the main cited reason for the claim, and (b) the prior housing 
circumstances of the applicant. This can provide insight into whether UC rollout is linked to 
homelessness arising from relationship breakdown/being “asked to leave” a 
partner/friend/family’s home, and/or homelessness arising from one’s own property e.g. due 
to a terminated tenancy. 
The relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and homelessness claim rates, by the 
main cited reason for the application, is modelled in Table 7.2. The results suggest that UC 
‘Full Service’ rollout is associated with an increase of 0.22 homelessness claims (per 10,000 
households) where the applicants cite “asked to leave” by the host as the main reason for 
their claim. However, no significant relationship was found between ‘Full Service’ rollout 
and the rate of homelessness claims citing household disputes or a terminated tenancy as the 
main reason. As mentioned in section 7.2.4., being “asked to leave” by the ‘host’ is the most 
common reason for homelessness claims in Scotland. The results outlined in Table 7.2 
suggest that this issue may be being exacerbated by UC rollout, due to UC’s long wait 
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periods, increased conditionality and monthly direct payments putting a strain on household 
finances and in turn straining relationships and the affordability of looking after all 
household members with payments. However, the results suggest that less common reasons 
for homelessness in Scotland e.g. terminated tenancies have not been impacted by UC up to 
March 2019.  
 
Table 7.2. Relationship Between UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout and Homelessness Claim Rates 
Across 29 Scottish Local Authorities, by Main Cited Reason for Application, January 2015 – 
March 2019. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (monthly) time fixed effects. All rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority, 
except the ‘Terminated Tenancy Rate’, which is per 10,000 rented dwellings. 10th percentile weekly wages 
includes both part-time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 
The relationship between ‘Full Service’ rollout and homelessness claim rates, by prior 
circumstances of the applicant making the claim, is modelled in Table 7.3. No significant 
relationships were found between ‘Full Service’ rollout and any of the prior circumstance 
categories at the 5% level. However, the positive relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ 
rollout and claims from those previously staying in family home or with relatives was 
significant at the 10% level – this suggests that the increase in homelessness claims from 
those “asked to leave” by the host are likely to be coming from those in family homes or 
staying with relatives – this is unsurprising given that, as noted in section 7.2.4, the ‘host’ in 
these circumstances tends to be a parent (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019, p. 72).  
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Table 7.3. Relationship Between UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout and Homelessness Claim Rates 
Across 29 Scottish Local Authorities, by Prior Circumstances of Applicant, January 2015 – 
March 2019. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (monthly) time fixed effects. All rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority, 
except the ‘SRS Property Rate’, ‘PRS Property Rate’, and ‘Owner Occupied Property Rate’ which is per 
10,000 rented dwellings in the given housing tenure. 10th percentile weekly wages includes both part-
time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 
 
7.4.3 Impact by Length of Rollout   
 
The above analysis was repeated in Tables 7.4-7.6 using the ‘UC Full Service (by rollout 
length)’ explanatory variable instead of the ‘UC Full Service’ variable. As in the previous 
empirical chapters, this is carried out in order to examine whether the impact of UC ‘Full 
Service’ rollout increases when it has been rolled out for longer within local authorities, and 
therefore reached more claimants. To ease interpretation visually, the coefficients from the 
regression models in Tables 5-7 are also plotted in Figures 7.3-7.5. 
The results in Table 7.4 (visualised in Figure 7.3) suggest that, in general, the impact of UC 
‘Full Service’ rollout on Housing Options approaches does indeed tend to increase when it 
has been rolled out for longer. Specifically, it is associated with an increase of 0.65 
approaches in the first 1-3 months post rollout (although not statistically significant), rising 
to 2.50 additional approaches 4-6 months post rollout and 3.65 additional approaches where 
‘Full Service’ has been rolled out for 13+ months (all per 10,000 households). To put this 
into context, given that the mean Housing Options approach rate in the 6-months prior to 
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‘Full Service’ rollout beginning (i.e. September 2015 – February 2016) was 16.2 approaches 
(per 10,000 households), the 3.65 additional approaches (per 10,000 households) where it 
has been rolled out for 13+ months corresponds to a 22.5% increase on pre rollout rates.    
However, the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout on working age homelessness claim rates 
is less clear. The results suggest that UC ‘Full Service’ rollout is associated with an increase 
of 0.34 working age homelessness claims (per 10,000 working age households) in the first 
1-3 months post rollout. This rises to 0.83 claims (per 10,000 working age households) in 
the 4-6 months post rollout. However, the impact then appears to reduce. This suggests that 
although a positive relationship exists between ‘Full Service’ rollout and the working age 
homelessness claim rate, the impact of rollout does not appear to increase the longer it has 
been rolled out despite the fact that more people will have moved onto UC. 
 
Table 7.4. Relationship Between UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout and the Total Housing Options 
Approach Rate (April 2014 – March 2019) and Working Age Homelessness Claim Rate 
(January 2015 – March 2019), by Rollout Length, Across 29 Scottish Local Authorities. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (monthly) time fixed effects. All rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority, 
except ‘Working Age Homelessness Claim Rate’, which is per 10,000 working age households in the local 
authority. 10th percentile weekly wages includes both part-time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
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Figure 7.3. Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout on Housing Options Approach Rate and 
Working Age Homelessness Claim Rate within Scottish Local Authorities, by Rollout Length, 
to March 2019. 
 
Notes: Point estimates are derived from the regression models in Table 7.4. Vertical bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Coefficients become slightly less precise in quarters further post rollout due to 
decreasing sample size of local authorities (this is conveyed by the widening confidence intervals).   
 
The regression models in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 examine any variation in the impact of UC ‘Full 
Service’ rollout (by rollout length) on homelessness claim rates between different reasons 
for the claim and different prior circumstances of applicants. The results in Table 7.5 
(visualised in Figure 7.4) find no overall significant relationship between ‘Full Service’ 
rollout and claims arising from household disputes or terminated tenancies. The results do 
however further highlight a positive association between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and the 
homelessness claim rate amongst those citing “asked to leave” as the main reason. Yet, 
similar to the relationship observed for the working age homelessness claim rate, the impact 
does not appear to increase where ‘Full Service’ has been rolled out for longer. Therefore, 
there is no clear increase in the impact of ‘Full Service’ rollout over time despite more people 
moving onto UC. Similarly, Table 7.6 (visualised in Figure 7.5) suggests that there was a 
small positive relationship between ‘Full Service’ and homelessness claims from those 
previously staying in family home or with relatives, but this did not clearly increase in the 
months post rollout. There was also no clear relationship between ‘Full Service’ rollout and 





Table 7.5. Relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and Homelessness Claim Rates 
Across 29 Scottish Local Authorities, by rollout length and main cited reason for 
application, January 2015 – March 2019. 
 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (monthly) time fixed effects. All rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority, 
except the ‘Terminated Tenancy Rate’, which is per 10,000 rented dwellings. 10th percentile weekly wages 
includes both part-time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 
Figure 7.4. Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout on Homelessness Claim Rate within Scottish 
Local Authorities, by Main Cited Reason for Claims and Rollout Length (January 2015 – 
March 2019). 
 
Notes: Point estimates are derived from the regression models in Table 6. Vertical bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Coefficients become slightly less precise (exemplified by widening confidence 
intervals) in quarters further post rollout due to decreasing sample size of local authorities. 
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Table 7.6. Relationship between UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout and Homelessness Claim Rates 
Across 29 Scottish Local Authorities, by Rollout Length and Prior Circumstances of 
Applicant, January 2015 – March 2019. 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local 
authority and (monthly) time fixed effects. All rates are per 10,000 households in the local authority, 
except for the ‘SRS Property Rate’, ‘PRS Property Rate’, and ‘Owner Occupied Property Rate’ which are 
per 10,000 rented dwellings in the given housing tenure. 10th percentile weekly wages includes both part-
time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 
Figure 7.5. Impact of UC ‘Full Service’ Rollout on Homelessness Claim Rate within Scottish 
Local Authorities, by Prior Circumstance of Applicant and Rollout Length (January 2015 – 
March 2019). 
Notes: Point estimates are derived from the regression models in Table 7. Vertical bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Coefficients become slightly less precise (exemplified by widening confidence 





This chapter has examined the impact of Universal Credit ‘Full Service’ rollout on Housing 
Options approach rates and homelessness claim rates (broken down by overall working age 
claims and claims for different reasons and from different prior circumstances) within 
Scottish local authorities. The findings suggest that a clear positive relationship exists 
between ‘Full Service’ rollout and Housing Options approach rates. Overall, after accounting 
for local authority and time fixed effects, unemployment rates, wages and rates of single 
adult and single parent households, ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with an increase of 
1.32 Housing Options approaches (per 10,000 households), on average within Scottish local 
authorities between April 2014 and March 2019. This corresponds, approximately, to an 8.1% 
increase on mean rates observed in the pre rollout period (i.e. September 2015 – February 
2016). This impact of UC rollout on Housing Options approach rates tended to increase 
where it had been rolled out for longer and thus reached more claimants. Where ‘Full Service’ 
had been rolled out for 13+ months it was associated with an increase of 3.65 approaches 
(per 10,000 households) – this corresponds to a 22.5% increase on pre rollout rates.  
The findings outlined in this chapter also suggest that UC ‘Full Service’ rollout is associated 
with a small increase in working age homelessness claim rates, but this impact was less clear 
than that seen for Housing Options approach rates. Overall, after accounting for local 
authority and time fixed effects, unemployment rates, wages and rates of single adult and 
single parent households, ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with an additional 0.45 
working age homelessness claims (per 10,000 working age households), on average within 
Scottish local authorities between January 2015 and March 2019. This increase was small, 
yet statistically significant, and corresponds approximately to a 3.0% increase on the mean 
rates observed in the pre rollout period. Unlike Housing Options, the relationship did not 
strengthen the longer ‘Full Service’ had been rolled out, meaning that the overall relationship 
was less clear, as claim rates did not increase over time despite more people moved onto UC. 
However, the fact that a larger and clearer impact was observed upon Housing Options 
approaches than on homelessness claims is logical given that a Housing Options approach 
is likely to occur prior to a homelessness claim (and thus more likely to be picked up in the 




The final finding outlined in this chapter is that disaggregation of the data on homelessness 
claims suggests that the small increase in claims associated with ‘Full Service’ rollout mostly 
arises from those previously staying in their family home/with relatives and becoming 
homeless due to being “asked to leave” by the ‘host’ of the household. Many of these ‘hosts’ 
will be the parent(s) of the homelessness applicant (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 
2019, p. 72), which suggests that UC rollout may be putting a strain on household finances 
and in turn straining relationships and the affordability of looking after all household 
members with payments. However, there was no significant relationship found between 
‘Full Service’ rollout and other cited reasons for homelessness, i.e. household disputes or 
terminated tenancies. This may partially reflect some of the contrasting reasons for 
homelessness in Scotland compared to England – as noted in section 7.2.4., homelessness in 
Scotland most commonly occurs amongst those previously staying with 
family/friends/partners, whereas in England it most commonly occurs due to the ending of 
a private tenancy or rent arrears. Therefore, the tendency for UC rollout’s small impact on 
homelessness claims to be “asked to leave” claims and not terminated tenancy claims may 
reflect Scotland’s lower overall housing pressures than England – this has previously been 
highlighted as a contributing factor to welfare reform having less devastating homelessness 
impacts in Scotland than in England (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019, p. 90). 
As with the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, the key strength of the analysis here is that it was 
able to exploit cross-area variation in the timing of UC rollout in order to examine its impact. 
However, unlike in Chapters 5 and 6, it was not possible to conduct a falsification test to 
improve causal inference by checking the specificity of the results. This is because no 
suitable non-equivalent outcome variable was identified for which data was available on. 
There are also several further limitations to the study.   
Firstly, in the homelessness and Housing Options data used in the analysis all figures were 
round to the nearest five claims/approaches – this reduces the accuracy of detecting small 
changes month to month. Secondly, as the analysis uses local authority level data rather than 
individual level data, there is (as in Chapters 5 and 6) potential for ecological fallacy. Thirdly, 
whilst the UC variables and homelessness variables are based on monthly data, the control 
variables are based on annual data converted into monthly estimates using linear 
interpolation (or in case of unemployment rates by taking previous 12 months average). This 
means that they can control for long-term trends but are not able to accurately account for 
month-to-month variation and seasonal fluctuations. This reduces their reliability and means 
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their coefficients should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, current data availability 
meant that it was not possible to control for any other homelessness determinants. However, 
for this to bias the results the omitted homelessness determinants would need to be correlated 
with both the timing of UC ‘Full Service’ rollout and monthly rates of homelessness 
claims/Housing Options approaches – there are no known reasons why this may be the case. 
Finally, whilst the inclusion of local authority and time fixed effects controls for unobserved 
factors that: (a) vary between local authorities but not over time, and (b) vary over time but 
not between local authorities, they cannot control for unobserved factors that vary both 
between local authorities and over time (Stock and Watson, 2015). In the analysis here, this 
means that the models are unable to control for any changes in procedures in the use of 
Housing Options over time within local authorities during the analysis period. This can be 
an issue given that it is up to local authorities themselves to decide what constitutes a 
recorded Housing Options approach. Fixed effects can control for the well documented 
variation in usage of Housing Options between different local authorities (see Fitzpatrick, 
Pawson, Bramley et al., 2019, p. 67; Scottish Government, 2019a, p. 8), but not if certain 
local authorities reduced/increased their propensity to use Housing Options over time within 




Chapter 8. Empirical Study 4: Impact of Universal 




This chapter examines the impact of Universal Credit rollout on household financial 
problems (i.e. the first stage of housing insecurity as set out in Chapter 3), including 
self-reported difficulties managing financially and self-reported problems paying for 
housing, bills and council tax. In contrast to the fixed effects panel design which was 
employed in Chapters 5-7 and which solely used local authority level data, the analysis 
here uses a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, making use of individual 
and household level data from England, Scotland and Wales from the ‘Understanding 
Society’ survey (aka the UK Household Longitudinal Study or UKHLS). The special 
licence version of UKHLS includes information on respondent’s subjective financial 
situation, their ability to meet payments for housing/bills/council tax, their employment 
status, their local authority of residence and characteristics such as sex, age, marital 
status and education. The analysis here links this individual/household level  data to local 
authority level data on the timing of UC rollout in UKHLS respondent’s area of 
residence in order to address the following research questions:  
 
1. Has UC rollout had an adverse impact on self-reported difficulties managing 
financially amongst unemployed individuals? 
 
2. Has UC rollout had an adverse impact on the ability to meet housing payments 
amongst unemployed individuals? 
 
3. Has UC rollout had an adverse impact on the ability to meet household bill 
payments amongst unemployed individuals? 
 
4. Has UC rollout had an adverse impact on the ability to meet council tax payments 




To address these research questions, the DiD analysis of this chapter splits UKHLS 
respondents into two groups: (a) a ‘treatment group’, made up of unemployed 
individuals, and (b) a ‘control group’, made up of working-age individuals who were 
not unemployed. The treatment group focusses on unemployed individuals because they 
were the first group to become exposed to UC during the ‘Live Service’ phase of rollout, 
which typically affected those who would previously have claimed income related 
Jobseekers Allowance (Department for Work and Pensions, 2020). Therefore, this lends 
itself to a natural experiment research design as newly unemployed individuals between 
2013 and 2018 either went onto UC or Jobseekers Allowance depending on where they 
made their claim (Craig and Katikireddi, 2020, p. E131). This type of analysis was not 
possible whilst using local authority level data in Chapters 5-7, as only individual-level 
data allows this type of disaggregation based on employment status.  
The DiD analysis outlined in this chapter is split into two parts. In part 1 of the analysis, 
the immediate impact of UC ‘Live Service’ – i.e. in its first 12 months of rollout – is 
examined. Here, a design similar to the standard two-group and two-time period DiD 
design (see Wing, Simon and Bello-Gomez, 2018) is employed. Data from UKHLS 
waves in the 12 months immediately before and after UC ‘Live Service’ rollout in a 
given respondent’s local authority of residence is used. Outcomes relating to subjective 
finances and problems paying for housing/bills/council tax are compared before and 
after the rollout date, measuring the difference for the treatment group (unemployed in 
both time periods and thus more likely to become exposed to UC) minus the difference 
for the control group (not unemployed in both time periods and thus unlikely to have 
become exposed to UC).       
In part 2 of the analysis, the impact of UC rollout is examined using a more longitudinal 
approach, by employing a DiD research design similar to that used by Wickham, Bentley, 
Rose et al. (2020) in their study of the effects of UC on mental health. Here, data from 
waves 1-9 of UKHLS (i.e. 2009-2019) are used, and in each wave respondents are 
assigned to the treatment group if they are unemployed in the given wave, or the control 
group if they are not unemployed in the given wave. Again, the DiD analysis here 
compares changes in outcomes relating to subjective finances and problems paying for 
housing/bills/council tax before and after UC rollout in each respondent’s local 
authority of residence. 
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This chapter begins by setting out the data, variables and difference-in-differences 
research design and methodology used in the chapter’s empirical analysis. It will then 
go on to set out the results of part 1 and part 2 of the analysis, before ending with a 
conclusion which summarises the research findings and the limitations of the analysis.  
 
8.2 Data, Variables and Methods 
 
8.2.1 Data and Participants 
 
UKHLS is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of around 40,000 households in 
the UK, and was created in order to build on and expand the longstanding British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), which ran from 1991-2009 with around 10,000 households (see 
Understanding Society, 2020). UKHLS began with its first wave of data collection in 2009-
11, and the same households are visited each year in order to track changes in circumstances 
(Ibid). All data is collected through either a face-to-face interview in the participant’s own 
home or a self-completed online survey. Up to the start of 2020, there had been nine waves 
of data collection, with Wave 9’s data being collected in 2017-19. The survey includes data 
at both the household level, which is collected via the survey’s ‘household questionnaire’, 
and individual level, which is collected via the survey’s ‘individual questionnaire’ 
(Understanding Society, 2018).   
Whilst part 1 of the analysis in this chapter uses data from UKHLS waves immediately 
before and after UC was first introduced in respondent’s area of residence, part 2 of the 
analysis takes a more longitudinal approach, as discussed, and uses data from all nine waves 
of UKHLS.  Both parts of the analysis include UKHLS respondents who were of working-
age and who had data available on their employment status, their local authority of residence 
(available via the special licence version of UKHLS only), the various outcome variables of 
interest (outlined below in section 8.2.2.), and the various control variables (outlined below 
in section 8.2.4.). Information on each respondent’s local authority of residence was used to 
link the UKHLS data with data from the UC rollout schedule in order to ascertain whether 
UC had rolled out yet in their area at the date of each interview. Those living in Northern 
Ireland were excluded from the analysis as data was not available on the UC rollout schedule 
here.    
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8.2.2 Household Financial Problems Data (Outcome Variables) 
 
The data from UKHLS was recoded in order to create five separate binary outcome variables 
for the analysis, each of which indicates a household financial problem.  
The first two outcome variables come from the UKHLS individual questionnaire, and 
provide a subjective measure of respondents’ current financial situation and views about 
their financial future. They are: (1) ‘Not Currently Managing Financially’ and (2) ‘Think 
Will be Worse off Financially in Future’. ‘Not Currently Managing Financially’ uses the 
survey question “How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days?” 
and classifies those who responded “Finding it quite difficult” or “Finding it very difficult” 
as not managing (coded 0 = managing or just about getting by, 1 = not managing). Similarly, 
‘Think Will be Worse off Financially in Future’ uses the survey question “Looking ahead, 
how do you think you will be financially a year from now?” and classifies those who 
responded as “Worse off than now” as thinking they will be worse off in future (coded 0 = 
better off/same and, 1 = worse off).  
The remaining outcome variables come from the UKHLS household questionnaire. They 
are: (3) ‘Problems Paying for Housing’, (4) ‘Problems Paying Bills’, and (5) ‘Problems 
Paying Council Tax’. Those who responded “Yes” to the survey question “In the last twelve 
months, have you ever found yourself behind with your rent/mortgage?” are classified as 
having problems paying for housing (coded 0 = no, 1 = yes). Those who responded “Behind 
with all bills” or “Behind with some bills” to the survey question “Are you up to date with 
all your household bills such as electricity, gas, water rates, telephone and other bills or are 
you behind with any of them?” are classified as having problems paying bills (coded 0 = up 
to date with all bills, 1 = behind with some/all). Finally, those who responded “yes” to the 
survey question “In the last twelve months, have you ever found yourself behind with paying 
Council Tax?” are classified as having problems paying council tax (coded 0 = no, 1 = yes).  
 
8.2.3 Universal Credit Rollout Variable and Assignment to Treatment 
and Control Groups 
 
The UKHLS data on each respondent’s local authority of residence (available via the special 
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licence version) was used to link the survey data with data from the official UC rollout 
schedule (available from: UK Government, 2015a; UK Government, 2015b and set out in 
Appendix 1 (for England), Appendix 2 (for Scotland) and Appendix 3 (for Wales)). A ‘UC 
rollout by interview date’ variable was then created to indicate whether UC had rolled out 
yet by the date of each interview in the dataset (coded 0 = no, 1 = yes). 
Part 1 of the analysis, as already explained, aims to examine the immediate impact of 
UC ‘Live Service’ rollout on household financial problems amongst unemployed 
individuals and their households, by using a DiD design similar to the standard two-
group and two-time period approach (see Wing, Simon and Bello-Gomez, 2018). Here, 
time period one is the year (i.e. UKHLS wave) immediately before ‘Live Service’ rolled 
out in each respondents local authority of residence. This is based on respondents 
UKHLS interview date, and where more than one wave of data occurred in the year 
prior to rollout, the wave closest to rollout was taken. Similarly, time period two is the 
year (i.e. UKHLS wave) immediately after ‘Live Service’ rollout in each respondents 
local authority of residence, with this again being based on the interview date  and the 
wave closer to rollout being taken if more than one wave of data occurred within a year 
post rollout. Respondents were assigned into either the treatment group or control group in 
each wave of the analysis based on their response to the survey question “Which of these 
best describes your current employment situation?”. Respondents were included in the 
treatment group if they self-reported being unemployed in both time period one and time 
period two. Conversely, they were included in the control group if they were of working age 
and self-reported not being unemployed (including those who were employed, self-
employed, on maternity leave, full-time students, doing an apprenticeship, doing an 
apprenticeship, or something else) in both time period one and time period two. 
Part 2 of the analysis, as also already explained, takes a more longitudinal approach, using 
data from wave 1 (2009-11) to wave 9 (2017-19) of UKHLS. Here, in a similar to the DiD 
research design employed by Wickham, Bentley, Rose et al. (2020)’s paper examining UC’s 
mental health impact, the analysis assigns respondents to the treatment group in a given wave 
if they self-reported being unemployed in that wave, or to the control group if they were of 
working age and self-reported not being unemployed in that wave. This means that – unlike 
in part 1 of the analysis – respondents could move from the treatment group to the control 
group or vice versa if their employment status were to change between waves. As in the 
aforementioned Wickham, Bentley, Rose et al. (2020) paper, the analysis here focuses on 
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unemployed people for the treatment group because they were the first group exposed to UC 
and more likely to have become exposed in the analysis period. Therefore, the analysis here 
again focusses on the timing of ‘Live Service’ rollout affecting mainly single unemployed 
people with no children. However, ‘Full Service’ would also have rolled out in the latter 
waves of the analysis, meaning that a wider range of groups would also have become 
exposed to UC, including unemployed people in couples with children and some people in 
work on low incomes. 
      
8.2.4 Control Variables 
 
In the UK, household difficulties managing financially can vary based on the demographics 
of the household. In particular, research into experiences of difficulties managing financially 
by the Financial Conduct Authority suggests that younger people are more likely to be in 
financial difficulties, as are women due to being more likely to be a single parent (see 
Financial Conduct Authority, 2017; Stack and Meredith, 2018; Gladstone, 2020). In addition, 
the link between educational attainment and labour market outcomes (and income) are well 
documented (e.g. see Furia, Castagna, Mattoscio et al., 2010; Ionescu, 2012), and research 
into homelessness specifically indicates that the financial security that comes with having a 
partner or spouse (and thus income coming from multiple adults) is a key provider of housing 
security (Bramley and Fitzpatrick, 2018).  
Consequently, in order to account for these potential confounders, four control variables 
were included in the analysis. These are: (1) ‘Sex’ (coded 1 = male, 2 = female), (2) ‘Age 
Band’ (coded 1 = 16-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64), (3), ‘Marital Status’ 
(coded 1 = married/civil partner, 2 = living as couple, 3 = widow/divorced/separated, 4 = 
never married), and (4) ‘Education’, which shows respondents highest qualification (coded 
1 = degree/equivalent, 2 = A level/GCSE/equivalent, 3 = other/no qualifications).   
 
8.2.5 Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
 
DiD analysis is a quasi-experimental econometric technique that uses longitudinal data on a 
treatment group and a control group as a means of judging the counterfactual and thus 
estimating a causal effect (Columbia Public Health, 2019). DiD is typically used to estimate 
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the effect of a policy intervention by assigning individuals into the treatment group if they 
are exposed to the intervention or into the control group if they are not exposed to the 
intervention. Changes in outcomes over time (‘differences’) are then compared between the 
treatment group (Difference 1 or D1) and the control group (Difference 2 or D2). This 
process is summarised – in the current context of estimating the intervention effect of UC 
rollout on household finances/ability to meet payments for housing, bills and council tax – 
via Equation 8.1 and Figure 8.1, which are below. 
 
𝑈𝐶 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝑫𝟏 − 𝑫𝟐
= (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 −  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑒,𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝)
− (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝
−   𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑒,𝑁𝑜𝑛− 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝) 
 
Where 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 refers to the various outcome variables outlined in section 8.2.2 
which indicate household financial problems. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 refers to interviews with respondents 
conducted after UC ‘Live Service’ had rolled out in the area in which they live. Conversely, 
𝑃𝑟𝑒 refers to respondents whose UKHLS interview date occurred before UC ‘Live Service’ 
had rolled out in the area in which they live. 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 refers to those who self-reported being 
unemployed, whilst 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 refers to those of working age who self-reported not being 
unemployed.  
 
Figure 8.1. Graphical Explanation of Difference-in-Differences Research Design and Parallel 





The key assumption of DiD analysis is the ‘parallel trends’ assumption. This assumption 
requires that, in the absence of the treatment, the difference in outcomes between the 
treatment group and the control group is constant over time (Murnane and Willett, 2011; 
Craig, Katikireddi, Leyland et al., 2017; Columbia Public Health, 2019). In other words, this 
means that the treatment and control group would have moved in parallel through the time 
period being investigated had the intervention not occurred. Whilst, in reality, this cannot be 
fully proven, one way to support the assumption is to show that outcomes were moving in 
parallel before the intervention. This can be examined via a visual inspection of trends before 
and after the intervention, as conveyed in Figure 8.1. If the parallel trends assumption is 
violated, this will lead to a biased estimate of the intervention effect (Columbia Public Health, 
2019).    
 
As discussed by Craig and Katikireddi (2020), the staggered nature of the UC rollout 
schedule lends itself to natural experimental evaluation, as it meant that individuals that 
were newly unemployed between 2013 and 2018 either went onto UC or onto Jobseekers 
Allowance depending upon their area of residence. In general, there are a wide range of 
natural experimental approaches to evaluation other than DiD that can be used to analyse 
policy reforms – e.g. instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, and interrupted 
time-series – and decisions about which approach to use should be based on the specific 
features of policy intervention of interest (Craig, Katikireddi, Leyland et al., 2017). For 
the analysis here, DiD was selected as the most appropriate design as: (a) a DiD design 
can take advantage of the fact that UC rolled out in different areas at different times in 
order to analyse its impact, and (b) DiD design can take advantage of the fact that UC 
rolled out to unemployed individuals first by using unemployed people (more likely to 
become exposed to UC) as the treatment group and not unemployed (less likely to 
become exposed to UC) as the control group. 
The analysis here estimates the intervention effect of UC rollout by running 
multivariable logistic regression models using the UKHLS data outlined in section 8.2.1 
and including an interaction term between the ‘UC rollout by interview date’ set out in 
section 8.2.2 and the variable indicating whether respondents are in the treatment group or 
control group.  
For part 1 of the analysis, which attempts to measure the immediate impact of UC ‘Live 
Service’ rollout, this is as follows: 
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Where the data comes from the UKHLS waves immediately before and after UC ‘Live 
Service’ rolled out in each respondent’s area of interest, and 𝑖 is the individual, 𝑡 is the 
year and ε is the error term. As in Equation 8.1, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 refers to the various 
outcome variables outlined in section 8.2.2. 𝑆𝑒𝑥 , 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡  and 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
represents the control variables outlined in section 8.2.4. 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝  indicates whether 
respondents were unemployed in both waves (and thus in treatment group), or not 
unemployed in both waves (and thus in control group). This does not vary over time, as those 
who transitioned from unemployment to employment or vice versa were excluded from the 
analysis. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐶  represents the ‘UC rollout by interview date’ variable. By interacting 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝  and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐶  (i.e. 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐶 ) this gives the difference-in-difference 
estimator of the immediate (i.e. in first 12 months of rollout) intervention effect of UC rollout.  
For part 2 of the analysis, which attempts to measure the UC intervention effect between 





















   
Where data comes from all nine UKHLS waves. Here, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝  indicates whether 
respondents are unemployed or not in a given wave whilst 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐶 indicates whether UC 
‘Live Service’ has rolled out yet in a given wave, and hence can vary both over time and 
between individuals. All other variables are the same as those in Equation 8.2. By interacting 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝  and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐶  (i.e. 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐶 ) this gives the difference-in-difference 
estimator of the intervention effect of UC rollout between wave 1 and wave 9 of UKHLS. 
In order to account for attrition and non-response within UKHLS, the survey’s longitudinal 
survey weight was applied when running the logistic regression models. This is in 





that the survey’s longitudinal weight should be applied when using multiple waves of 
UKHLS data. The guidance also sets out that it is the longitudinal weight from the last wave 
of the analysis that should be applied (Understanding Society, 2021), meaning that it was 




8.3.1 Empirical Analysis Part 1: Two-Group and Two-Time Period Study 
on Immediate Impact of UC ‘Live Service’ Rollout 
 
As already set out above, part 1 of the empirical analysis of this chapter examines the 
immediate impact of UC ‘Live Service’ rollout using data from the UKHLS waves that occur 
immediately before and after its rollout, employing a design similar to the standard two-
group and two-time period DiD. Table 8.1 provides the unweighted baseline characteristics 
for the treatment group (i.e. those unemployed in both time periods) and the control group 
(i.e. those not unemployed in both time periods). It highlights that those who were in the 
treatment group were more likely to be male, young, unmarried and hold fewer formal 
qualifications when compared to those who were in the control group. This highlights the 
importance of controlling for these characteristics in the DiD analysis. In terms of the 
outcome variables indicating financial problems, those in the treatment group were more 
likely to not be managing financially and to be in a household with problems paying for 
housing, problems paying for bills, and problems paying for council tax. Yet, it is important 
to note that this divergence in itself does not introduce any bias to the analysis.     
Table 8.2 shows the results of the logistic regression models for the five outcome variables 
indicating financial problems. Models report odds ratios and are run with and without control 
variables. With regards to control variables, the results suggest that – in line with the 
literature discussed in section 8.2.4. – financial problems tended to be more prevalent 
amongst those who were unmarried, female, held fewer formal qualifications. Problems 
paying for housing, bills and council tax (although not subjective financial difficulties) 
tended to be more prevalent amongst younger people. In terms of the DiD estimator 
(Unemployed*UC rollout), no significant UC intervention effect was found for any of the 
outcome variables. This suggests that there was no immediate impact (in first 12 months of 
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rollout) of UC ‘Live Service’ rollout on financial problems, although it is important to note 
that this finding is subject to several limitations (these will be discussed in section 8.4).   
  
Table 8.1. Unweighted Baseline Characteristics of Treatment and Control Group in Analysis 











































































































Notes: Data is taken from the UKHLS wave immediately prior to ‘Live Service’ rollout in each given 
respondent’s area of residence. The treatment group includes those who were unemployed in time 
period 1 and time period 2 of the analysis, whilst the control group includes those who were not 
unemployed in both time periods. Percentages do not account for any missing values and may not add 




Table 8.2. Logistic Regression Models (Analysis Part 1) 
Notes: Results show odds ratios followed by robust standard errors in brackets. Default values are shown 
in square brackets.  Unemployed*UC Rollout is the odds ratio for the DiD estimator. All (b) models 
additionally control for the wave in which the data was collected in order to account for any secular time 
trends in outcome variables. UKHLS longitudinal weights were applied to all models, which automatically 
restrict the models to a balanced panel. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.   
 
8.3.2 Empirical Analysis Part 2: Longitudinal Study on Impact of UC 
Rollout 
 
As already set out, part 2 of the analysis takes a more longitudinal approach than part 1. 
It examines the impact of UC rollout by using data from waves 1 to 9 of UKHLS and 
splitting respondents into a treatment group and control group based or their 
employment status in a given wave. Specifically, the treatment group was made up of 
those who were unemployed and thus more likely to be exposed to UC, whilst the control 
group was made up of those who were not unemployed and thus less likely to be exposed 
to UC. Table 8.3 provides the unweighted baseline characteristics of the treatment group 
and control group prior to UC rollout, with the data being taken from wave 3 of UKHLS 
(i.e. the first wave prior to ‘Live Service’ rollout commencing).  
As in part 1 of the analysis, those who were in the treatment group here were more likely 
to be male, younger, unmarried and hold fewer formal qualifications when compared to 
those who were in the control group. With regards to the outcome variables indicating 
financial problems, those in the treatment group were again more likely to not currently 
managing financially and again more likely to be in a household that is facing problems 
paying for housing, problems paying for bills, and problems paying for council tax. 
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However, this in itself does not introduce bias to the analysis as long as the parallel 
trends assumption is not violated.  
 
Table 8.3. Unweighted Baseline Characteristics of Treatment and Control Group pre UC 







































































Think Will be Worse off 






































Notes: Data is taken from UKHLS wave 3 (i.e. first wave before UC ‘Live Service’ Rollout Began). The 
treatment group includes all those who were unemployed in this wave, and the control group includes 




Unlike in DiD analysis in part 1 involving just two time periods, longitudinal studies with 
multiple data points pre policy intervention (as is the case here) can gain some insight into 
whether the parallel trends assumption is met via a visual inspection of trends in outcomes 
before the intervention. This is done in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. Time – based on the date of the 
interview – is adjusted in the graphs in order to be relative to UC rollout in each respondents’ 
area of residence. The graphs suggest that outcomes are broadly parallel prior to UC rollout, 
with the treatment group having a higher proportion of those not managing financially and 
struggling to pay for housing/bills/council tax pre-UC rollout (as already shown in Table 3). 
However, the gap between treatment and control group does appear to widen slightly over 
time pre rollout with regards to problems paying for housing and council tax, which may 
introduce some bias, although they do not diverge dramatically from the parallel trends 
assumption.  
  
Figure 8.2. Subjective Financial Situation before and after UC rollout in Treatment and 







Figure 8.3. Household Problems Paying for Housing, Bills and Council Tax before and after 
UC rollout in Treatment and Control Groups. 
 
 
Table 8.4 shows the results of the logistic regression models. As in part 1 of the analysis, 
models are run with and without control variables. DiD estimates are shown in the form of 
an odds ratio in the main model, whilst the postestimation marginal test provides an estimate 
of the percentage point change in the prevalence of experiencing each financial problem 
following UC rollout. With regards to control variables, the results are broadly in line with 
the relationships expected based on discussion in section 8.3.4. – financial problems tended 
to be more prevalent amongst those who were female, unmarried, and who held fewer formal 
qualifications. In addition, household problems paying for housing, bills and council tax 
(although not subjective difficulty managing financially) were more common amongst 
young people.  
In terms of the DiD estimates of the UC intervention effect, the results suggest that – after 
controlling for sex, age band, marital status and education – the prevalence of problems 
paying for housing, bills and council tax all increased (for the treatment group relative to the 
control group) following the introduction of UC in respondents’ area of residence. 
Specifically, the prevalence of problems paying for housing increased by 3.9%, problems 
paying for bills by 3.1%, and problems paying council tax by 4.5% (again, this is prevalence 
in the treatment group relative to the control group). However, no significant (at 5% level) 
UC intervention effect was found with regards to subjective difficulties to manage 
financially. Therefore, the results suggest that UC rollout was associated with an increase in 
the prevalence of households being behind with payments for housing, bills and council tax, 
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but there was not a corresponding increase in the prevalence of unemployed individuals 
reporting that they were finding it difficult to manage financially. However, it should be 
noted that there are some important limitations associated with this analysis, which mean 
that causality cannot confidently be inferred – these limitations are discussed in section 8.4 
below. 
 
Table 8.4. Logistic Regression Models (Analysis Part 2) 
    
Notes: Results show odds ratios followed by robust standard errors in brackets. Default values are shown 
in square brackets.  Unemployed*UC Rollout is the odds ratio for the DiD estimator. All (b) models 
additionally control for the wave in which the data was collected in order to account for any secular time 
trends in outcome variables. Marginal Test indicates the estimated overall percentage point change in 
the prevalence of outcomes and was calculated using Stata’s ‘margins’ postestimation command. UKHLS 
longitudinal weights were applied to all models, which automatically restrict the models to a balanced 




This chapter has used data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (aka 
‘Understanding Society’) in order to examine the impact of UC rollout in England, 
Scotland and Wales on various financial problems amongst unemployed individuals and 
their households. The empirical analysis was conducted in two parts, with part 1 
investigating the immediate impact of UC ‘Live Service’ rollout via a difference -in-
differences research design similar to the standard two-group and two-time period 
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approach, and part 2 examining the impact of UC rollout via a more longitudinal 
difference-in-differences approach.  
The results from part 1 of the analysis suggest that there was no significant UC 
intervention effect for any of the five outcome variables indicating financial problems. 
This suggests that UC ‘Live Service’ rollout was not associated with an immediate 
increase in financial problems amongst unemployed people within the first 12 months 
of rollout. However, there are some key limitations that must be noted, and which could 
bias the results.  
Firstly, two of the outcome variables used in the analysis – ‘Problems Paying for Housing’ 
and ‘Problems Paying Council Tax’ – ask respondents if they have experienced problems 
meeting their payments in the previous 12 months. Therefore, where UC had rolled out for 
less than 12 months in their area, respondents in the treatment group who report problems 
meeting housing/council tax payments may be referring to problems from before UC had 
rolled out.  
Secondly, the treatment group includes those who self-report being unemployed in the 
waves immediately before and after UC rollout – this is not a perfect measure of 
exposure to UC. This is because even after UC had rolled out in their area, individuals 
would only become exposed to it if they had a change in circumstance or made a new 
claim (e.g. due to entering employment before becoming unemployed again). This 
means that although those in the treatment group were more likely to become exposed 
to UC than those in the control group, not all would have become exposed, which will 
lead to a conservative estimate of the UC intervention effect.   
In terms of part 2 of the analysis, taking a more longitudinal approach, the results suggest 
that UC rollout was associated with an increase in the prevalence of unemployed individuals 
and their households experiencing some financial problems. Specifically, the results suggest 
that for the treatment group relative to the control group – after accounting for sex, age band, 
marital status and education – the prevalence of problems paying for housing increased by 
3.9%, problems paying for bills by 3.1%, and problems paying council tax by 4.5%. 
However, no significant (at 5% level) UC intervention effect was found with regards to the 
prevalence of self-reported difficulties managing financially. This suggests that whilst there 
has been an increase in the prevalence of unemployed individuals’ households having 
problems meeting basic costs, this has not corresponded to an increase in reporting of 
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difficulties managing financially. One possible explanation is that unemployed individuals 
may still feel that they are just about getting by financially despite falling behind with some 
payments for housing, bills or council tax – indeed, some qualitative research with UC 
claimants (Bush, Templer, Allen et al., 2019, p. 5) described how claimants were pushed to 
the limit of their incomes but just about managed to get by via borrowing from family 
members or by employing the tactic of ‘rotating’ the payment of household bills.      
As in part 1 of the analysis, part 2 has some important limitations that must be noted, 
and which could bias the results. Firstly, as in part 1 of the analysis, the issue discussed 
above of the outcome variables relating to housing and council tax measuring problems 
within the last 12 months also applies here. Secondly, as in part 1, the limitation of self-
reported employment status not being a perfect measure of exposure to UC also applies 
here. However, using this more longitudinal approach means that this is less of an issue 
as over time a higher proportion of unemployed individuals in the analysis would have 
become exposed to UC due to having a change in circumstance or making a new claim. 
In Wickham, Bentley, Rose et al. (2020)’s paper on UC’s mental health impacts, which 
employed a similar design using waves 1-8 of UKHLS, the authors estimated that around 
73% of unemployed people were exposed to UC in this analysis period, with 27% 
remaining on legacy benefits. Thirdly, a limitation that is specific to part 2 of the 
analysis is that in the latter waves of the analysis period some of those in the control group 
are likely to have become exposed to UC. This is because as the ‘Full Service’ phase of UC 
rolled out it affected those in work on low incomes, and some individuals in this group could 
be in the control group. However, this is likely to be a very small proportion of the overall 
control group and would lead to an underestimate of the true UC intervention effect.  
Fourthly, as outlined in the results section, graphical inspection of pre-UC rollout trends in 
the outcome variables used in the analysis suggest a small amount of divergence from the 
parallel trends assumption with regards to problems paying for housing and council tax. 
Parallel trends is the key assumption of difference-in-difference analysis, and its violation 
results in a biased estimate of the causal intervention effect (Columbia Public Health, 2019). 
Here, the graphs in Figure 8.3 suggest that the gap between treatment and control groups 
widened a small amount prior to UC rollout. Whilst this divergence from the parallel trends 
assumption was not dramatic, it may still introduce bias. Finally, as UKHLS respondents in 
part 2 of the analysis can move between treatment and control group in different waves, this 
may have a sorting effect on the treatment/control groups. Prior to UC rollout, unemployed 
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people would be composed of people with more/less severe financial problems. DiD 
estimators in the analysis will capture the causal effect of UC on prevalence of financial 
problems. But, as the aim of UC is to improve employment, it may also capture a sorting 
effect if those in treatment group with less severe financial problems are the ones who 
transition into employment – if this is the case, the DiD estimators in the analysis would 
overstate the UC intervention effect.  
Overall, the DiD analysis in this chapter is a useful supplement to the previous empirical 
analysis in Chapters 5-7 of this thesis. Whilst the previous chapters have relied on local 
authority-level data to examine housing security, the analysis here was able to make use of 
individual level data from UKHLS linked to local authority level data on UC rollout in order 
to employ a difference-in-difference research design. Although the results of part 1 of the 
analysis suggest no immediate intervention effect of UC ‘Live Service’ rollout on financial 
problems, the part 2 longitudinal analysis suggests UC rollout is associated with an increase 
in problems paying for housing, bills and council tax, which is in line with the findings of 
existing qualitative studies with UC claimants (as set out in the literature review in Chapter 
3, e.g. Britain Thinks, 2018; Cheetham, Moffatt and Addison, 2018; Bush, Templer, Allen 
et al., 2019; Robertson, Wright and Stewart, 2020). However, there are numerous limitations 
to part 1 and part 2 of the analysis, and as a result, it is not possible to confidently infer 
causality from the findings of this chapter alone.    
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This chapter sets out how this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by going 
over the original aims and objectives, summarising the research findings, and explaining 
how they link in with existing empirical evidence on UC’s housing insecurity impacts. The 
chapter ends by discussing what the implications of the research findings are for UC 
claimants, for landlords, and for UC as a policy going forwards.  
 
9.2 Thesis Contribution to Knowledge 
 
9.2.1 Thesis Aims and Objectives  
 
As set out in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis has been to exploit cross-area variation in 
the timing of UC rollout as a form of natural experiment in order to examine its impact 
on the four stages of housing insecurity. These four stages were set out in detail in 
Chapter 3. They are: (1) household financial problems, (2) build-up of rent arrears, (3) 
repossession actions, and (4) threatened/actual homelessness, and the empirical analysis 
of this thesis has sought to provide insight into the impact of UC rollout on all four 
stages. Based on this, the specific overarching objectives of this thesis  (as outlined in 
Chapter 1) have been as follows: 
 
1. To apply causal modelling to provide robust empirical analysis into the impacts of 
Universal Credit rollout on the different stages of housing insecurity in the UK. 
 
2. To draw upon this empirical analysis in order to contribute to policy debates in the 
UK over the ongoing rollout of Universal Credit. 
 
In order to address objective 1, this thesis has included four separate empirical chapters, 
with each one making use of different sources of administrative/survey data to examine 
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UC’s impacts on the four stages of housing insecurity. Specifically, financial problems 
leading to difficulties meeting rent payments (first stage of insecurity) were examined 
in Chapter 8, build-up of rent arrears (second stage of insecurity) were examined in 
Chapter 6, landlord repossession actions (third stage of insecurity) were examined in 
Chapter 5, and homelessness (fourth and most extreme form of insecurity) was 
examined in Chapters 6 and 7.   
In terms of objective 2, the policy review chapter (Chapter 2) and literature review 
chapter (Chapter 3) of this thesis introduced UC as a policy and have discussed existing 
empirical evidence and debates regarding its key design features and its impacts. The 
extent to which the empirical analysis of Chapters 5-8 contribute to these debates will 
be discussed throughout the course of this conclusion chapter.   
 
9.2.2 Summary of Research Findings from Empirical Chapters 
 
The four separate empirical studies in Chapters 5-8 have provided evidence of a clear link 
between the rollout of Universal Credit and housing insecurity in the UK, consistent across 
various indicators of insecurity from different data sources. The research findings for each 
of the four stages of housing insecurity are summarised below, with an overview of the 
headline findings also set out in Figure 9.1. 
 




Firstly, with regards to the impact of UC rollout on financial problems leading to difficulties 
meeting rent payments (first stage of insecurity), this was examined in Chapter 8’s 
difference-in-differences analysis. The results suggest that UC ‘Live Service’ rollout had no 
immediate (i.e. in first 12 months) intervention effect on financial problems such as self-
reported difficulties managing financially, problems paying for housing, problems paying 
for bills and problems paying for council tax. However, when taking a more longitudinal 
approach using data from all nine waves of UKHLS, the results suggested that UC rollout 
was associated with a 3.9% increase in the prevalence of problems paying for housing, 3.1% 
increase in the prevalence of problems paying for bills and a 4.5% increase in the prevalence 
of problems paying for council tax (amongst unemployed individuals and their households, 
relative to those not unemployed). No significant UC intervention effect was found with 
regards to the prevalence of self-reported difficulties managing financially. This analysis had 
a range of limitations which mean that causality could not be confidently drawn from the 
findings of Chapter 8 alone. 
Secondly, with regards to the impact of UC rollout on rent arrears (second stage of 
insecurity), this was examined in the fixed effects panel analysis of Chapter 6. The results 
suggest that UC rollout in England has led to an increase in demand for advice from Citizens 
Advice on rent arrears related issues. Specifically, the results suggest that ‘Full Service’ 
rollout, on average, led to an increase of 2.97 rent arrears advice issues within English local 
authorities (per 10,000 rented dwellings) by 2019 Q1. This corresponds to an 11% increase 
on rates in the pre ‘Full Service’ period. The impact tended to be greater when it had been 
rolled out for longer and thus reached more claimants. Where it had been rolled out for 6+ 
quarters, ‘Full Service’ led to an increase of 4.84 rent arrears advice issues (per 10,000 rented 
dwellings), i.e. an 18% increase on pre rollout rates. Importantly, disaggregating the advice 
data by housing tenure suggested that this detrimental impact of UC rollout on rent arrears 
advice rates was greater in the social rented sector than it was in the private rented sector. 
The internal validity of these research findings was strengthened by its use of a falsification 
test, whereby the main analysis was repeated using the mortgage arrears advice rate as a non-
equivalent outcome variable.  
Thirdly, in terms of UC’s impact on landlord repossession actions (the third stage of 
insecurity), the results of the fixed effects panel analysis in Chapter 5 suggest that UC ‘Full 
Service’ rollout, on average, had no significant impact on bailiff repossessions but did lead 
to an increase of 1.74 landlord repossession claims, 1.42 landlord repossession orders and 
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0.70 landlord repossession warrants within English local authorities by 2019 Q1 (all figures 
are rates per 10,000 rented dwellings). To put these figures into context, this corresponds to 
a 4-5% increase on rates in the pre-UC ‘Full Service’ period. The results here also suggested 
that the impact of UC ‘Full Service’ on repossession rates tended to increase when it had 
been rolled out for longer and thus reached more claimants. Where it had been rolled out for 
12+ months, ‘Full Service’ led to an increase of 2.60 landlord repossession claims, 2.89 
landlord repossession orders and 1.09 landlord repossession warrants (again, all per 10,000 
rented dwellings). This corresponds to a 6-10% increase on rates in the pre-UC ‘Full Service’ 
period. As with the above findings regarding rent arrears, the internal validity of these 
research findings was also strengthened through its use of a falsification test, whereby 
repeating the analysis using mortgage repossession rates as non-equivalent outcome 
variables.  
Fourth and finally, the impact of UC rollout on threatened/actual homelessness (the fourth 
stage of insecurity) was investigated in both Chapter 6’s fixed effects panel analysis of 
Citizens Advice data on homelessness issues in England and Chapter 7’s fixed-effects panel 
analysis of ‘Housing Options’ approaches and homelessness claims in Scotland. Chapter 7’s 
results suggest that UC rollout in Scotland was associated with an increase in rates of 
Housing Options approaches, but that its relationship with rates of statutory homelessness 
claims was less clear. To be specific, ‘Full Service’ rollout was associated with an increase 
of 1.32 Housing Options approaches (per 10,000 households) within Scottish local 
authorities by March 2019 (corresponding to an 8.1% increase on rates in the pre-‘Full 
Service’ period). This relationship was stronger where ‘Full Service’ had been rolled out for 
longer, with an increase of 6.65 approaches (again, per 10,000 households) where it had been 
rolled out for 13+ months (corresponding to a 22.5% increase on pre rollout rates). Whilst 
‘Full Service’ was associated with a small increase in homelessness claim rates (specifically 
from claims where the applicant had been “asked to leave” their previous accommodation – 
most likely their family home), this relationship was less clear as it did not significantly 
strengthen the longer ‘Full Service’ had been rolled out. Chapter 6 found no significant 
relationship between UC rollout and rates of people approaching Citizens Advice with 
homelessness related issues in England.   
When taken together, the empirical analysis of Chapters 5-8 provides strong insight into the 
detrimental impact of UC rollout on housing insecurity. Each separate piece of analysis (i.e. 
each empirical chapter) is individually robust. However, when they are considered together 
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the fact that they show consistently negative housing insecurity impacts across a range of 
data sources makes this thesis a form of “meta-analysis”, which improves causal inference 
(see Weed, 2000). Moreover, the findings in general, also suggest that UC has adversely 
impacted more clearly on earlier stages of insecurity because (as discussed above) there was 
no evidence found of a clear link between UC rollout and actual homelessness. This is logical 
given that earlier stages of insecurity occur more quickly and there are fewer protective 
barriers against rent arrears/repossession actions than there are against the most extreme 
form of insecurity, homelessness. 
 
9.2.3 Research in Context: How Findings Contribute to Existing 
Literature on Universal Credit’s Housing Insecurity Impacts 
 
Chapter 3 provided a full review of existing literature on UC’s impacts on housing 
insecurity (and indeed its wider impacts on outcomes such as employment, mental 
health and wellbeing, incomes and debt, and food bank usage). Importantly, it set out 
how the DWP have tended to have a single-minded focus on employment outcomes, and 
have conducted their own research into UC’s labour market impacts (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2017a; Department for Work and Pensions, 2018b) but not on its 
wider impacts like housing insecurity. They have been criticised for this by the National 
Audit Office (2018) and by the United Nations special rapporteur on extreme poverty 
and human rights (Alston, 2018).  
Outside of the government’s own analysis, research that has been conducted on the 
housing insecurity impacts of UC rollout have tended to be qualitative studies or 
quantitative studies that were limited to specific localities.  For example, qualitative 
studies have highlighted household financial problems during UC’s long wait periods, 
leading to rent arrears (and in some instances repossession actions) amongst claimants 
who did not have adequate savings or the means to receive financial support from friends 
or family (Britain Thinks, 2018; Bush, Templer, Allen et al., 2019; Cheetham M, 
Moffatt S, Addison M et al., 2019; Robertson, Wright and Stewart, 2020). Meanwhile, 
other qualitative studies have highlighted how UC’s conditionality regime has led to 
rent arrears and/or repossession actions for some claimants (Batty, 2018; Wright, Dwyer, 
Jones et al., 2018). This is because claimants cut back on housing costs when their 
benefit payments are reduced by sanctions (see Beatty, Foden, McCarthy et al., 2015, 
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pp. 35-36). In terms of quantitative research, small scale studies of social housing 
tenants in specific localities have found increased prevalence of rent arrears for UC 
claimants compared to Housing Benefit claimants (Smith Institute, 2017), and also that 
rent arrears are triggered by the introduction of the direct payment system (Hickman, 
Kemp, Reeve et al., 2017). 
The research conducted in this thesis makes an important contribution to this existing 
knowledge of UC’s housing insecurity impacts. It backs up these findings of existing 
studies by providing strong evidence of the causal impacts of UC on housing insecurity. 
It also builds on some of the key limitations of the few existing quantitative studies on 
UC’s housing insecurity impacts by using more national level data (from multiple 
administrative/survey data sources) and by applying causal modelling (fixed effects 
panel modelling, falsification tests, difference-in-differences analysis) to provide more 
robust empirical evidence that is qualitatively different to existing studies and is 
consistent across a diverse range of data sources. In particular, the key strength of the 
analysis was that it was able to exploit variation in exposure to UC – arising from cross-
area variation in the timing of its rollout across local authorities – in order to examine 
its impacts. Whilst the analysis in each of the four empirical chapters had a set of 
limitations (discussed in detail at the end of each chapter) they overall, and taken 
together with existing empirical literature, provide evidence of a clear link between UC 
rollout and housing insecurity.    
 
9.3 Implications of Research Findings 
 
This thesis’s research findings of increased housing insecurity arising from UC have 
wide-ranging implications. This includes implications for UC claimants, for landlords 
renting property to UC claimants, and for UC as a policy going forward. 
 
9.3.1 Implications for Universal Credit Claimants 
 
As set out in Chapter 3, housing is one of the key social, economic and environmental 
conditions that influences people’s health and wellbeing (Braubach, 2011), contributing 
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to physical health by providing a physical place to dwell and social wellbeing by 
providing a sense of identity, worth, security and constancy (Preece and Bimpson, 2019). 
Therefore, this thesis’s research finding of increased housing insecurity arising from 
UC has implications for UC claimants, with various harms potentially arising from 
housing insecurity, whether that is through being in financial difficulty/debt, threat of 
eviction or uncertainty about ability to meet rent payments.  
Firstly, UC claimants who are facing rent arrears and/or repossession actions from their 
landlord may be forced to cut back spending on other essential costs, e.g. food or heating, 
in order to pay off the arrears and avoid losing their home through actual eviction . This 
may be a contributing factor to the rise in demand for food banks following UC rollout 
(Thompson, Jitendra and Rabindrakumar, 2019; Trussell Trust, 2019; Reeves and 
Loopstra, 2020), which was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, reduced security of housing for UC claimants has implications for their 
mental health, given that housing security is a known determinant of mental health. 
Previous research has highlighted how reduced security or affordability of housing is 
associated with adverse impacts on psychological wellbeing over and above that caused 
by the financial hardship alone (For example, see Nettleton and Burrows, 1998; Taylor, 
Pevalin and Todd, 2007), and this relationship has been shown to be causal in the context 
of previous welfare reforms to cut Housing Benefit under the UK’s legacy benefits 
system (Reeves, Clair, McKee et al., 2016). In the short-term, this arises most directly 
through the stress and anxiety caused by fear of losing your home, and this issue has 
been highlighted by qualitative studies with UC claimants (Wright, Dwyer, Jones et al., 
2018; Robertson, Wright and Stewart, 2020). More broadly, in the longer term, and as 
discussed in Chapter 3, having a secure home provides a base from which to engage in 
society through holding down work and building social networks and social connections 
(Bailey, Besemer, Bramley et al., 2015). This is threatened by housing insecurity, and 
social connections will be disrupted (for both householders and their children) if 
evictions or unaffordability lead to frequent moves. Therefore, UC’s adverse housing 
insecurity impacts can have wide-ranging implications for mental health, and as 
discussed in Chapter 3, research has already highlighted that the prevalence of 
psychological distress has increased as UC has rolled out (Wickham, Bentley, Rose et 
al., 2020).       
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9.3.2 Implications for Landlords 
 
In terms of implications for landlords, the build-up of rent arrears and subsequent 
repossession actions will likely negatively impact upon the incomes of landlords due to the 
income they lose through unpaid rent (and its associated other costs) along with the legal 
costs associated with evicting a tenant. This may also lead to landlords reducing services and 
cutting back on maintenance costs (thus leading to poorer standards of housing) in order to 
recoup their losses accrued from rent arrears or repossession actions.   
For the social rented sector, it is clear that the shift from payment of housing costs to 
landlords under Housing Benefit to the direct payment system under UC increases the scope 
for rent arrears despite Alternative Payment Arrangements and UC ‘Scottish Choices’ being 
in place in attempt to mitigate this. One of the reasons for this is that there is economic logic 
in housing association tenants not paying some or all of their rent (and prioritising other 
costs) when experiencing a financial emergency because interest is not charged on rent 
arrears (Hickman, Pattison and Preece, 2018, p. 12). This is likely to reduce the income 
streams of housing associations, as not only do they lose income from unpaid rent, but they 
also need to invest more money in resources for rent collection and personalised tenant 
support (Ibid, pp. 33-39). Consequently, Hickman, Pattison and Preece (2018) note that the 
impact of UC is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the finances of housing 
associations, and ultimately may threaten the financial viability of some associations that are 
smaller and not well placed to manage UC’s impacts on their cashflow.  
UC’s housing insecurity impacts also have implications for the incomes of private landlords. 
In particular, UC tenants going into rent arrears can place considerable financial risk onto 
private residential landlords. This issue has been highlighted by research by Simcock (2018), 
whose survey of 2,234 private landlords across the UK found that 61% of landlords who let 
to UC claimants had lost income due to tenants going into arrears, with these landlords on 
average being owed £2,390.19 and thus potentially putting both tenants and landlords in a 
dangerous financial situation.  
As a result of all these problems with UC and housing insecurity, a broader implication is 
that landlords will become increasingly unwilling to let their property to tenants who are on 
UC due to fears they will be unable to pay their rent. In the social rented sector, there is 
evidence that social landlords are increasingly needing to use affordability assessments in 
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order to determine prospective tenant’s ability to meet rental costs (Preece, Hickman and 
Pattison, 2019). UC and other welfare reforms have contributed to this, and potentially 
increase the potential for exclusion from affordable housing on the grounds of ability to pay 
(Ibid). Hickman, Pattison and Preece (2018, pp. 12-13) note that when housing associations 
do exclude households based on their ability to pay (e.g. households with poor ‘credit’ 
history), this raises concerns over who will house these households and whether alternative 
housing providers will have the capacity to do so. Moreover, in the private rented sector, 
there is evidence that, aware of all of UC’s issues, some landlords are now discriminating 
against all UC claimants by refusing to let their property to anyone who is in receipt of UC. 
For example, the aforementioned survey of private landlords by Simcock (2018) found that 
62% of landlords were unwilling to let to those who were on UC, and this is backed up by 
another survey by the National Landlords Association (2017).      
 
9.3.3 Implications for Universal Credit as a Policy 
 
 The research findings of this thesis have several implications for UC as a policy. It is 
important to note that the empirical analysis of this thesis used data up to early 2019, 
meaning that it covers a time period that was still relatively early in the overall rollout 
of UC. Merging six different working-age and means-tested benefits – which were 
administered separately by three different government departments (DWP, HMRC and 
local authorities) – into a single benefit payment administered by the DWP was a 
significant administrative challenge. As such, ‘teething problems’ were to be expected. 
However, the research findings of this thesis suggest a significant impact on housing 
insecurity that it likely to be the result of systematic flaws with UC as a policy rather 
than merely due to teething issues and administrative errors.  
Despite widespread criticism of UC over its potential impacts on the ability of claimants 
to meet rent payments, the government have tended to argue that safeguards such as 
Alternative Payment Arrangements and advance payments are in place to prevent such 
insecurity (e.g. see HC Debate 29 October 2018 cW), and that “the best way to help 
people pay their rent is to help them into work” (The Independent, 2018). The analysis 
of this thesis has focussed on the overall impact of UC rollout by examining the timing 
of its rollout within local authorities. This means that it isn’t possible from the analysis 
to disentangle the impact of UC’s different design features on housing insecurity, or the 
impact of safeguards such as advance payments or Alternative Payment Arrangements. 
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However, by considering the research findings of this thesis alongside the findings of 
existing qualitative studies which have examined the impacts of specific design features, 
it is possible to identify which aspects of UC have been most detrimental and should be 
reformed. 
Firstly, it is likely that UC’s long wait periods (typically 5 weeks) between a claimant 
initially making a claim and receiving their first payment has contributed to the observed 
impact on housing insecurity. This is because the wait period can leave claimants  with 
little or no income with which to meet rent payments (as highlighted by qualitative 
studies such as Britain Thinks, 2018; Cheetham, Moffatt and Addison, 2018). The UC 
advance payments safeguard can mitigate this issue to some extent in the short-term. 
However, these are effectively just interest free loans and need to be paid back via 
deductions on future UC payments. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 3, and pointed 
out by Thompson, Jitendra and Rabindrakumar (2019, p. 33), they effectively leave 
claimants with a choice between “hardship now or hardship later” . Consequently, in 
order to protect claimants from housing insecurity there is clearly a need to end the 5-
week wait period under UC entirely. This could be done by making UC advance 
payments non-repayable, or, as recommended by the House of Lords Economic Affairs 
Committee (2020), by introducing a non-repayable two-week initial grant for all UC 
claimants. This would provide some extra security for claimants and alleviate the 
problem of claimants falling into arrears whilst waiting for their first full UC payment.  
Secondly, it is likely that UC’s extended and intensified conditionality regime, which 
was set out in Chapter 2 and has been described as establishing a new “ubiquitous 
conditionality” (Dwyer and Wright, 2014), has also contributed to the observed impact 
on housing insecurity. This is because, by reducing claimants incomes, sanctions can 
lead to people cutting back on housing costs and thus falling into arrears (Beatty, Foden, 
McCarthy et al., 2015), and qualitative research with UC claimants has highlighted how 
its sanctions regime has led to some claimants (including those were in work) being 
placed at risk of losing their homes due to rent arrears (Wright, Dwyer, Jones et al., 
2018, p. 10). Consequently, there is a need to reduce the severity of sanctions in a way 
that ensures claimants are not placed at risk of rent arrears and eviction (and that other 
essential costs e.g. food, heating etc. can also be met). Emerging evidence suggests that 
the temporary suspension of conditionality (amongst other forms of support) during the 
COVID-19 pandemic led to claimants – particularly those who were furthest away from 
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labour market and those with complex needs – finding it easier to manage financially 
under UC (Edmiston, Robertshaw, Gibbons et al., 2021). This further motivates the need 
to reform UC’s use of conditionality in the long-term. 
Thirdly, UC’s default system of monthly direct payments is also likely to have 
contributed to the observed impacts on housing insecurity. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
this system can have implications for claimants ability to meet rent payments as it can 
lead to missed payments amongst those who lack budgeting skills (particularly amongst 
young people - see Homeless Link, 2018) or those who experience a financial 
emergency and who prioritise other essential costs over rent (as discussed above in 
section 9.3.2 this can be particularly problematic in the social rented sector as interest 
is not paid on rent arrears and hence other costs that interest are paid on will be 
prioritised in the first instance). There is some evidence that Alternative Payment 
Arrangements (APAs) (e.g. managed payment of housing costs to landlords or more 
frequent UC payments) have helped mitigate this issue, at least in certain localities 
(Smith Institute, 2019). However, other research suggests that there is a lack of 
awareness of APAs amongst some claimants (Hobson, Spoor and Kearton, 2019). 
Therefore, going forward there is a need to ensure all claimants are aware of the option 
of APAs (as is already the case in Scotland where “Scottish Choices” are given to  all 
claimants automatically). Greater take-up of APAs amongst those who need them is 
likely to help reduce rent arrears and repossession actions.  
Finally, another important factor that will determine the housing security of UC 
claimants is the actual value of UC payments (not just in terms of the amount households 
receive specifically towards housing costs but also the amount of the standard 
allowance). As discussed in Chapter 3, the initial extent to which UC rollout effected 
the incomes of claimants compared to the legacy system depended on their household’s 
circumstances, although importantly, analysis by Brewer, Joyce, Waters et al. (2019) 
had suggested that whilst there were many winners and losers it was the poorest 
households who were most likely to lose out from the switch to UC. However, in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the UC standard allowance was uplifted by £20 
per week, or £1,040 per year. This uplift effectively reversed three decades of benefit 
retrenchment (i.e. the three decades of benefit retrenchment outlined in Chapter 2) 
(Brewer and Gardiner, 2020). Early research by Summers, Scullion, Baumberg Geiger 
et al. (2021) suggests that the £20 UC uplift has helped claimants, but that even with 
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the uplift the value of UC was still inadequate, with many claimants still experiencing 
financial difficulties and falling behind with their housing costs. At the time of writing, 
the £20 UC uplift is due to end in September 2021. In order to protect the housing 
security of claimants, there is a need to not just make this uplift permanent, but also to 
increase it further. 
 
9.4 Future Research  
  
The empirical analysis of this thesis examined the impacts of Universal Credit rollout 
up to early 2019. The fixed effects panel analyses conducted in Chapters 5-7 all used 
data up to March 2019, whilst the difference-in-differences analysis of Chapter 8 used 
data up to wave 9 of UKHLS, which was collected from 2017-2019. By this point, UC 
was still in the relatively early stages of its rollout – there were around 1.8 million 
people on UC (UK-wide) by March 2019 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2021b), 
and this was initially expected to rise to 7 million by the time UC was fully rolled out, 
i.e. by the time the ‘managed migration’ process had transferred those still on legacy 
benefits over to UC. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a huge surge in the 
number of UC claims (see Brewer and Handscomb, 2020, p. 18), and as of February 
2021 there were already over 6 million claimants (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2021b), whilst the ‘managed migration’ process had been delayed. As already touched 
on, the COVID-19 pandemic has also led to some important temporary changes to policy 
in relation to UC and housing insecurity, such as uplifting the UC standard allowance 
by £20 per week, increasing the UC housing element (at least in some areas) by re-
linking Local Housing Allowance to 30% of market rents in the local area, suspending 
conditionality and suspending evictions. Going forwards, it is important that both 
qualitative and quantitative research continue to investigate the impacts of UC on 
housing insecurity as its rollout continues, and in particular to assess what the impacts 
have been/what lessons can be learned from changes to UC over time and policies 
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Appendix 1: Timing of UC ‘Live Service’ and ‘Full 
Service’ Rollout in English Local Authorities 
 
Local Authorities ‘Live Service’ rollout ‘Full Service’ rollout 
   
North East   
   
1. County Durham September 2015  October 2017 (2 JCPs) 
December 2017 (4 JCPs) 
June 2018 (4 JCPs)  
2. North Tyneside November 2015  May 2018  
3. South Tyneside February 2016  May 2018  
4. Sunderland November 2015  July 2018  
5. Darlington November 2015  June 2018  
6. Hartlepool February 2015  December 2016  
7. Middlesbrough February 2016  October 2018  
8. Northumberland February 2016  November-December 
2018  
9. Redcar and Cleveland March 2016  November 2018 
10. Stockton-on-Tees December 2015  July 2018  
11. Gateshead June 2015  October-November 2017  
12. Newcastle Upon Tyne April 2015  May 2016 (1 JCP) 
February 2017 (1 JCP) 
March 2017 (1 JCP) 
   
North West   
   
13. Blackburn with Darwen December 2014  February 2018  
14. Blackpool December 2014  December 2018  
15. Cheshire East August 2014  July 2017 (1 JCP) 
July 2018 (2 JCPs) 
16. Cheshire West and 
Chester 
August 2014 July 2017 (1 JCP) 
November 2017 (1 JCP) 
December 2017 (3 JCPs) 
17. Halton December 2014 July 2016  
18. Warrington July 2013 February 2017  
19. Allerdale December 2014 November 2016  
20. Barrow-in-Furness December 2014 December 2018  
21. Carlisle December 2014 July 2018  
22. Copeland December 2014 November 2016  
23. Eden January 2015 July 2018  
24. South Lakeland December 2014 September 2018  
25. Bolton June 2014 November 2018  
26. Bury July 2014 July 2018  
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27. Manchester October 2014 October 2017  
November 2017  
July 2018  
28. Oldham August 2013 April 2017  
29. Rochdale September 2014 May 2018  
30. Salford July 2014 September 2018  
31. Stockport December 2014 November 2018  
32. Tameside April 2013 March 2018  
33. Trafford July 2014 July 2017  
34. Wigan July 2013 April 2018  
35. Burnley October 2014 May 2017  
36. Chorley November 2014 July 2018  
37. Fylde December 2014 December 2018  
38. Hyndburn November 2014 February 2018  
39. Lancaster December 2014 July 2016  
40. Pendle October 2014 November 2018 
41. Preston August 2014 July 2018  
42. Ribble Valley December 2014 November 2018 
43. Rossendale November 2014 November 2018  
44. South Ribble August 2014 July 2018  
45. West Lancashire September 2014 December 2017  
46. Wyre November 2014 December 2018  
47. Knowsley August 2014 May 2018 (2 JCPs) 
September 2018 (2 JCPs) 
48. Liverpool October 2014 September 2018 (2 JCPs) 
November 2018 (2 JCPs) 
December 2018 (2 JCPs) 
49. Sefton July 2014 October 2017  
50. St. Helens July 2014 July 2018  
51. Wirral July 2014 November 2017  
   
Yorkshire and the Humber   
   
52. East Riding of 
Yorkshire 
January 2016 July 2018  
53. Kingston upon Hull, 
City of 
February 2016 December 2018  
54. North East Lincolnshire June 2015 December 2017  
55. North Lincolnshire June 2015 October 2017  
56. York February 2015 July 2017  
57. Craven February 2015 October 2016  
58. Hambleton February 2015 October 2016  
59. Harrogate February 2014 June 2016  
60. Richmondshire May 2015 June 2016 
61. Ryedale February 2015 June 2016  
62. Scarborough November 2015 May 2018  
63. Selby November 2015 May 2018  
64. Barnsley March 2015 July 2017  
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65. Doncaster September 2015 October 2017  
66. Rotherham December 2015 July 2018  
67. Sheffield January 2016 November-December 
2018  
68. Bradford November 2015 June 2018  
69. Calderdale April 2015 June 2017  
70. Kirklees June 2015 November 2017  
71. Leeds February 2016 October 2018  
72. Wakefield April 2016 November 2018  
   
East Midlands   
   
73. Daventry  February 2015 November 2016  
74. East Northamptonshire October 2015 May 2018  
75. Kettering June 2015 October 2018  
76. Northampton November 2015 November 2018  
77. South 
Northamptonshire 
November 2015 November 2018 
78. Wellingborough September 2015 November 2018  
79. Ashfield June 2015 November 2018  
80. Bassetlaw February 2015 December 2017  
81. Broxtowe November 2015 November 2018  
82. Gedling June 2015 November 2018  
83. Mansfield October 2015 September 2018  
84. Newark and Sherwood October 2015 May 2018  
85. Rushcliffe February 2016 October 2018  
86. Derby January 2016 July 2018  
87. Leicester January 2016 June 2018  
88. Nottingham February 2016 October 2018  
89. Rutland October 2015 October 2017  
90. Amber Valley October 2015 June 2018  
91. Bolsover November 2015 November 2018  
92. Chesterfield March 2015 November 2017  
93. Derbyshire Dales November 2015 September 2018  
94. Erewash February 2015 May 2017 
95. High Peak June 2015 September 2018  
96. North East Derbyshire November 2015 July 2018  
97. South Derbyshire October 2015 November 2018  
98. Blaby January 2016 June 2018  
99. Charnwood June 2015 July 2018  
100. Harborough February 2015 November 2016  
101. Hinckley and 
Bosworth 
March 2015 March 2017  
102. Melton February 2015 November 2016  
103. North West 
Leicestershire 
September 2015 February 2018 
104. Oadby and 
Wigston 
January 2016 June 2018  
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105. Boston April 2015 September 2018  
106. East Lindsey November 2015 June 2018 (1 JCP) 
September 2018 (1 JCP) 
107. Lincoln November 2015 March 2018  
108. North Kesteven November 2015 November 2018  
109. South Holland November 2015 July 2018  
110. South Kesteven March 2015 October 2017 
111. West Lindsey November 2015 September 2018  
112. Corby March 2015 February 2017  
   
West Midlands   
   
113. Herefordshire, 
County of 
March 2015 June 2018  
114. Shropshire April 2015 May 2018  
115. Stoke-on-Trent February 2016 June 2018  
116. Telford and 
Wrekin 
June 2015 November 2018  
117. Cannock Chase December 2015 November 2018  
118. East 
Staffordshire 
April 2015 November 2018  
119. Lichfield March 2015 November 2017  
120. Newcastle-
under-Lyme 
April 2015 December 2018  
121. South 
Staffordshire 
December 2015 November 2018  
122. Stafford October 2015 November 2018  
123. Staffordshire 
Moorlands  
June 2015 September 2018  
124. Tamworth March 2015 November 2017  
125. North 
Warwickshire 
October 2015 September 2018  
126. Nuneaton and 
Bedworth 
June 2015 October 2017  
127. Rugby February 2015 May 2016  
128. Stratford-on-
Avon 
February 2015 December 2016  
129. Warwick October 2015 October 2018  
130. Birmingham April 2015 November-December 
2017  
131. Coventry December 2015 July 2017  
132. Dudley April 2015  July 2017 
133. Sandwell November 2015 November 2018  
134. Solihull May 2015 July 2017  
135. Walsall June 2015 July 2018 (2 JCPs) 
October 2018 (2 JCPs) 
136. Wolverhampton February 2016 December 2017  
137. Bromsgrove October 2015 September 2018  
138. Malvern Hills October 2015 September 2018  
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139. Redditch February 2015 October 2017  
140. Worcester October 2015 October 2018  
141. Wychavon October 2015 November 2018  
142. Wyre Forest October 2015 November 2018  
   
East of England   
   
143. Bedford March 2015 May 2017 
144. Central 
Bedfordshire 
February 2016 November 2018  
145. Luton February 2016 October 2018  
146. Peterborough December 2015 November 2017  
147. Southend-on-
Sea 
April 2015 July 2017  
148. Thurrock March 2015 October 2017  
149. Cambridge February 2016 September 2018 (1 JCP) 
October 2018 (1 JCP) 
150. East 
Cambridgeshire 
February 2016 September 2018  
151. Fenland March 2016 September 2018  
152. Huntingdonshire February 2016 October 2018  
153. South 
Cambridgeshire 
February 2016 October 2018  
154. Basildon March 2015 November 2017  
155. Braintree October 2015 October 2017  
156. Brentwood March 2015 November 2017 
157. Castle Point May 2015 July 2018  
158. Chelmsford September 2015 December 2018  
159. Colchester March 2015 July 2018  
160. Epping Forest February 2016 December 2018  
161. Harlow February 2016 July 2017  
162. Maldon September 2015 December 2018  
163. Rochford February 2016 July 2018 
164. Tendring April 2015 Tendrong 2  
165. Uttlesford October 2015 October 2017  
166. Broxbourne June 2015 November 2017  
167. Dacorum September 2015 December 2018  
168. East 
Hertfordhsire 
February 2016 October 2018  
169. Hertsmere September 2015 December 2018  
170. North 
Hertfordshire 
February 2016 October 2018  
171. St Albans May 2015 November 2017  
172. Stevenage February 2016 October 2018  
173. Three Rivers November 2015 December 2017  
174. Watford November 2015 December 2017  
175. Welwyn 
Hatfield 
September 2015 December 2017  
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176. Breckland April 2015 June 2018 (1 JCP) 
September 2018 (1 JCP) 
177. Broadland December 2015 October 2018  
178. Great Yarmouth March 2016 April 2016  
179. King’s Lynn 
and West Norfolk  
March 2016 November 2018  
180. North Norfolk September 2015 October 2018 (1 JCP) 
December 2018 (2 JCP 
181. Norwich December 2015 October 2018  
182. South Norfolk November 2015 May 2018  
183. Babergh September 2015 October 2017  
184. Forest Heath April 2015 December 2018  
185. Ipswich November 2015 April 2018  
186. Mid Suffolk September 2015 May 2018  
187. St Edmundsbury April 2015 October 2017  
188. Suffolk Coastal April 2015 October 2018  
189. Waveney March 2015 May 2016 (1 JCP) 
October 2017 (1 JCP) 
   
London   
   
190. Camden March 2016 December 2018  
191. City of London March 2015 March 2017  
192. Hackney March 2016 October 2018  
193. Hammersmith 
and Fulham 
February 2015 June 2016 (1 JCP) 
November 2016 (1 JCP) 
December 2016 (1 JCP) 
194. Haringey March 2016 October 2018  
195. Islington November 2015 June 2018  
196. Kensington and 
Chelsea 
November 2015 December 2018  
197. Lambeth February 2016 October 2016 (1 JCP) 
December 2017 (2 JCPs) 
February 2018 (2 JCPs) 
198. Lewisham February 2016 July 2018  
199. Newham February 2016 July 2018  
200. Southwark November 2015 November 2015 (1 JCP) 
April 2016 (1 JCP) 
October 2016 (1 JCP) 
November 2016 (1 JCP) 
201. Tower Hamlets March 2015 March 2017  
202. Wandsworth April 2015 September 2018  
203. Westminster November 2015 June 2018  
204. Barking and 
Dagenham 
July 2015 March 2018  
205. Barnet March 2015 May 2018  
206. Bexley February 2016 October 2018 
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207. Brent March 2015 November-December 
2018  
208. Bromley January 2016 July 2018  
209. Croydon July 2015 November 2015 (1 JCP) 
April 2016 (2 JCP) 
210. Ealing July 2015 March 2018 
211. Enfield July 2015 November 2017 (1 JCP) 
March 2018 (1 JCP) 
May 2018 (1 JCP) 
212. Greenwich January 2016 October 2018  
213. Harrow October 2015 July 2018  
214. Havering February 2016 June 2018  
215. Hillingdon November 2015 October 2018  
216. Hounslow April 2015 January 2016  
217. Kingston upon 
Thames 
November 2015 June 2018  
218. Merton January 2016 December 2017  
219. Redbridge February 2016 June 2018  
220. Richmond upon 
Thames 
November 2015 June 2018  
221. Sutton February 2015 December 2015  
222. Waltham Forest May 2015 May 2018 
   
South East   
   
223. Bracknell Forest  September 2015 May 2018  
224. Brighton and 
Hove 
December 2015 October-November 2017  
225. Isle of Wight December 2015 June 2018 (1 JCP) 
October 2018 (1 JCP) 
226. Medway October 2015 May 2018 
227. Milton Keynes November 2015 December 2018  
228. Portsmouth March 2016 September 2018  
229. Reading September 2015 December 2017  
230. Slough September 2015 April 2018  
231. Southampton March 2015 February 2017 
232. West Berkshire July 2015 December 2017  
233. Windsor and 
Maidenhead 
September 2015 May 2018  
234. Wokingham September 2015 December 2017 (1 JCP) 
May 2018 (1 JCP) 
235. Aylesbury Vale November 2015 September 2018  
236. Chiltern November 2015 September 2018  
237. South Bucks November 2015 April 2018 (1 JCP) 
September 2018 (1 JCP) 
October 2018 (1 JCP) 
238. Wycombe November 2015 September 2018  
239. Eastbourne June 2015 October 2017 
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240. Hastings April 2015 December 2016  
241. Lewes June 2015 September 2018  
242. Rother April 2015 July 2017  
243. Wealden June 2015 October 2017  
244. Basingstoke and 
Deane 
March 2016 May 2018  
245. East Hampshire February 2016 October 2018  
246. Eastleigh May 2015 July 2017  
247. Fareham March 2016 November 2018  
248. Gosport March 2016 November 2018  
249. Hart February 2016 October 2018  
250. Havant March 2016 September 2018 (2 JCPs) 
November 2018 (1 JCP) 
251. New Forest December 2015 June 2018 (1 JCP) 
September 2018 (2 JCPs) 
252. Rushmoor February 2016 October 2018  
253. Test Valley September 2015 July 2018  
254. Winchester September 2015 July 2018  
255. Ashford April 2015 June 2018  
256. Canterbury January 2016 July 2018  
257. Dartford January 2016 July 2018  
258. Dover January 2016 May 2017  
259. Gravesham May 2015 May 2018  
260. Maidstone March 2015 November 2018  
261. Sevenoaks October 2015 May 2018 (1 JCP) 
July 2018 (1 JCP) 
262. Folkestone and 
Hythe 
January 2016 May 2018 (1 JCP) 
June 2018 (1 JCP) 
263. Swale March 2015 December 2017  
264. Thanet October 2015 July 2017 
265. Tonbridge and 
Malling 
October 2015 November 2018 
266. Tunbridge 
Wells 
October 2015 November 2018  
267. Cherwell May 2015 November 2017  
268. Oxford April 2015 October 2017  
269. South 
Oxfordshire 
April 2015 October 2017 (1 JCP) 
December 2017 (1 JCP) 
270. Vale of White 
Horse 
April 2015 October 2017  
271. West 
Oxfordshire 
April 2015 November 2017  
272. Elmbridge February 2016 November 2018  
273. Epsom and 
Ewell 
February 2016 November 2018  
274. Guildford February 2016 October 2018  
275. Mole Valley February 2016 October 2018  
276. Reigate and 
Banstead 
February 2016 October 2018  
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277. Runnymede February 2016 November 2018  
278. Spelthorne February 2016 November 2018  
279. Surrey Heath February 2016 November 2018  
280. Tandridge February 2016 October 2018  
281. Waverley February 2016 October 2018  
282. Woking February 2016 December 2017 (1 JCP) 
May 2018 (1 JCP) 
283. Adur October 2015 July 2018  
284. Arun October 2015 July 2018  
285. Chichester October 2015 July 2018  
286. Crawley September 2015 June 2018  
287. Horsham September 2015 June 2018  
288. Mid Sussex September 2015 June 2018  
289. Worthing October 2015 July 2018  
   
South West   
   
290. Bath and North 
East Somerset 
February 2014 May 2016 
291. Bournemouth June 2015 November 2017  
292. Bristol, City of November 2015 June 2018 (3 JCPs) 
September 2018 (2 JCPs) 
October 2018 (1 JCP) 
293. Cornwall May-July 2015 December 2017 (3 JCPs) 
May 2018 (4 JCPs) 
June 2018  
294. Isles of Scilly June 2015 June 2018  
295. North Somerset February 2015 June 2017 (1 JCP) 
July 2017 (1 JCP) 
296. Plymouth January 2016 October-November 2017 
297. Poole June 2015 October 2017  
298. South 
Gloucestershire 
January 2016 September 2018 (1 JCP) 
October 2018 (2 JCPs) 
299. Swindon February 2015 November-December 
2016  
300. Torbay January 2016 September 2018  
301. Wiltshire March 2015 May 2017 (1 JCP) 
June 2017 (1 JCP) 
July 2017 (2 JCPs) 
302. East Devon November 2015 July 2018  
303. Exeter November 2015 September 2018  
304. Mid Devon November 2015 July 2018  
305. North Devon  November 2015 July 2018  
306. South Hams November 2015 September 2018  
307. Teignbridge November 2015 September 2018  
308. Torridge November 2015 July 2018  
309. West Devon  November 2015 September 2018 (1 JCP) 
October 2018 (1 JCP) 
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310. Christchurch June 2015 November 2017  
311. East Dorset June 2015 October 2017  
312. North Dorset June 2015 October 2017  
313. Purbeck  June 2015 October 2017  
314. West Dorset  October 2015 December 2017 
315. Weymouth and 
Portland 
October 2015 December 2017  
316. Cheltenham June 2015 December 2017  
317. Cotswold May 2015 November 2017  
318. Forest of Dean May 2015 November 2017  
319. Gloucester June 2015 February 2018  
320. Stroud June 2015 October 2017  
321. Tewkesbury June 2015 December 2017  
322. Mendip March 2015 July 2016  
323. Sedgemoor March 2015 May 2016 
324. South Somerset April 2015 April 2017  
325. Taunton Deane April 2015 October 2016  
326. West Somerset April 2015 October 2016  
TABLE A1. Timing of Universal Credit Rollout in English Local Authorities. Notes: JCPs refer to Jobcentre 




Appendix 2: Timing of UC ‘Live Service’ and ‘Full 
Service’ Rollout in Scottish Local Authorities 
 
Local Authority ‘Live Service’ Go-Live 
Month 
‘Full Service’ Go-Live 
Month 
Aberdeen City November 2015 October 2018 
Aberdeenshire May 2015 June 2018 
Angus April 2016 November 2017 
Argyll and Bute March 2016 September 2018 
City of Edinburgh March 2015 October-November 2018 
Clackmannanshire May 2015 June 2017 
Dumfries and Galloway April 2015 May 2018 
Dundee City November 2015 November 2017 
East Ayrshire February 2016 October 2017 
East Dunbartonshire December 2015 November 2016 
East Lothian April 2015 March 2016 
East Renfrewshire February 2016 September 2018 
Falkirk May 2015 March 2018 
Fife April 2016 December 2017 
Glasgow City June 2015 September-December 2018 
Highland  November 2013 (Inverness) 
and February 2015 (Rest of 
Highland) 
June 2016 (Inverness) and 
July 2017 (Rest of 
Highland) 
Inverclyde October 2015 November 2016 
Midlothian April 2015 March 2017 
Moray November 2015 June 2018 
Na-h-Eileanan Siar May 2015 September 2018 
North Ayrshire April 2015 October 2017 
North Lanarkshire March 2015 April 2018 
Orkney May 2015 September 2018 
Perth and Kinross April 2016 June 2018 
Renfrewshire June 2015 September 2018 
Scottish Borders April 2015 June 2018 
Shetland Islands May 2015 September 2018 
South Ayrshire October 2015 February 2018 
South Lanarkshire October 2015 October 2017 
Stirling May 2015 June 2017 
West Dunbartonshire March 2015 November 2018 
West Lothian November 2015 May 2018 
TABLE A2. Timing of Universal Credit ‘Live Service’ and ‘Full Service’ Rollout in Scottish Local Authorities 
Sources: (UK Government, 2015a; UK Government, 2015b; UK Government, 2018) 
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Appendix 3: Timing of UC ‘Live Service’ and ‘Full 
Service’ Rollout in Welsh Local Authorities 
 
Local Authority ‘Live Service’ Go-Live 
Month 
‘Full Service’ Go-Live 
Month 
Blaenau Gwent October 2015 April 2018 
Bridgend June 2015 February 2018 
Caerphilly May 2015 May 2018 
Cardiff November 2015 February 2018 
Carmarthenshire October 2015 March 2018 
Ceredigion November 2015 May 2018 
Conwy May 2015 February 2018 
Denbighshire July 2015 February 2018 
Flintshire February 2015 April 2017 
Gwynedd October 2015 April 2018 
Isle of Anglesey September 2015 March 2018 
Merthyr Tydfil September 2015 March 2018 
Monmouthshire September 2015 March 2018 
Neath Port Talbot April 2015 October 2017 
Newport June 2015 November 2017 
Pembrokeshire November 2015 May 2018 
Powys October 2015 June 2018 
Rhondda Cynon Taf March 2016 July 2018 
Swansea July 2015 December 2017 
Torfaen April 2015 July 2017 
Vale of Glamorgan February 2016 June 2018 
Wrexham March 2015 October 2017 
TABLE A2. Timing of Universal Credit ‘Live Service’ and ‘Full Service’ Rollout in Welsh Local Authorities 




Appendix 4: Chapter 5 Falsification Test 
   
   
TABLE A4 Relationship Between UC Rollout and  . Notes: Models examine the relationship between UC 
Rollout and Mortgage Repossession Rates Within 323 English Local Authorities, 2012 Q1 – 2019 Q1. Notes: 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown in brackets under coefficients. All models include local authority and 
(quarterly) time fixed effects. N refers to the number of local authority quarters. Mortgage repossession 
warrants and bailiff repossessions are not considered as these take much longer to reach under the legal 
mortgage repossession process than under the landlord repossession process, meaning the two are not 
comparable. Mortgage repossession rates are per 10,000 owner occupied dwellings. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 






FIGURE A2.1. Quarterly trends in mean mortgage lender repossession rates in UC ‘Full Service’ 
versus non UC ‘Full Service’ local authorities, 2017-2018. Notes: The number of local authorities 
that were UCFS areas gradually increased over time as rollout progressed – 10 percent of local 
authorities were UCFS areas by 2017 Q1, increasing to 17 percent by 2017 Q3, 37 percent by 2018 
Q1, 65 percent by 2018 Q3 and 85 percent by 2018 Q4. 
 
 
FIGURE A2.2. Quarterly trends in mean mortgage lender repossession rates (relative to the average 
across local authorities) in English local authorities, before and after UC ‘Full Service’ rollout. Notes: 
only includes data on the 136 local authorities with repossessions data available to the fourth 
quarter or more post ‘Full Service’ rollout. ‘Full Service’ rollout is the first quarter in which UC ‘Full 
Service’ was available in most Jobcentres in the local authority for most of the quarter. Y axes give 
the mean of the ratio between mortgage lender repossession rates and the average across the 136 




Appendix 5: Chapter 6 Falsification Test 
 
 
TABLE A5. Relationship between UC rollout and rates of CAB advice given on mortgage arrears 
within 323 English local authorities, 2014 Q1 - 2019 Q1. Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors shown 
in brackets under coefficients. All models include local authority and (quarterly) time fixed effects. 
Mortgage arrears advice rate is per 10,000 owner occupied dwellings in the local authority. Median 
weekly wages includes both part-time and full-time work. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
